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Preface
This issue of the Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology contains thir-
teen papers that deal with diverse problems of network security, or various issues related to
wire and wireless communication networks including wireless sensor networks.
The first two papers are devoted to intrusion detection in computer networks. Damian
Jankowski and Marek Amanowicz in the paper Intrusion Detection in Software Defined Net-
works with Self-organized Maps consider the new opportunities enabled by the Software
Defined Network (SDN) architecture to implement security mechanisms in terms of unau-
thorized activities detection. They describe a novel approach to threat detection based on
the machine learning integrated with the SDN controller. The movement-assisted threat
detection system using mobility to enhance a global threat assessment in networks created
by resource-limited things is presented in the paper Intrusion Detection in Heterogeneous
Networks of Resource-Limited Things. Adam Kozakiewicz et al., describe the architecture of
the threat monitoring system for a wireless sensor network that provides a separate physical
secure channel to deliver collected information.
Mariusz Dzwonkowski and Roman Rykaczewski in the paper Quaternion Feistel Cipher
with an Infinite Key Space Based on Quaternion Julia Sets concentrate on the quaternion
encryption. The authors claim that the application of modular quaternion to perform rotations
of data sequences in 3D space to Feistel Cipher can bring an efficient encryption scheme.
The proposed encryption algorithm is described and compared with the AES method.
The next three papers deal with secure IP communication provision for the power system
management. The architecture and functionality of the cyber security system for a power
grid control are presented by Jacek Jarmakiewicz et al., in the paper Evaluation of the Cyber
Security Provision System for Critical Infrastructure. The results of the system verification
and validation in a testbed network are presented and discussed. Przemysław Malec et al., in
their paper Detecting Security Violations Based on Multilayered Event Log Processing start
with premise that correlating data from multiple event log sources increase the accuracy
of threat detection. The authors propose the multilayered event log analysis approach
for managing and handling security incidents. Kamil Kołtyś and Robert Gajewski in the
paper SHaPe: A Honeypot for Electric Power Substation describe the concept, architecture,
and implementation of the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) honeypot
supporting the IEC 61850 standard. The presented system is open source software publicly
available under GNU GPL.
Kazumasa Oida in the paper Uniqueness and Reproducibility of Traffic Signatures consid-
ers the feasibility of applying a traffic signature to the user machine identification. The
author describes the novel approach with the signature calculated from HTTP-based video
stream transmitted by the authentication server, and evaluates his proposal through numerous
experiments.
The problem of limitations of a mobile cloud network and possible fault events at clouds
are discussed by Jordi Mongay Batalla et al., in the paper On Providing Cloud-awareness to
Client’s DASH Application by Using DASH over HTTP/2. The concept and implementation
of the end-to-end framework for cloud congestion identification for DASH-capable video
application are presented. The performance of the system for cloud-aware and its applicability
to real clouds are discussed.
The applicability of the burst ratio parameter to multi-channel scenarios in transmission net-
works is discussed in the paper Analysis of Burst Ratio in Concatenated Channels. To con-
firm and demonstrate the validity of the burst ratio analysis Jakub Rachwalski and Zdzisław
Papir present the results of numerous simulation experiments performed with NS2 network
simulator.
The issue of coexistence of DVB-T and LTE communication systems operating in contiguous
UHF frequency bands is raised in the paper Measured Interference of LTE Uplink Signals
on DVB-T Channels. Massimo Celidonio et al., survey and investigate the potential LTE
influence on a DVB-T reception. The performance parameters that should be considered
for assessing the corresponding interfering effects, i.e. protection ratio and protection dis-
tance parameters are under consideration. The numerous measurements carried out at the
laboratory are analyzed.
The following two papers deal with various issues related to sensing systems. The paper The
Integration, Analysis and Visualization of Sensor Data from Dispersed Wireless Sensor Net-
work Systems using the SWE Framework is concentrated on integration and interoperability
of measurements gathered by various sensing devices. Yong Jin Lee et al., describe the ex-
tensions to the SWE (Sensor Web Enablement) framework to integrate disparate and disperse
wireless sensor networks and to support standardized access to sensor data. Furthermore,
the proposed software system introduces web-based data visualization and provides statistical
analysis services. The next issue considered is the detection of location of the radiation in
space to localize given data source. Youssef Khmou et al., in the paper Lorentzian Operator
for Angular Source Localization with Large Array propose a novel high resolution algo-
rithm utilizing the Lorentzian function for Direction of Arrival (DoA) of narrowband and far
field punctual estimation. The profitability of application of this algorithm is demonstrated
through simulation study.
The last paper is concerned with maintenance of lead-acid batteries to achieve a high reli-
ability of telecommunication services. Ryszard Kobus et al., in the paper Maintenance of
Lead-acid Batteries Used in Telecommunications Systems survey the primary types of bat-
teries used in telecommunication systems and describe the techniques for monitoring and
measuring their current capacity. The main attention is focused on an universal module for
charging/discharging batteries (TBA-A) that was developed by the authors. They claim that
the TBA-A module integrated with a control unit TBA-W creates a novel ATE device that
can be successfully used in power systems for remote telecommunication facilities.
We wish our Readers an interesting reading time.
Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz
Guest Editor
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Abstract—The Software Defined Network (SDN) architecture
provides new opportunities to implement security mechanisms
in terms of unauthorized activities detection. At the same
time, there are certain risks associated with this technol-
ogy. The presented approach covers a conception of the mea-
surement method, virtual testbed and classification mecha-
nism for SDNs. The paper presents a measurement method
which allows collecting network traffic flow parameters, gener-
ated by a virtual SDN environment. The collected dataset can
be used in machine learning methods to detect unauthorized
activities.
Keywords—IDS dataset, machine learning, metasploit, network
security, network simulation, open flow, virtualization.
1. Introduction
The Software Defined Networks (SDNs) allow to imple-
ment and control network functionality through software.
Such an approach allows to deploy new services and ap-
plications in a virtual environment and to share resources
with the performance and isolation from the rest of pro-
cesses [1]. However, with the flexibility and scalability
provided by SDNs, it is important to maintain an ade-
quate security level. The intrusion detection technologies,
integrated with the SDNs environment, can provide an addi-
tional security element, besides the classical Intrusion De-
tection System (IDS) and Intruder Prevention System (IPS).
SDN architecture creates new opportunities to increase the
security level, especially in the context of the unauthorized
activities detection. Nevertheless, there are certain risks
associated with this technology.
2. The Software Defined Network
Technology
The basic idea of the SDNs is the separation of data plane
from the control plane. In contrary to the classical network
solutions, the network devices are here supervised by SDN
controllers in a centralized manner. Such a solution enables
configuration and programming from a host to match the
service requirements in a distributed network. Moreover,
the centralized logic and management allows for compre-
hensive monitoring network [1].
SDNs are associated with Network Function Virtualization
(NFV). The current rapid development of hardware server
platforms gives sufficient performance of services operat-
ing on virtual machines. Servers became more efficient and
have better functionality than previously, and are suitable
for use in a virtual environment. NFV is a network archi-
tecture that implements virtualization of network nodes. It
enables for the functionality implementation based on the
available servers, switches, storage devices, without using
dedicated hardware devices. To sum up, the functionality
of network hardware devices can be implemented in soft-
ware technologies [2].
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Fig. 1. Packets forwarding scheme in SDNs.
The SDN controller communicates with network devices
using the OpenFlow protocol and controls network traffic
according to the programmed rules. The forwarding pack-
ets methods are defined in a flow table, which is stored in
SDN controllers and in switches memory supporting the
OpenFlow protocol. The operation order, which describes
how SDN controllers set the traffic flow, is presented in
Fig. 1. In the case, that packet is forwarded to the switch
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Fig. 2. Flow entry structure in SDNs.
and there is no entry in the flow table, the packet is trans-
mitted to the SDN controller. Applications and modules,
which run on controller, determine manner of packet pro-
cessing. After that, the controller transmits the new entry
in the flow table to the switch. That network traffic flow
is then defined and established using algorithms developed
on application modules in SDN controller. The structure
of the traffic flow is shown in Fig. 2.
The main flow element specifies the parameters that are
taken into consideration in the process of matching packets
to the flow. An action field defines a way of forwarding
that can be performed on packets from the particular flow.
In addition, flows are linked with specific network traffic
statistics, which latter can be used for traffic features ex-
traction [2].
Thanks to the open architecture, the network logic is estab-
lished with application modules running on the SDN con-
troller. Hence, it is possible to develop algorithms fulfilling
specific user functionality. Programmers can use classical
programming languages, frameworks, frameworks, APIs
and libraries for the process of developing application in
the SDN environment.
3. Vectors of Attacks in SDNs
The SDN architecture has an important impact on the class
of attack that can be performed, as presented in Fig. 3. The
most dangerous situation takes place when the SDN con-
troller is compromised. This can be done by the exploita-
tion of vulnerabilities of processes and services running
on the controller. Consequently the entire SDN domain is
compromised, and the attacker has the ability to take con-
trol of all network devices. The degree of vulnerability of
such attacks mainly depends on the hardware implemen-
tation of the SDN controller, programming languages and
libraries used. The threats prevention can utilize IDS and
IPS techniques, as well as methods of replication and re-
covery status of SDN servers from time before attack. Due
to the nature of SDN technologies, classical IDS may be
insufficient [3].
Potential security vulnerability may also exist on the admin-
istrative station, which is used to manage network operat-
ing system (SDN controller). Such terminals are used for
developing applications for the control logic of network de-
vices and ensure the monitoring of activities in the network
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Attacks
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Fig. 3. Potential vector of attacks in SDNs.
environment. Attackers could potentially exploit vulnera-
bility at the supervisor station or its connection with the
controller. Reducing the risk can be achieved by making
use of mutual SDN server authentication and the terminal
or IDS and/or IPS techniques [4].
Other threats are attacks on the communication stream be-
tween data and control plane. For instance, the security
protocol between controllers and network devices can be
TLS. A potential vector of attack would exploit vulnerabil-
ities in its implementation.
The classical network threats are still present in the SDN
technologies. It is possible to generate malicious activi-
ties in IT systems, for instance deny of services or exploit
vulnerabilities on servers, host or network devices [5].
4. Attacks Detection in SDNs
Despite the security vulnerabilities, SDN creates new op-
portunities for the implementation of more effective intru-
sion detection methods. Moreover, it allows for the inte-
gration of threat detection methods with the SDN environ-
ment. Due to the openness of platforms supporting SDN
technologies, it is possible to use existing mechanisms and
protocols. An important factor associated with intrusion de-
tection is the possibility of aggregating statistics logs from
network devices memory and forwarding them to the con-
troller. Collected parameters can be used as source data
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Table 1
Selected intrusion detection methods for SDNs
Approach
Principle of
Extraction of Machine learning
Detected attacks Accuracy
False
operation
attack symptoms method or logical
for dataset
Network traffic
[%]
positive
or features reasoning [%]
Method 1
Assessment of
Maximum entropy Benign – real SDN
the first packet
detector, TRW-CB, None DoS, probe network, attacks – 80–90 0–70
transmitted to the
Rate-limiting, NETAD artificial traffic
SDN controller
Method 2
Evaluation of the TRW-CB,
Fuzzy logic DoS
Artificial
95 1.2
threats level Rate-limiting traffic
Creating profiles
TRW-CB, DDoS, worm pro-
Benign – real SDN
Method 3 using sFlow
Entropy level
None
pagation probe
network, attack – 100 23–39.3
and OpenFlow artificial traffic
Flow statistics
Flow based Self-organized
DDoS Artificial
Method 4
collection
statistics maps of Artificial
from botnet traffic
98.57–99.11 0.46–0.62
and features Neural Network
for intrusion detection algorithms. In recent studies, there
are a few proposals to use SDN’s capabilities for intrusion
detection mechanism. The four sample solutions are shown
in Table 1:
• Method 1 – revisiting traffic anomaly detection using
software defined networking [6];
• Method 2 – a fuzzy logic-based information security
management for SDNs [7];
• Method 3 – combining OpenFlow and sFlow for an
effective and scalable anomaly detection and mitiga-
tion mechanism on SDN environments [8];
• Method 4 – lightweight DDoS flooding attack detec-
tion using NOX/OpenFlow [9].
The methods listed above detect common types of mali-
cious activities, i.e., denial of service, port scan, and at-
tempts to propagate malicious software. However, there
is no papers describing SDN solutions, which would en-
able the detection of more sophisticated groups of attacks.
These attacks can rely on the use of vulnerabilities in so-
phisticated services, and one of the phases of attack is to
inject a malicious code. The presented methods have a very
good detection accuracy rate, but the false positive rate is
poor in approaches given by method 3. In method 1 the
false positive rate may vary from 0 to 70 due to the detec-
tion technique used. Hence, it is problematic to compare
the effectiveness of selected solutions because their per-
formance tests were carried out in different environments,
according to various methodologies and using different
data sets.
5. The Architecture of the Proposed
Approach of Intrusion Detection
The presented idea is based on the assumption that it is
possible to classify whether network traffic flows represent
normal operation or attack (Fig. 4). The flows classifica-
tion is based on features obtained through the functionality
Virtual testbed
Traffic
generator
Measurement
module
Dataset
collection
Classification
mechanism
Evaluation
Sampling
Fig. 4. Architecture of presented mechanism.
available in the SDN technology. The virtual testbed is
used for generating certain classes of traffic, benign and
malicious. Generated network traffic is sampled by the
measurement module implemented as OSGi bundle and re-
sides on the Opendaylight SDN controller memory. The
module also programs flows. At the same time, the REST
client communicates with the SDN controller and collect
statistics related with flows. The present mechanism oper-
ates in the control plane. The collected data can be stored
in a database or an external file. At this stage, the fea-
tures for further classification can be calculated and ex-
tracted. The collected data are then converted to a dataset
for testing machine-learning methods. At the current stage
of research, the classification process is performed by self-
organized maps of Artificial Neural Network (SOM ANN),
but in future, studies would be extended to other classifi-
cation methods.
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6. Principle of Measurements
The measurement software module works on the SDN
Opendaylight controller as an OSGi bundle [10] and im-
plements the switch functionality (Fig. 5). The traffic flows
are matched by the following criteria:
• destination IP address,
• source IP address,
• destination port of transport layer,
• source port of TCP/UDP layer,
• protocols – ARP, IP, TCP, UDP or unknown.
For each flow, an idle timeout parameter is set that defines
the period after the entries are deleted from the flow ta-
ble, and an identification number. Such matching network
traffic distinguishes traffic in the context of different port
numbers. As a result, it is possible to measure the pa-
rameters and define relationships between connections at
the transport layer, which are refreshed within a specified
period.
Another component used in the measurements is a REST
client. This module communicates with the Opendaylight
server. The following parameters permit to change the res-
olution of measurements:
• time between queries (in the REST client),
• time between refresh of array status and statistical pa-
rameters defined configuration flow controller SDN.
For each collected flow, a set of parameters is determined.
These data values constitutes the input vector for the ma-
chine learning method:
• the measurement results contain value of n vectors
features Xi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) at i time of sampling. The
vector features xi are parameters and statistics re-
trieved from network flows;
• the input vector X(max x1, max x2, . . . , max xn) in-
cludes maximum values of features from all Xi vec-
tors;
• labels defining classes are assigned to vectors X , due
to IP host address.
In a review of the existing solutions in threat detection
technology, SDN indicates that the described method shall
detect the attack time from flow table. The presented ap-
proach is based on the flows classification by the trans-
port layer level discrimination. It allows identifying a spe-
cific connection representing the unauthorized action. The
Opendaylight software environment enables the measure-
ment of selected parameters, which can be potentially used
as features for threat detection methods.
The primary parameters obtained from the OpenFlow pro-
tocol are IP addresses, port numbers, duration, number of
packets and bytes in the flow. More, the collected statistics
REST
client
Flow statistics
Features calculated
from statistics
OPEN
DAYLIGHT
OSGi module
Programming flows:
- source and destination MAC
- source and destination IP
- IP and TCP/UDP layer protocols
- source and destination ports
- idle timeout > 0Flow sampling
http
JSON
Control plane
Data plane
Flow table entry
1st packet
from flow
Fig. 5. Measurement method based on SDNs.
can be used to extract other information. Such values are
calculated in the context of the entire array, for the sam-
ple time stamp. It reflects the dependence of connections
between hosts. Example additional features are:
• single flow coefficient,
• flow rate to the host,
• multiple flows with the same host coefficient,
• flow rate of the same service to a host from multiple
hosts.
The primary and additional parameters represent the x fea-
tures of the input vector X . Features can be determined
based on the first packet transmitted to the controller. How-
ever, at this stage of research, this mechanism is not imple-
mented. The approach of analyzing the header and the first
package contents may have a positive influence on the de-
tection performance of attacks on specific groups. However,
it is necessary to improve the performance without packets
inspection, because packets can be obfuscated. Therefore,
with the development of the presented method, it will be
evaluated which feature is more important.
7. Virtual SDN Testbed
The most of the machine learning methods for intrusion
detection is based on the KDD99Cup dataset. It is used in
the process of learning and testing, allowing comparing the
performance of different methods. Unfortunately, there are
no such datasets that could be used to evaluate the detection
methods. The proposed concept is based on the mechanism
of SDN flow classification. Therefore, an important com-
ponent of the presented approach is the test environment
for the generation of SDN network traffic, allowing veri-
fying the effectiveness of the presented method. In this
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Fig. 6. Virtual SDN testbed architecture.
Table 2
Traffic classes which are performed in virtual testbed
Activities
Examples Tools for traffic
of activities generation
DoS Denial of service
metasploit, hping3,
nping
Probe
Port probe, vulnerability
metasploit, nmap
scan, version scan
User2Root
Exploit vulnerabilities,
metasploit
shell control, backdoor
Remote2Local Password crack metasploit, hydra
Normal
Communication between
FTP, SSH, SMB,
clients and servers
Apache, Web,
Tomcat, RMI Ruby,
Java RMI, Postgres,
Telnet
research a SDN network emulator mininet, developed in
Python and C is used. In the connection with the Open-
daylight controller functionality, it is possible to model
the SDN environment with different network topologies. At
this stage of the implementation, the SDN has a star topol-
ogy with a single switch. The architecture of the testbed is
shown in the Fig. 6. The testbed covers normal traffic gen-
eration and selected groups of attacks using tools presented
in Table 2.
The following classes of activities are generated in this
virtual environment:
• normal – benign traffic generated between hosts and
servers;
• DoS – denial of service attacks, performed against
the transfer, network or computation resources of IT
system;
• Probe – port, version or vulnerability scanning. Such
activities give information to intruders about the po-
tential targets of the attacks;
• U2R – attacks work by exploitation of vulnerability;
• R2L – this class covers credentials guessing and
unauthorized access to IT resources.
The server side is emulated by metasploitable virtual ma-
chines with the Ubuntu Linux operating system. Vulner-
abilities of services and the OS are intentionally left on
the server environment. Simultaneously, the clients gener-
ate requests to the server. At the same time, the malicious
host performs unauthorized activities directed to servers by
using attack tools. The client activities are automated by
Python scripts [11]. Generated traffic is probing by the
measurement module. The servers reside on separate vir-
tual machines and clients are virtualized on the mininet OS
level.
8. Self-organizing Maps as Machine
Learning Attack Detector
Machine learning methods are commonly researched con-
cerning intrusion detection mechanisms [12]. The pre-
sented approach would use self-organized maps (SOM) to
perform the unauthorized activities detection. It is a method
of unsupervised machine learning, based on artificial neural
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networks, useful for a graphical representation of datasets.
However, when input vectors are labeled, this method can
be used as a classification mechanism. The Kohonen al-
gorithm is used as SOM learning method. As a result of
the applied input signals, network indicates the activation
of neurons in varying degrees, as a result of adaptation
to changes in the synaptic weights, during the process of
learning. Some neurons, or groups of neurons, are acti-
vated in response to stimulation, adapting to the form of
specific patterns. Because of this, the test vectors activate
neurons of a trained network, which are the most simi-
lar. After the initialization process, networks are reliant
based on the parameters, each of the neurons is assigned
to a specific position of the multidimensional space. Dis-
tribution of neurons can be created in a random way. They
are associated with neighbors in a hexagonal manner. In
a further stage, the network is learned by a training set.
The most stimulated neuron and neighboring neurons up-
date the weights, in response to learning vectors using the
scheme (see Fig. 7):
Wi(k +1) = Wi(k) = ηiG(r)
[
X −Wi(k)
]
, (1)
where: X – input vector of features, Wi – i weight vector
of the neuron at k time, ηi – learning rate, G(r) – neigh-
borhood function given by Eqs. (3) and (4).
The distances of input vector X(x1, x2, . . . , x j) to winner
neurons W (w1, w2, . . . , w j) are calculated on base of the
Euclidean distance:
d(X ,Wi) =
∥∥X −Wi
∥∥ =
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(x j−wi j)2 , (2)
where: X – input vector of features, x j – j feature in X input
vector, Wi – i weight vector of the neuron, wi j – j value of
weight in i weight vector of the neuron.
The weight adaptation degree G(i) of winner and neighbors
neurons is calculated by Gaussian formulas:
r = d(i,W ) =
∥∥i−W∥∥ =
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(i j−w j)2 , (3)
G(r) = e
−r2
2λ2 , (4)
where: r – Euclidean distance of i neuron from winner
neuron, W – winner neuron, λ – neighborhood radius.
The SOM network allows creating a type of structure,
which can be represent input vectors in the best way [13],
[14], [15]. It can be said, that the single neuron represents
many vectors from the dataset. The class is assigned to
the neuron with the consideration of which class is the
most numerous, from stimulating vectors. The classi-
fication step is preformed after learning. This involves
determining which labeled neuron is activated under the
input vector. The dataset is normalized in the range 0 . . .1.
The SOM input vector records are collected data in the
measuring module with assigned labels specifying the
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Fig. 7. Self-organizing map structure.
type of traffic. For instance, the 11 dimensional input
vector X(x1, x2, . . . , x11) elements can be represented by
following features:
x1 − destination IP address,
x2 − source IP address,
x3 − destination TCP/UDP port,
x4 − source TCP/UDP port,
x5 − duration,
x6 − number of packets in flow,
x7 − number of bytes in the flow,
x8 − single flow rate,
x9 − flow rate to the host,
x10 − multiple flows rate with the same source host,
x11 − rate of connections on the same port to a host from
other computers.
In addition, the feature vector is linked to a label that de-
fines the class of activities. Due to research scenario, the
composition of features in input vector can vary. To evalu-
ate performance, the cross validation method with 10 folds
will be used. After the process of learning, neural net-
work can be presented in low dimension space by using
Sammon mapping. The results of the classification will be
evaluated by the confusion matrix, ROC curves and typical
coefficients used in machine learning methods evaluation
process.
9. Summary
The presented research describes the intrusion detection
method integrated with the SDN controller. This concep-
tion classifies unauthorized activities performed in SDN
environment. Further studies cover the implementation of
all modules and performance tests of the detection mech-
anism. Realized implementation and evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness will be described in further publications. In
the case that the proposed mechanism will not be effec-
tive, it is necessary to research and implement additional
features, especially based on the parameters and data of
8
Intrusion Detection in Software Defined Networks with Self-organized Maps
the first packet in the flows. Another important stage is
the research on the most significant feature selection and
features extraction.
The aim of the work is also the investigation of the ability
to detect a wider range of network attacks, especially those
that are not identified in other technologies. It is important
to study new classes of attack specified for the SDN envi-
ronment. This aspect especially includes attacks on SDN
controllers and the control plane. The proposed method
may have potential performance disadvantages because of
the high-grained traffic matching in a flow table. The use
of the measuring module developed for all controllers in
the network can be problematic in terms of performance.
Therefore, an exemplary architecture can assume that only
selected SDN controllers in the network will implement
functions of intrusion detection. Another point is the com-
parison of other machine learning methods.
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Abstract—The paper discusses the threats to networks of
resource-limited things such as wireless sensors and the dif-
ferent mechanisms used to deal with them. A novel approach
to threat detection is proposed. MOTHON is a movement-
assisted threat detection system using mobility to enhance
a global threat assessment and provide a separate physical
secure channel to deliver collected information.
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1. Introduction
The terms like computer or network are becoming less clear
as the technology advances. No more than ten years ago,
most of the nodes in the Internet were stationary computers
with a wired connection. On the server side of the network
this is still an accurate depiction at least of the physical
setup, although admittedly more and more inaccurate on the
logical side, as virtualization advances and the additional
cloud layer isolates the servers from their hardware.
On the client side, the network changed completely. Most
of new devices are wireless. Also, the name “device” is
quite appropriate, as more and more of them do not look
like traditional computers (even if that’s what they essen-
tially are). The trend is not only directed at mobility of
computing, as in case of laptops, smartphones, tablets,
etc., but also towards expanding the computational abili-
ties of other things, leading to ideas such as smart home or
smart city.
The side effect of this approach is that the network is be-
coming full of devices with at least one of the following
limitations: battery power, meaning that energy conserva-
tion becomes crucial factor, or limited computing power,
due to lowering costs, lowering energy consumption or pre-
venting heating. These limitations, the fact that many of
the devices (especially smart things) are designed by com-
panies with little experience in computing and the thing
status, meaning that users are unlikely to participate in in-
stallation of updates (so either the things will never be up-
dated or will have a fully automated update mechanism,
creating a tempting target for attacks) lead to a rather dif-
ficult situation from the security standpoint. While most
of the things are seen as not worth attacking, the situation
becomes worse when the entire heterogeneous network is
seen as a single system. Unsafe devices are points of entry
to the network, threatening other resources. They can also
be used in orchestrated attacks, e.g. providing multiple con-
sistent but false data streams leading to wrong decisions.
With diminishing isolation, security of things becomes
crucial.
The paper focuses on the client side of such a heteroge-
neous network – the (logically) local network of things,
using multi-hop ad-hoc connections if transmission range
is too short. The energy and power limitations, specialized
hardware, wireless communication and minimal manual
configuration characterizing most of smart things are also
typical in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), making them
a proto-example of a network of things. Many of the re-
sults of research in WSNs security are therefore almost
directly applicable to other devices. The main difference
is that a single WSN is usually rather homogeneous, while
in case of the Internet of Things (IoT) the devices may be
completely different in both hardware and software.
Detection of compromised nodes is most complicated in
this resource- and energy-limited part of the heterogeneous
network, where the extra load introduced by the detection
mechanisms becomes too large. The tradeoff between hav-
ing an insecure network or expending energy and resources
on protective measures could be eliminated by introducing
more powerful nodes dealing with this task. Unfortunately,
providing sufficient network coverage would require many
such nodes, effectively multiplying the system cost beyond
sensible limits.
In this paper a workaround limiting the cost of detection
nodes is proposed by allowing each detector to monitor
multiple locations through mobility.
The paper starts with a discussion of major threats classes
to such networks of small devices in Section 2. Section 3
provides an overview of the approaches toward securing
such networks. Section 4 presents authors idea of a mo-
bile intrusion detection system (IDS). A short conclusion
is given in Section 5.
2. Threats to the Network
There are many possible modes of attack against a sensor-
like network of things [1]–[3]. In general, they can be
grouped depending on several factors, such as the activity
of the attacker (active or passive), computing power (sensor
class or laptop class), location (logically inside or outside
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the network), target layer and attack goals (communication
obstruction, data capture, modification or data fabrication).
Attacks in physical layer are hard to prevent, as neither
the electromagnetic medium nor the sensors themselves are
(usually) physically protected. Active jamming attacks are
therefore effective, although rather easy to detect. Passive
sniffing is effective unless encryption is used. Physical at-
tacks on nodes are possible even without any tools (destruc-
tion or theft of nodes). More advanced physical attacks are
dangerous to the network as a whole, because of the virtu-
ally unlimited possibility of tampering with the hardware
and programming (e.g. using JTAG interface).
Attacks on the data layer are more limited, usually focusing
on flooding the medium with messages, or using standard
violations such as long frames to cause collisions.
Attacks in the network layer are potentially very effective,
but made more difficult by the fact that routing in such
networks is not part of the standard and may be done us-
ing a variety of algorithms. Attacks in this layer usually
focus on affecting the routing decisions in order to either
obstruct communication as such, or to maximize the effec-
tiveness of the limited number of malicious nodes in the
network. In the first case, providing false information in
the path building phase or sending many unnecessary path
queries are simple and quite effective sensor-class attacks,
causing additional unnecessary communication and com-
putation by network nodes, draining batteries. The second
group of attacks uses advertising great connection quality
(or other methods) in order to direct as much of the net-
work’s traffic as possible through a malicious node. Then,
after routing is established, the node can be used to monitor
the traffic (sniffing) or obstruct it, either by blackholing the
communication or by selective forwarding increasing loss
frequency.
Finally, attacks in the higher layers (transport – applica-
tion) are also possible and potentially most useful in case
of targeted attacks. The range of possibilities is too wide
to describe here. As simple examples consider attacks on
time synchronization algorithms, node location or key dis-
tribution. An attack in this layer, conducted with a deep
understanding of the goals and implementation of the net-
work, can turn the network into an extremely dangerous
misinformation tool.
3. Security Measures
Due to the limited computing power of nodes and their
need to conserve energy, any security measure that requires
a lot of computing activity on part of the network nodes
is a mixed blessing. Another problem is the broadcast-
based, self-organizing dynamic nature of such networks –
even if not mobile, they must reorganize to allow for node
malfunctions, etc. There are no natural policy enforcement
points apart from the base station – any node in the network
may be routed around. These problems result in a reduced
choice of security solutions for networks of things.
3.1. Intrusion Prevention
The first layer of defense is provided by protection mea-
sures aimed at preventing successful penetration. In case of
wireless networks of resource-limited devices this layer is
unfortunately not as strong as in wired computer networks.
Since the medium is freely accessible, the prevention must
be applied at every point in the network. However, ap-
plication of advanced mechanisms is made difficult by the
limited computing resources and the need to preserve en-
ergy. Still, some steps have been made towards provision
of important information security protections.
Proper application of cryptographic techniques can provide
privacy, authentication and data integrity. Unfortunately,
software implementations require a lot of operations, low-
ering battery life. Hardware support reduces this impact
and is available in radio modules implementing the IEEE
802.15.4 standard [4]. An unfortunate limitation of this so-
lution is the use of a single symmetric key. A lot of work to-
wards introducing cryptographic protections to higher lay-
ers and enabling efficient and secure key distribution has
been performed in recent years, including e.g. TinySec [5],
MiniSec [6], ContikiSec [7], ZigBee, LEAP/LEAP+ [8].
Another protective measure, most effective not in preven-
tion of attacks, but in network protection against already
malicious nodes, is trust management [9]. Due to limited
memory in network nodes the most practical approach is
reputation based. An example of its application to sensor
networks can be found in [10].
3.2. Intrusion Detection
Once a successful attack has been performed, the network
might be operating with one or more malicious nodes. This
constant threat to information security is often more danger-
ous than the initial attack. Detection of misbehaving nodes
allows proper mitigation techniques to be applied, including
blacklisting the node and routing around it or even phys-
ically removing it from the network (if possible). Many
methods have been proposed to detect malicious nodes.
Most of them have a common problem – secure delivery
of detection information to the base station or secure prop-
agation of information between non-malicious nodes. If
a single malicious node is detected, it might not be the only
one. If another one is in path of the warning message, it
can easily render the detection system powerless. Therefore
IDS alerts require either a separate secondary channel for
propagation, or effective protection if the primary channel
is used (separate path, encryption, etc).
The simplest form of detection of malicious behavior is the
watchdog mechanism [11], using the shared medium aspect
of wireless networks. The node sending a message can
monitor the medium to verify whether the receiving node
forwarded it correctly. There are many variations to this
mechanism in the literature. A different, more sophisticated
approach is using more advanced, rule-based intrusion de-
tection systems [12], capable of detecting many different
kinds of attacks. Both approaches require modification of
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all or selected nodes. A standard watchdog mechanism
only detects malfunctioning neighbors, so it must be active
in most of the nodes to cover the entire network. An IDS
may be somewhat effective even if only implemented at the
base station, but delivers less information.
One more approach, often used in classical networks, is
a server honeypot – a service existing only as a target for
attacks. This approach might be applicable to WSNs by
emulating a node on a more powerful device, waiting for
messages modifying its state in illegal ways. This detec-
tion method would be effective against previously unknown
types of attacks as long as the identity of the honeypot node
remains secret.
All of the previously described approaches are generally
passive – they either base detection on received traffic only
or (in case of the server honeypot) respond to messages,
but never initiate communication as part of the detection
activity. An active alternative is a client honeypot – a node,
which sends messages in order to verify whether they are
properly forwarded to the base station or other target. The
actual detection is performed at the receiving node, where
any changes to the message or variation from the normal
loss rate can be easily identified. The mechanism requires
that both the sender and the receiver agree on the nature of
the testing message or sequence of messages. This can be
done through predefinition or by using a secondary chan-
nel for transmission of this information. Note that prede-
fined messages are easier to learn and avoid at malicious
nodes.
4. Movement-assisted Threat Monitoring
in WSN
Taking into account limited resources of sensors, collec-
tion and analysis of data concerned with network security
are usually performed in a periodic manner and carried
out by selected devices implementing threat monitoring ca-
pabilities. However, in general, it is possible to extend
the functionality of all nodes and to implement permanent
monitoring. Regardless of the selected monitoring scheme,
a common objective of all security systems is establishing
a safe and reliable communication channel for exchanging
security information i.e. reporting, alerting, control traffic,
etc. between nodes. Therefore the communication can be
organized in several ways:
• by utilizing the transmission channels already set up
to propagate data in the system,
• by creating channels using disjoint logical connec-
tions within existing networks,
• by adding extra nodes to create a separate sensor
network which shares the same transmission medium,
• by equipping sensor nodes with additional hardware
modules (Wi-Fi, GSM, etc.) that can be used to
establish an additional communication channel.
Finally, threat monitoring can be successfully supported by
controlled geographic migration of sensors that have loco-
motion. A mobility of sensors is leveraged recently for
many WSN applications. Using mobile platforms to assist
sensor placement in a working space can significantly en-
hance the capability to monitor the data and detect attacks.
4.1. MOTHON System Overview
The authors have proposed a novel approach to threat mon-
itoring in WSN. In presented threat detection system one or
several mobile sensors implementing threat detection func-
tionality are forced to move to desired directions. As it is
presented in Fig. 1, due to the ability to change the location
of a sensor node, information about security events can be
passed directly to the network sink (IIIa – after completion
of all tasks, IIIb – after threat detection) or indirectly via
other nodes from another area of the monitored network.
II
I IIIa
IIIb
mobile sensor sensor sink data synchronization
route threat detection, route modification
Fig. 1. The concept of movement-assisted threat monitoring: I –
task order phase, II – performing actions phase, III – reporting
phase (a – after completion of all tasks, b – after threat detection).
The MOTHON (MObile THreat mONitoring for WSN)
system implements the concept depicted in Fig. 1. It is
composed of three components: a mobile platform (MP),
threat monitoring sensor (TMS) and management station
(MS) responsible for controlling of MP and TMSs (see
Fig. 2). It is assumed that the mobile platform can carry
one or several TMS sensors. All these sensors can be
placed in any locations in a workspace.
The MOTHON operates in three stages. The management
station initiates the first stage. The aim of the this stage
is to synchronize and gather data about a given network
(topology, characteristics of nodes, etc.) and define moni-
toring mode and plan. Passive and active modes of threat
detection are considered. Next, all data related to deci-
sions done by MS are transferred to a MP and TMS sensor
(or sensors) dedicated to threat monitoring, and the system
switches to the second stage.
Threat monitoring sensor is carried to the desired destina-
tion by mobile platform (MP). After placing at the tar-
get location TMS starts to perform assigned tasks con-
cerning the threats detection. The third stage relates to
re-synchronization of information between TMS and MS
which can occur in two cases – after completion of all
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USB
USB
USB
USB
TelosB
TMSs
Raspberry PI RJ45
RJ45
Lego Mindstorms NTX 2.0
Management
application [APP]
Mobile platform [MP]
Management station [MS]
(PC/laptop)
Fig. 2. MOTHON prototype architecture.
tasks or after threat detection. TMS transfers collected in-
formation, e.g. detected threats, additional statistics about
traversed route, etc. to MS. It can be implemented in two
ways:
• all data gathered by TMS are stored in MP, which
transfers this data to MS directly – just after threat
detection or after completion of all tasks,
• using existing communication channel via other
nodes from another area of the monitored network.
In both cases MP can leave the TMS (with default network
software) to avoid the occurrence of “temporary” nodes
in the system. Moreover one mobile platform can carry
multiple TMS sensors and place them in different locations
in workspace.
4.2. Detection Methods
MOTHON can employ either active or passive methods for
threat detection. Data analyses can be carried out either
on-line by the TMS and mobile platform, or post factum
by the mobile platform and management station.
Passive methods, which are based on analysis of informa-
tion received from neighbors (IDS) or data sniffed from
a shared medium (watchdog IDS), can keep a copy of the
observed traffic for further analysis. This is not effective
approach in case of threat monitoring with static nodes, but
can be very valuable in case of mobile platform returning
to sink from time to time. Moreover, simultaneous moni-
toring of the communication channel from several locations
in the workspace can ease analysis by allowing detection
of hidden and exposed nodes problems.
In contrast to passive methods, active solutions are not lim-
ited only to verification of individual sensor actions (cor-
rect operation of protocols, transmitted information, etc.).
Active methods provide tools for verification of the network
operation as a whole, e.g. verification the service packet for-
warding over the network to the sink by sending a specific
content, at the specific time and from specific place.
4.3. MOTHON Prototype Architecture
The prototype system composed of three elements is pre-
sented in Fig. 2. The management application provided
by MS is a console tool is written in C++.
Mobile platform consists of two hardware components:
Lego Mindstorms NTX 2.0 and Raspberry Pi single board
microcomputer. Moreover it is expected, that MP will
be equipped with GPS module or other localization sys-
tem [13], [14].
Fulfilling all the tasks assigned by management application
requires from this platform significantly greater capabilities
in terms of processing power and energy resources. The
key software components of MP are:
• Control module – the main module, responsible for
communication with all other modules and creating
the logic of solution based on information obtained
from the management station.
• Mobility module – responsible for motion trajectory
planning movement and speed calculation.
• Threat analysis module – used for data gathered
from TMSs modules analysis and threat detection.
TMS is implemented over TelosB platform using Con-
tiki OS. Eventually, to complete the system, an automation
process enabling wireless communication between MP an
MS must be added.
5. Conclusion
Starting with a review of threats and security measures
applicable to wireless networks of resource-limited things,
a new approach, introducing mobility as a way of over-
coming the limitations of existing methods has been pre-
sented.
Mobility of a threat detection sensor should improve over-
all security state of monitored networks without any need
to perform their reconfiguration or upgrade. The approach
can be used in existing networks without any modifications
to installed devices. The implementation details, such as
means of mobility, depend on the target network – obvi-
ously a different solution is appropriate inside a building
than in case of a network of oceanic drones.
Various methods of threat detection in MOTHON are cur-
rently under development. In future work authors plan to
conduct experiments in testbed network to show the effec-
tiveness of detection against different kinds of attacks.
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Abstract—In this paper Quaternion Feistel Cipher (QFC)
with an infinite key space based on quaternion Julia sets is
proposed. The basic structure of the algorithm is based on
the scheme proposed in 2012 by Sastry and Kumar. The pro-
posed algorithm uses special properties of quaternions to per-
form rotations of data sequences in 3D space for each of
the cipher rounds. It also uses Julia sets to form an infi-
nite key space. The plaintext is divided into two square ma-
trices of equal size and written using Lipschitz quaternions.
A modular arithmetic was implemented for operations with
quaternions. A computer-based analysis has been carried out
and obtained results are shown at the end of this paper.
Keywords—cryptography, lossless scheme, multimedia encryp-
tion, security.
1. Introduction
Quaternion encryption as presented in [1]–[3] uses the
unique properties of quaternions in order to rotate vectors
of data in a three-dimensional space. The concept, however,
lacks general interest and is not popular, thus it is difficult
to find a paper that would introduce any significant con-
tribution to the field. However, an authors’ papers [4]–[8]
show different, possible implementations of quaternion en-
cryption and they discuss the security aspect of each pro-
posed algorithm.
The cipher proposed by the authors in [9] is a modification
of the Feistel Cipher with the implementation of modu-
lar arithmetic. In this paper an another modification of the
Feistel Cipher is proposed. In this modification, modular
quaternion rotations are used to encrypt subsequent rounds
without the need to use matrix multiplication as introduced
in [9]. The proposed quaternion model features very fast
computation advantages over its matrix-based counterpart
in [9], thus this makes it a perfect match for encrypt-
ing multimedia. The specific properties of computations
in the field of quaternions are covered more extensively
in [10], [11]. Additionally, when encrypting a color image
in RGB representation, it is possible to increase encryption
efficiency even further because in that case a single quater-
nion can successfully store information about all three
RGB channels.
It is important to note that the algorithm proposed here
is part of an ongoing project, thus further studies on the
method are necessary and are highlighted in the paper. The
algorithm proposed here was originally designed to encrypt
multimedia data, thus the security aspect is not the focus
of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a brief in-
troduction to quaternion calculus and quaternion Julia sets
is provided. Section 3 describes the quaternion rotation
concept as well as the application of quaternion Julia sets.
Section 4 concerns the proposed encryption scheme with an
illustration of the Quaternion Feistel Cipher. In Section 5
the simulation results are shown, the avalanche effects are
discussed and the computation speed of the proposed al-
gorithm with the AES algorithm is compared. Finally, in
Section 6, the conclusions are drown.
2. Quaternion Calculus
Quaternions are hyper-complex numbers of rank 4 and
have two parts – a scalar part and a vector part, which is an
ordinary vector in a three-dimensional space R3. A quater-
nion q is defined by formula [10], [12]:
q = w+ xi+ y j + zk , (1)
where w, x, y, z are real coefficients of quaternion q,
and i, j, k are imaginary units with the following prop-
erties [10], [12]: i2 = j2 = k2 = i jk = −1, i j = − ji = k,
jk = −k j = i, ki = −ik = j. A quaternion could also be
considered as a vector represented by a column matrix (all
vectors in this paper are represented by column matrices)
or as a composition of scalar part w and vector part ~v
q = [w x y z]T or q = (w, ~v) =
(
w, [x y z]T
)
. (2)
The sum of two quaternions q1, q2 is defined by adding the
corresponding coefficients of those quaternions, i.e., in the
same manner as for complex numbers [10], [13]:
q1 +q2 = (w1 +w2)+(x1 + x2)i+(y1 + y2) j +(z1 + z2)k .
(3)
The product of two quaternions is more complex due to the
anti-commutativity of the imaginary units of quaternions.
The product of the two quaternions q1, q2 consists of scalar
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and vector products (“◦” denotes the scalar product and “×”
denotes the vector product) [10], [13]:
q1 ·q2 = (w1w2−~v1 ◦~v2, w1~v2 +w2~v1 +~v1×~v2) . (4)
In this paper “·” denotes the quaternion multiplication. Fur-
thermore, it is important to define the other properties of
quaternions: a conjugate q∗, a norm ‖q‖ and an inverse
q−1 of a quaternion q:
q∗ = w− xi− y j− zk, ‖q‖=
√
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 , (5)
q−1 =
q∗
‖q‖2
=
w− xi− y j− zk
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2
. (6)
It is important to notice that in the case of a unit quaternion,
for which the norm is equal to 1, there is the following
relation: q−1 = q∗.
2.1. Quaternion Julia Sets
Julia sets are produced by a procedure of repeated itera-
tions [14], [15]. The polynomial used in the process of
iteration is quadratic, cubic, quartic or any higher order de-
gree [15]. A Julia set consists of all points p∈C for which
a recursive sequence:
z0 = p , (7)
zn+1 = z
2
n + c , (8)
does not approach infinity. The parameter c in Eq. (8) is
a complex number, i.e., a parameter determining the shape
of the produced set. For a quaternion Julia set, the starting
point p is determined in a three-dimensional space (1, i, j)
for a constant dimension k. Parameter c is then considered
a quaternion. An exemplary quaternion Julia set is shown
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Exemplary quaternion Julia set, number of iterations = 12,
c = 0.0882 + 0.1251i−0.7555 j + 0.1552k, control number = 16,
without an intersection plane.
In order to generate a quaternion Julia set, first must be
set: all of the necessary initialization parameters, such as
the number of iterations, to perform rule given by Eq. (8),
the coefficients of quaternion c, a control number determin-
ing convergence of the starting points and the intersection
plane.
3. Quaternion Rotation
The quaternion rotation can be performed by possessing
a quaternion around which we will be rotating another
quaternion. If the rotated quaternion as a data vector in
three-dimensional space is considered, then the idea of
quaternion encryption could be implemented.
Let us consider two quaternions q = [w x y z]T and P =
[0 a b c]T , where a vector [a b c]T , which represents a vec-
tor part of the quaternion P with a zero scalar part, will
store information about a piece of data to be rotated around
quaternion q. The obtained quaternion Prot will be a spatial
mapping of the rotated data vector [a b c]T . The quaternion
rotation is written as
Prot = q ·P ·q−1 . (9)
If we possess a tool, which can handle quaternion calcula-
tions, it is possible to implement encryption according to
the Eq. (9).
3.1. Encryption Concept
The encryption method that was implemented in presented
algorithm is entirely based on the quaternion rotation (9).
It is possible to optimize the rotation process by extending
the vector part of quaternion P in order to obtain a new
quaternion B, as is shown in Formula (10):
P =

0,


a
b
c



→ B =

0,


[a1 a2 a3]
[b1 b2 b3]
[c1 c2 c3]



 . (10)
The encryption and decryption process for the quaternion
method with the new extended quaternion B (meant to
store data information) is shown in Eqs. (11) and (12),
respectively.
Brot = q ·B ·q−1 , (11)
B = q−1 ·Brot ·q , (12)
where Brot is the rotated (encrypted) quaternion B and q is
the quaternion-key (encryption key).
3.2. Infinite Key Space
In order to generate an infinite key space it is necessary
to first calculate a rotation matrix [1]–[3]. By using the
Formula (9) and applying the Formulas (4)–(6) it is possi-
ble to introduce a rotation matrix [3], [12], [13], [16] and
write:
Prot = Γ(q)P , (13)
P =


a
b
c

 , Γ(q) =


w2 + x2−y2−z2 2xy−2wz 2xz+2wy
2wz+2xy w2−x2 + y2−z2 2yz−2wx
2xz−2wy 2yz+2wx w2−x2−y2 +z2

 ,
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Initial rotation matrix ( )G q
0
w11 = ( of remaining elements) /6S
R G B
Mean value
mR mG mB
f i j k
1 R B
= m + m + m
G
Fractal image of the quaternion Julia set
Before calculating 2nd order quaternion-
keys, one must rotate all 1st order
quaternion-keys around quaternions f.
q = w + x i + y f z k12 12 12 12 12
q = f .q .f12rot 2 12 2
-1
q = f .q .f13rot 3 13 3
-1
q = w + x i + y f z k13 13 13 13 13
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
1st order quaternion-key calculation.q
11
Remaining 1st order quaternion-keys and are calculated in the same manner.q q12 13
Fig. 2. Process of calculating 1st order quaternion-keys from an initial rotation matrix.
where Γ(q) is the rotation matrix calculated from the vector
part of quaternion Prot , which is defined by Formula (9).
The rotation matrix is directly linked to quaternion q from
which it was calculated.
The authors propose a key-generation algorithm based
on concept [1], but additionally a quaternion Julia sets
is introduced. The idea of the process is to treat ele-
ments of each column of the rotation matrix as coefficients
(x, y, z) of subsequent quaternions from which other rota-
tion matrices can be generated. In order to obtain coeffi-
cient w of subsequent quaternions, the mean value from
six elements of the rotation matrix must be calculated,
which were not used to determine coefficients (x, y, z), see
Fig. 2.
Let us assume that the first quaternion q from which a ro-
tation matrix was generated (13) is called an initial quater-
nion q0. After grouping the elements of initial rotation ma-
trix Γ(q0) three quaternion-keys of 1st order (q11, q12, q13)
can be obrained. From these quaternions three rotation
matrices can be generated, from which there is possibility
to generate nine quaternion-keys of 2nd order. If we as-
sume n as a rotation order, then the number of obtained
quaternion-keys for the appropriate order n is equal to 3n.
The process is iterative, which means that in order to ob-
tain higher order quaternion-keys we first need to define the
rotation matrices of the lower orders.
However, before generating rotation matrices from quater-
nion-keys, we must first rotate every quaternion-key around
quaternion fi. Quaternions fi are calculated from a random
quaternion Julia set (Fig. 2).
The authors used the Quat generator [17] for visualization
of quaternion Julia sets in 3D space as color images. The
fractal image is divided into smaller fragments. The num-
ber of fragments is based on the size of the key space,
e.g., for order = 2 nine quaternion-keys of 2nd order would
be produced, thus we will need to divide the fractal im-
age into 12 fragments (9 for quaternion-keys of 2nd or-
der and 3 for quaternion-keys of 1st order). From each
fragment a different quaternion f is calculated. Its coeffi-
cient w is always equal 0 and coefficients (x, y, z) represent
a mean value calculated from the pixels values in the R, G
and B channels of the fragments (Fig. 2).
The process of calculating 1st order quaternion-keys is
shown in Fig. 2. The key generation process can be sum-
marized by the following steps:
1) define q0,
2) calculate Γ(q0),
3) calculate q11 q12 q13,
4) calculate f1 ·q11 · f−11 f2 ·q12 · f−12 f3 ·q13 · f−13 ,
5) calculate Γ(q11rot) Γ(q12rot) Γ(q13rot),
6) calculate q21 q22 q23 q24 q25 q26 q27 q28 q29,
7) . . .
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(a) (b)
Read , , , Nq nB Read , B , , Nq nenc
L
0 LnR0 Rn
for i = 1 to n for i = to 1n
Li-1
L R Li i i-1 = ( - ) mod N
L q.R qi i= (
. ) mod N
-1
-1
R q .L .qi i-1 = ( ) mod N
-1
R L Li i i= ( + ) mod N-1
Li
Li
Li
Li-1
Li-1
Ri-1 Ri
Ri
Ri
Ri-1
Ri-1,,
B L Renc n n= || B L R= ||0 0
Fig. 3. Process of encryption (a) and decryption (b) for the proposed Quaternion Feistel Cipher.
4. Proposed Scheme
The proposed algorithm is designed to encrypt images (both
color and gray-tone) but it can also be used to encrypt tex-
tual data. For the purpose of this paper an implementation
for RGB color images is presented.
Let us now consider a plaintext B, which will be treated
as RGB color image data. The plaintext can be written as
three matrices B: BR, BG, BB. Each matrix B is of equal
size with the image. Each element of all three matrices B
is a value in the range of 0–255. For the purpose of the
algorithm, all three matrices B should be rewritten as ma-
trices with m rows and 2m columns, where m is calculated
according to the rule:
m =
⌈√
widthB ·heightB
2
⌉
. (14)
If the number of elements in such matrices exceeds the
original amount of the images’ pixels, then the additional
elements are filled with random numbers in the range
of 0–255. The three obtained matrices B (m× 2m) are
split into three square matrices: L0R, L0G, L0B and three
square matrices: R0R, R0G, R0B, each of size m×m. All
six square matrices are then written as components of two
quaternions, L0 and R0 using the following rule:
L0 = w0 + x0i+ y0 j + z0k, where (15)
w0 = 0, x0 = [L0R], y0 = [L0G], z0 = [L0B] .
R0 = w0 + x0i+ y0 j + z0k, where (16)
w0 = 0, x0 = [R0R], y0 = [R0G], z0 = [R0B] .
The basic equations governing the encryption (17) and de-
cryption (18) in proposed scheme are very similar in con-
cept to the one presented in [9]. In this work, matrix mul-
tiplication is substituted by quaternion multiplication:
Li = (q ·Ri−1 ·q−1) mod N , (17)
Ri = (Li−1 +Li) mod N for i = 1 to n ,
Ri−1 = (q−1 ·Li ·q) mod N , (18)
Li−1 = (Ri−Li) mod N for i = n to 1 .
The flowcharts depicting both the encryption and de-
cryption processes of the proposed cipher are presented
in Fig. 3.
According to Fig. 3, it should be noted that the symbol ‖ is
used for placing the vector part of a quaternion L adja-
cent to the vector part of quaternion R. The value n in-
dicates the number of rounds in the cipher. Each round is
encrypted with a different quaternion-key qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The unique round keys are provided by the key generation
algorithm (see Section 3.2).
4.1. Modular Arithmetic
Modular arithmetic operations were implemented in order
to remain in the same field of values for data and cipher
text. For that reason it was necessary to use Lipschitz
integers (quaternions with integer components).
In order to calculate a modular inversion of any integer
from the range of 0–255, and also a modular inversion
of a Lipschitz integer, which is needed according to rota-
tion rule (9), it was necessary to choose a special modulus
value (a prime number) that together with all the integers
in 0–255 would yield their Greatest Common Divisor
(GCD) equal to 1. That is why for the RGB color im-
ages we cannot go for the most obvious choice and select
a modulus of value 256, as such a number is not prime
(256 = 28) and will not make it possible to calculate a mod-
ular inversion for most cases. Instead, a modulus equal to
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prime integer N = 257 is used. Therefore values of the range
0–256 for all quaternions Li and Ri can be obtained. It
is important to note that despite the fact that in the en-
crypted image we obtained modified values from the range
(0–256), the algorithm is so constructed that we will still
be able to obtain the exact same image without any errors
after the decryption process. The values obtained in the
decryption process will be set into the appropriate range
of 0–255.
The modular arithmetic with modulus 257 was imple-
mented not only for the encryption/decryption process but
also for the key generation algorithm (Section 3.2).
5. Simulation Results
The proposed scheme was scrutinized by computer-based
simulation. The results of the encryption and decryption
processes are shown in Fig. 4b and 4c, respectively.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4. Encryption and decryption of a color Lena image
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lenna) performed by the proposed
quaternion cipher: (a) original image, (b) encrypted image, (c) de-
crypted image, (d) decrypted image using one key that is different
in its binary form (1 bit) from the original one.
In Fig. 5, two histograms, i.e. of the original and the en-
crypted color Lena image, are shown. One can notice that
the pixel values of the encrypted image are governed by
a uniform distribution.
5.1. Randomness Tests
Chi-squared tests of randomness based on the diehard pack-
age [18] as well as on the freeware software Cryptool [19]
were implemented in order to estimate the security level
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Fig. 5. Histograms for a color Lena image: (a) original image,
(b) encrypted image.
of the proposed encryption model. The primary factor,
which informs us about the effectiveness of the obtained
randomness in encrypted data is a parameter called the
p-value. Its values differ from 0 to 1, and the authors al-
ways aim for values as close to 0.5 as possible. If the
p-value equals 0 or 1, that means that the encrypted data
fails a particular randomness test. The obtained results for
selected diehard randomness tests are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
p-values for different randomness tests
from the diehard package
Birthday Binary Parking
spacings rank lot
p-values 0.613 0.585 0.209
The Up-down
Craps3Dsphere runs
p-values 0.293 0.147 0.692
DNA Count-the-1’s OQSO
p-values 0.726 0.241 0.363
OPERM5
Minimum Overlapping
distance sums
p-values 0.588 0.811 0.534
The authors also analyzed the randomness of proposed al-
gorithm by using the Cryptool [19]. It offers 6 statistical
tests: the Frequency Test, Poker Test, Runs Test, Serial
Test and two additional tests embedded in Cryptool’s bat-
tery test: Long-Run Test and Mono-Bit Test. Presented
algorithm successfully passes all of them.
5.2. Avalanche Effect
In order to study the avalanche effect, let us consider a color
Lena image as a plaintext. If 1 bit in one of the calculated
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round keys (quaternion-keys of higher order) is changed,
a new cipher text (encrypted image) will be obtained. Such
a cipher text will yield a nearly 50% difference in its binary
form in reference to the original cipher text.
The same situation is achieved when changing 1 bit in the
initial encryption key (initialization quaternion). The dif-
ference in binary form of the modified cipher text and the
original cipher text is also very close to 50%.
Let us now consider an example shown in Fig. 4. The aim
is to encrypt a color Lena image. In the encryption process
9 rounds of the proposed algorithm are used. Each round
has its own unique key (quaternion-key of higher order).
Assume that the attacker knows 8 unique keys and pos-
sesses substantial knowledge about the last key (let us as-
sume that the only difference is 1 bit in the binary form
in the value y of the last quaternion-key). Decryption of
the image performed by the attacker in such a scenario is
shown in Fig. 4d. The presented result proves to be a strong
avalanche effect.
5.3. Computation Speed
The authors analyzed the computation speed of proposed
algorithm in comparison to the Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES). For the purpose of this test the fastest AES
version is implemented, i.e. AES-ECB, and its capabili-
ties on the same machine as for our quaternion algorithm
are measured. The machine used for the test was: Intel
Core i5-3570 CPU @ 3.40 GHz, 16 GB RAM, and simu-
lation environment was Matlab. The results of the compar-
ison for a color Lena image are presented in Table 2. The
expected values with confidence intervals calculated from
20 simulations are shown. The expected values presented in
Table 2 are an estimation of the expected value µ , deter-
mined according to equation [20]:
P
(
X − tα
S
√
N−1
< µ < X + tα
S
√
N−1
)
= 1−α , (19)
where X is the expected value of the sample, S is the stan-
dard deviation of the sample, N is the size of the sample
(20 simulations), tα is a value obtained from the t-Student
table for N−1 degrees of freedom and 1−α is the confi-
dence coefficient equal to 95%.
The initialization time refers to the time needed to cal-
culate all of the necessary initialization parameters/val-
ues/matrices in order to perform the encryption/decryption.
For AES, the initialization parameters refer to: the substitu-
tion box and its inverse, an arbitrary 16-byte cipher key, key
expansion, a polynomial transformation matrix and its in-
verse. For the proposed algorithm, the initialization param-
eters refer to: the components of the initialization quater-
nion, initialization values for the quaternion Julia fractal,
and the rotation order for which an appropriate key space
is calculated (Fig. 2).
According to the results as presented in Table 2, one can
see one of the main advantages of proposed algorithm,
Table 2
Comparison of the computation speed of AES
and the proposed algorithm for a color Lena image
of size 243×243 pixels
AES-ECB X
tα S
√
N−1
Initialization time [s] 0.6226 4.851E-03
Encryption time [s] 68.05 0.1416
Decryption time [s] 98.55 0.2095
Total time [s] 167.2 –
Proposed algorithm X
tα S
√
N−1
Initialization time [s] 0.05428 9.101E-03
Encryption time [s] 0.2643 2.018E-03
Decryption time [s] 0.2642 1.270E-03
Total time [s] 0.5829 –
i.e. its fast computation speed. Moreover, in a practical
scenario, encryption with AES could take even more time,
especially considering the fact that a more secure imple-
mentation will be required, e.g., AES-CBC, AES-CTR,
AES-OFB, or AES-OCB.
6. Conclusions
According to the presented simulation results, it is rela-
tively easy to show that a very good randomness of bit
sequences in an encrypted image can be obtained using the
proposed encryption scheme. Moreover, one of the main
advantages of QFC is its fast computation speed. Because
of the structure of the algorithm, the specific properties
of quaternions and enormous key space, the algorithm’s
resistance to cryptanalytic attacks should significantly ex-
ceed multimedia encryption requirements. Of course, many
possibilities exist according to which the proposed model
could further be improved, e.g., main research focus now is
to introduce additional operations to the cipher which will
further increase its robustness capabilities.
It is important to note that when using the proposed key
generation scheme, the number of possible encryption keys
for each round is particularly large because of the possi-
bility of setting the rotation order, the values of the 4 pa-
rameters of the initialization quaternion and the values for
all quaternions f calculated based on a random quaternion
Julia fractal image [1]–[3], [12].
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Abstract—The paper presents an assessment of the functional
mechanisms that are part of the security system for the power
grid control. The security system, its components, and the
real time processes for the control of electricity supply were
defined. In particular, SCADA protocols used in the control
system and mechanisms for transferring them between the
control center and actuators were identified. The paper also
includes presentation of a test environment that is used for
developed security mechanisms evaluation. In the last frag-
ment of the paper, the test scenarios were formulated and
the results obtained in the cyber security system were shown,
which cover security probes reaction delay, forged malicious
IEC 60870-5-104 traffic detection, DarkNet and HoneyPot in-
terception of adversary actions, and dynamic firewall rules
creation.
Keywords—critical infrastructure, cyber security system, power
system security, SCADA system.
1. Introduction
The Critical Infrastructure (CI) includes supply of energy,
raw materials and energy consumption, communication,
computer networks, financial services, food and water sup-
ply, healthcare system, transport, emergency medical ser-
vices. A CI ensures the continuity of public administration,
production, storage, handling and use of chemicals and ra-
dioactive substances, including pipelines of hazardous sub-
stances. CI also comprises real and cyber systems (and
devices or facilities included in these systems) necessary
for minimal operation of the economy and the state.
In many countries energy supply is controlled in real-time
from the Load Frequency Control (LFC) system [1]. The
electricity is generated on the basis of electrical devices
requests and is adjusted to their load. The power supply
realization is centralized in the so called “secondary con-
trol process”, which means that the produced power is con-
trolled via the Central Control System (CCS). Any dis-
turbance in this system can have significant impact on all
industries and citizens.
Recently, the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems have been used to control power supply
processes. In the past, such systems run over dedicated
analog lines and networks with vendor specific protocols,
hardware and software. The network for power generation
control was, and still should be, isolated from the public
networks. Control systems such as SCADA, power trans-
mission management system, centralized LFC system and
intelligent field devices, e.g. Remote Terminal Unit located
in the Control and Supervisory Substation (CSS) and In-
telligent Electronic Devices (IED) create new concerns for
the cyber security.
Today open transmission protocols are broadly used and
computers with commercial operating systems work as
IED. It significantly improves automation efficiency and de-
creases costs, but certainly it also increases system vulnera-
bilities and decreases the security level. Nowadays SCADA
control commands and responses flow across IP networks
and over IP protocol stack. Control processes run in real-
time and are managed by power station generators.
Cyber security in information technology is used to protect
computers and networks from intentional and unintentional
events and malicious attacks. Many research and develop-
ment programs in SCADA security assessment and analysis
have been conducted, including risks analysis, vulnerabil-
ity and security assessment, penetrating testing and evalu-
ation, system simulation and emulation. Many works and
articles [2]–[7] related to this subject have been written,
but it seems that they don’t investigate the essence of the
problem. Certainly the importance of this issue and secu-
rity restrictions don’t allow publications related to it. Due
to the differences in equipment and technologies used in
the industrial control networks, the security solutions are
unique and must be adapted to the specific CI, because
of the limitations relate to the system generation environ-
ment, tools and software libraries used for its development,
as well as predispositions of design and generation teams
documented with security certificates.
The paper presents a developing process of security sys-
tem for the critical infrastructure. As a result of the design
works, solutions were developed and implemented that are
aimed at detection and reaction to cyber incidents such
as attacks from outside the system and authenticated, but
unauthorized actions from inside the power system. The
elaborated solutions and mechanisms were combined into
a cyber security and incident response system. At present,
the security system mechanisms developed by authors are
being assessed in the test environment [8]. A number of
tests and tools are prepared that are used for evaluation
of the efficiency of presented solutions. The research is
carried out in quasi-real conditions, whereby the threats
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and attacks are detected in the ICT traffic that comes from
the real control system of the national energy sector. The
power control network environment was very accurately
mapped. The research is conducted with the use of tools
elaborated for performance of attacks on SCADA control
systems that authors use in order to adjust the sensitivity
of probes and solutions. The developed system can op-
erate in both a multi-domain, dispersed environment and
in a multi-domain, centralized environment, depending of
the stakeholders’ requirements. Soon after mechanisms ad-
justment, the system will be used in a real control and
supervision station. The authors believe that the developed
cyber security system will be successfully implemented in
the national power system.
2. Related Works
Many research centers develop and adapt the security sys-
tems for the critical infrastructure in an environment map-
ping the real control mechanisms. At least several ap-
proaches to develop a SCADA system testbed were iden-
tified, varying from high-level modeling and simulation
frameworks interconnecting simulation environments, to
specialized tools recreating client-server interactions on
protocol level. These environments are prepared to test
the solutions for attacks detection and IT protection of the
critical infrastructure systems.
The need of European SCADA Security Testbed creation is
subject of [9]. SCADA LAB project [10] was an example
of such an initiative, which lasted for 2 years, and consti-
tuted coordinated efforts of many European partners. The
benefits of the project include:
• definition of security requirements for industrial con-
trol systems and a methodology for security testing,
• development of a security laboratory reflecting real
environment,
• creation of tools to facilitate efficient testing channels
and remote testbed as a service, and for effective
sharing of results and experiences,
• smart online and oﬄine dissemination of results for
beneficiaries in public and private sectors in the EU.
Research work described in [11] presents a high abstrac-
tion level method of modeling CI, as transformation from
a detailed “potential” system model to a “specific” model
reflecting a particular instance of the system.
Authors of [12] describe the Critical Infrastructure Pro-
tection and Resilience simulation (CIPRsim) modeling and
simulation framework, which has the capability for sim-
ulation and visualization of effects and interdependencies
associated with a hazard or threat event. The elements of
a simulation model communicate through High Level Ar-
chitecture (HLA) bus [13], which provides a common ar-
chitecture for distributed modeling, component-based sim-
ulation and linking to real systems. Thousands of modeled
objects took part in the simulation process, while threats
were modeled analytically in order to stress HLA bus per-
formance capabilities, rather than to assess security features
of the evaluated CI system.
Only part of the existing solutions was created with se-
curity characteristics assessment in mind, the rest being
focused on studying the interdependencies in critical in-
frastructures, information management performance and/or
reliability, etc.
3. Analysis of the Domestic Power
Distribution Control System
Efficient and proper work of complex power generation,
transmission and distribution system is required for com-
mon access to the benefits of electricity. The system is
characterized by simultaneous generation and consumption
of energy, where practically there is no energy storage. The
main task of the energy services is to constantly main-
tain appropriate settings in the system in order to generate
the right amount of power to fulfill the ever-changing con-
sumers needs, with appropriate quality parameters and in
the agreed quantities. The process of energy supply is real-
ized by power plants within less than 30 s since the moment
the demand occurs. This process is controlled in real-time
from the CCS. Generators are activated in the power plants
by the LFC mechanism in the process of frequency and
power control [1]. In CCS, the controller operates in real-
time in a loopback. Currently, the power grid consists of
114 centrally controlled energy sources [14].
In LFC, the command and response process time equals
less than 10 s (Table 1) The control is implemented using
SCADA protocols IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, which are
encapsulated in TCP/IPv4 packets. In the case of failure,
the control is taken over by redundant systems and manual
control is possible as well.
Table 1
Processing and transmission estimated time
of control systems by LFC
Name
Estimated
time [s]
Downloading data from RTU CSS
5
on the control area exchange lines
Front-end to LFC transmission 0.8
LFC processing 2
Transmission of control LFC
2
to ICCP generator
Total 10
Generator turbines are controlled from the CCS by sending
data through an independent wide area network based on
the SDH technology (Fig. 1). Telecommunication cables
are suspended on poles along with high voltage cables.
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LFC CCS computer network is based on standard IPv4
and Ethernet with VLANs. The exchange of commands
and responses with the generators and energy consump-
tion readouts is performed in CSS. Control commands from
the CSS are directed through switches and routers to WAN
and are transferred to target routers of the power plants
generators [15].
LFC 1 LFC 2
SCADA
SCADA
SMPP 1 SMPP 2 Other systems CCS
CCS
Ethernet
Ethernet
LAN 1
LAN 2
FWFW FW
FW FW FW
ICCP
ICCP
SMPP
SMPP
WAN
Server 1 Server 2
1 ...N
...N
TCS
Power
plant 1Generator NGenerator 2Generator 1
Fig. 1. The power distribution control system architecture.
General example of the station is shown in Fig. 2. Con-
trol data are sent to the CSS station, from where they are
directed to servers, which send the commands to genera-
tors’ drivers. The connection equipment and automation
systems for the fields are controlled by the CSS as well.
The CSS is also used for supervision and monitoring of
the stations equipment and systems. At the CSS side of
the power plant, the traffic flows by separated VLANs. In
the CSS, there are field controllers which are responsible
for connection processes of electrical circuits, protection
of circuits and cooperation with power plants. Commands
from the CCS are delivered to the CSS through routers and
modems which are used to perform readouts from IEDs [2].
In addition to remote control from the CCS, it is possible to
manually control field automation systems from the CSS,
400 kV protections from Human Machine Interface (HMI)
and internal elements of the station from HMI Substation
Control. The entire CSS is physically protected using an
alarm and supervisory system. Control commands are per-
formed by SCADA systems in the CSS station. SCADA
systems are hard real-time systems because the completion
of an operation after its deadline is considered useless and
potentially can cause cascading effect and severe damage
to expensive facilities.
4. Cyber Security System Objectives
The purpose of the developed CI security system is to en-
sure secure IP communication within the power grid man-
agement. The results of the works include a security system
prototype providing:
• probing and correlating information with the use of
probes and network sensors, aimed at handling,
• automated detection and tracking of threats and ap-
propriate response measures,
• ensuring the security of ICT infrastructure of stations
and technological communication through:
– authentication,
– advanced access control, e.g. with the use of
security policies,
– monitoring and filtering of management and
control IP traffic transferring IEC protocols,
– encryption of management messages,
– monitoring of the status of the protected facility
and secure storage of information,
– honeypots and SCADA hardware emulation,
– secure communication with the central device
of Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) and Graphic User Interface (GUI),
– documentation of management operations and
detection of potential unauthorized inside oper-
ations.
5. Security System and Testbed
Environment Overview
Electricity supply control network is an object of a too
high strategic value for direct conducting of tests related
to attacks and detection of threats because it could im-
pose a high risk for the power system. Therefore, testing
of protective mechanisms of control networks in the power
industry requires organization of environment similar to the
real one. This is way the environment for testing the cyber
security system for the power grid control was developed in
the project. Such an environment should reflect power con-
trol network elements and imitate processes implemented
therein as reliably as possible [3]–[8]. A number of re-
quirements could be formulated in relation to the testbed
for cyber security, i.e.:
• similar network resources and protocols should be
used that characterize the same vulnerabilities of the
real system. The mechanisms should enable reflec-
tion of the network structure, elements configuration,
routing mechanisms and set of the computer network
protocols used;
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Fig. 2. The CSS station structure and attack scenarios.
• the processes realized in the real system should be re-
flected as accurately as possible. Controlled SCADA
resources should be used as in the real system;
• data traffic exchanged in the testbed should corre-
spond to flows in the real network.
In order to identify, and later reflect the real system prop-
erties and solutions for its protection, it is convenient, at
the initial stage, to use the ontological model of the critical
infrastructure system. It will allow identification of impor-
tant system resources of the real environment and error pre-
vention consisting in omission of elements influencing the
entire system security. Afterwards, the system vulnerability
should be determined and, as a result, solutions increasing
the system security level should be proposed. Increased se-
curity of the control system requires identification of those
system properties that will be controlled by the protection
system [9].
The authors built a testbed consisting of one control center
CCS and several substations CSS, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
A communication subsystem is modeled in the form of
switch and router is the central node. These elements pro-
vide communication within the entire power station, sup-
porting the individual VLANs, and they create virtual net-
work in the entire network using the VRF technology [16].
The individual subsystems of the CCS station operate in the
independent VLANs, and they can communicate through
a router and CSS firewall. Elements of the CSS system
were developed using Cisco devices. The testbed includes
real IED subsystem and fields emulators as part of the
CSS, communicating using IEC 61850 and 60870-5-104
protocols. The Elkomtech devices were used for its con-
struction: communication hub (RTU) Ex-mBEL COM [17]
and Ex-mBEL field controller [18] (Fig. 3). Extortions for
IEDs (single-line-to-ground, symmetrical, short-circuit cur-
rent) and readouts (measured values) are generated using
a custom device and a station model prepared using the
LabVIEW environment. Field controllers and the commu-
nication hub communicate through an industrial Ethernet
switch using IEC-104 protocol. Display and management
of the model power system is performed using WindEx
software [19] located in the corporate network segment.
The control and management processes are performed us-
ing IEC 61850 protocol.
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Fig. 3. The power station model and the SCADA system.
SCADA network includes also the SCADA probe (Snort,
Bro) which enables monitoring of SCADA traffic. The
remaining probes of the security system allow monitoring
of i.e.:
• traffic incoming to the power station network, of
which copy is fed to one of the probes from CS
router,
• both the generation and non-generation traffic from
the enterprise network and monitoring and control
network – a copy of this traffic is fed on-line from
CS switch.
The generated IP network traffic streams are based on traf-
fic samples analysis captured at the boundary of the real
industrial power system. The gathered traffic types covered
LFC, corporate network, energy trading, measurement and
control and network management.
Traffic samples were obtained using FPGA-based hardware
probe with nanosecond accuracy and wirespeed record ca-
pability. Traffic capture includes corporate network seg-
ment traffic and control traffic data (IEC 60870-5-104).
Collected samples were regenerated [8] prior to use in
testbed generators and targeted to appropriate sinks.
Preliminary analysis of the collected traffic shows the pos-
sibility of data packets fields structure and values modifi-
cation and therefore a chance to slightly overcome proto-
cols inconveniences and limitations (required by industrial
equipment manufacturers). These proprietary modifications
can be analyzed with customized protocol analyzers, such
as Sisco open source Ethernet analyzer based on WireShark
for IEC-61850, IEC60870-6 TASE.2 [20].
In such a network (Fig. 2), which reflects the condition
of the real power management network (Fig. 1), the func-
tional tests of the developed protection mechanisms were
conducted. The researchers intend to verify the efficien-
cy of anomalies and attack detection by tools developed
by us, i.e.:
• probes based on Snort and Bro software that are
adapted for analysis of SCADA protocols in order
to detect anomalies in the power control and man-
agement systems,
• commercial IDS/IPS probes that were previously pur-
chased and are currently used in the power control
and management network,
• HoneyPots, SCADA HoneyNets and DarkNets for
monitoring and logging of all of the threats activ-
ities in ICS network,
• mediation device developed to normalize the mes-
sages obtained from the other security systems and
elements,
• SIEM system gathering, analyzing and aggregating
information received from abovementioned elements,
• databases gathering the history of power control and
management conditions,
• Cyber security Visualization and Management Sys-
tem processing data developed in SIEM in real-time,
• developed tools and open source tools designed for
verification of resilience of the power control and
management systems.
6. The Use Cases for Evaluation
of the Security System Elements
Functional tests were implemented in a quasi-real environ-
ment which is described in Section 5. The experiments
were designed to verify the system ability to detect cyber
attacks and to protect against them, as well as to adjust the
sensitivity of probes and decoys developed in the project.
For the purpose of the experiments, test scenarios were
defined, in which the probable directions and sources of
attacks were provided. In particular, the scenarios relate to
the following directions of attacks were defined:
1. from the Internet and over PSTN with the use
of unauthenticated and unauthorized measures by
hackers,
2. from the enterprise network, the attacks coming from
authorized users of this network who, due to various
reasons, attack the power control system,
3. from the control network by persons who know the
effects of the attacks and due to personal and/or ex-
ternal reasons conduct attacks on the infrastructure,
4. from the control network by users who are not aware
of the threats, authorized to resources, e.g. during
a software update, a malware is installed and trans-
ferred along with the useful applications.
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The attacks may be carried out from outside and inside the
control system. They can be performed not only by external
attackers, but also by e.g. bribed or intimidated employees,
or those unaware of the threat.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Functional tests results of DarkNet and HoneyPot.
Let us analyze the scenario of attack from the Internet
(no. 1) with the use of PSTN or from the direction of
the enterprise network, in which the firewall protecting the
control network access was breached (no. 2, Scenario 1 in
Fig. 2). In this case, the symptoms of attack are traces
left by the control station environment recognition appli-
cations. In the scenario with the hacker poorly acquainted
with the environment, the attacker has to find out the con-
trol station structure, functions performed by the devices,
their addresses and protocols used. Two-directional traf-
fic monitoring, from and to the station, will be performed
then. Collected features of monitored traffic will be sent
toward the attacker. Such actions could be detected on the
routers in the form of increased traffic. Scanning of ad-
dresses and/or ports may be detected by SCADA decoys –
darknets (Fig. 4a) and honeypots (Fig. 4b), emulating op-
eration of station devices.
The authors present the test results that confirm detection of
unauthorized operations on the security elements (Fig. 4).
The network is scanned directly to the unused DarkNets
and HoneyPots addresses, and, as a result of referring to
honeypots in GUI of the server with SIEM, the system
service is informed on the attempt of unauthorized access
to the resources. The next scenario relates to unauthorized
operations performed from the control network (no. 3, Sce-
nario 2 in Fig. 2). Unfortunately, this access is possible,
e.g. as a result of the CSS personnel carelessness. Sup-
pose that the engineering interface serving for updating the
software is not secured and the attacker connected through
an external telecom box. It would be also possible to ac-
cess the CSS control network through a GPRS modem,
which, despite prohibitions, was installed by the control
devices manufacturer to facilitate the software update pro-
cess. A dangerous attack would be that performed by an
authenticated user authorized to operate within the CSS
but, for e.g. religious reasons, wants to cause failure of the
unfaithfuls’ power supply system. There was once a case
of an authorized employee of a large power plant suffering
from a heartbreak, who attempted to shutdown the genera-
tors. In this scenario an alert information from HoneyPot,
HoneyNet or DarkNet systems won’t probably be received.
The attacker is familiar with the station structure and prob-
ably knows that, apart from the regular devices, decoy de-
vices operate there as well. Disconnection of the station
devices would immediately result in generation of alerts in
the supervision center. Therefore, the attacker wishing to
be successful, will seek to incorrectly control the station
devices of the power plant generator and possibly forge
responses from the controlled device. In this class of at-
tacks in the security system, SCADA probes adjusted to
the device and analyzing the status history of the protected
systems will be helpful. The SCADA probe is connected in
parallel with the protected facility, but it exchanges alerts
over a path isolated from the control network to the station
security system, so its operation cannot be noticed even by
an authorized employee.
Figure 5 presents functional test of SCADA device security.
The traffic probe is connected to the IED and it analyzes
the traffic and its responses – this is the Probe learning
stage. It collects the behavior patterns of the server issuing
commands to the IED and feedback sent to the server. After
some time, the Probe enters the detection mode. The Probe
constantly reports its activity in the facility security system.
If it is switched off, the security system will generate an
alert. If the Probe detects incorrect data in the control
commands, an alert will be generated as well. The second
case is presented in Fig. 5. The incorrect control signals
are sent to the IED (c), due to which an alert occurs in the
security system (d).
(c)
(d)
Fig. 5. Functional tests results of SCADA traffic probe.
The use of malware is the last presented scenario (case
no. 4, Scenario 3 from Fig. 2), which is in fact not the
last possible scenario of attacks. Such software may en-
ter the control station along with the installed hardware or
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updated software, or as a result of infection from USB drive
or the station personnel laptop containing a virus. The older
devices and those used in the station may already contain
malware, which is waiting for the right moment to activate.
Such cases already happened in the past, an example of
which is the Stuxnet worm and its more advanced forms
from Flame or Gauss platforms.
(e)
(f)
Fig. 6. Functional tests results of DarkNet and HoneyPot.
In this scenario, detection of malware will be possible for
each of the developed cyber security measures. If the de-
vice recognizes the network environment, it will be noticed
on HoneyPot or DarkNet during scanning of addresses or
ports in the control network. The alerts will be delivered by
channels isolated from the control network to the network
protection center. In the case of control sequences sent to
SCADA (Fig. 6e) devices by malware, SCADA probe will
report anomalies, which will force appropriate action by
the station personnel. The result of malware impact will
be similar to that obtained in scenario (Fig. 6f). If the mal-
ware starts to cooperate with SCADA decoy, an alert will
be reported in SCADA DarkNet, similar to that presented in
Fig. 6. The changes in the control process will be detected
by SCADA probes present in the security system, and the
effect will be identical to that provided in the scenario.
7. Summary
The achieved readiness state of the security system allows
for its installation in the real power station environment.
The paper presents developed the supervision system of the
CSS set through the use of domain cooperation mechanisms
within one entity and inter-domain cooperation mechanisms
of different entities with the use of security policies. Due
to the limitations in the volume of the article, they could
not be included in the presented content. In addition to
the issues covered in this paper, authors have been working
on automation of security mechanisms implementation, and
they plan to not only passively, but also actively influence
certain, selected processes carried out in the control system.
In the near future, authors intend to develop the system to-
ward adaption to other critical infrastructure environments,
such as the gas industry or smart-grid.
It may be anticipated that the challenges in the smart-grid
environment associated with the security level will be even
greater.
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Paper Detecting Security Violations
Based on Multilayered Event
Log Processing
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Abstract—The article proposes a log analysis approach to de-
tection of security violations, based on a four layer design.
First layer, named the event source layer, describes sources of
information that can be used for misuse investigation. Trans-
port layer represents the method of collecting event data, pre-
serving it in the form of logs and passing it to another layer,
called the analysis layer. This third layer is responsible for
analyzing the logs’ content, picking relevant information and
generating security alerts. Last layer, called normalization
layer, is custom software which normalizes and correlates pro-
duced alerts to raise notice on more complex attacks. Logs
from remote hosts are collected by using rsyslog software and
OSSEC HIDS with custom decoders and rules is used on a cen-
tral log server for log analysis. A novel method of handling
OSSEC HIDS alerts by their normalization and correlation is
proposed. The output can be optionally suppressed to pro-
tect the system against alarm flood and reduce the count of
messages transmitted in the network.
Keywords—HIDS, log analysis, NIDS, syslog.
1. Introduction
Events occurring in the operating system, like software in-
stallation, managing system services, as well as successful
and failed login attempts, are preserved real-time in the
form of logs. Every log stores data regarding its origin,
priority and time of appearance, which allows use of event
logs as a reliable source of information when building sys-
tems for alerting about security violations. Raising alarm
after detecting every single malfunction would lead to fre-
quent false positives. That is why receiving and correlating
data from multiple event log sources would increase accu-
racy of detection and allow to reveal violations with more
complex indicators.
Normalization
Analysis
Transport
Event source
Custom software
OSSEC HIDS
rsyslog
Log producers
Fig. 1. Multilayered event log processing.
The design of the log-based system for detecting security
violations consists of four layers, presented in Fig. 1.
The bottom layer, named event source, specifies the log
sources in Linux and network environment relevant in the
process of detecting events. The essential information may
originate from typical system services and network devices,
as well as from security dedicated services like audit and
integrity check tools.
Transport layer is responsible for collecting log messages
from various sources and passing them to the log-col-
lecting server, where the analysis is done. The transport
must guarantee confidentiality and transmitted data in-
tegrity, achieved by using rsyslog software [1]. This layer
secures a copy of all incoming logs (crucial in security log
management according to the guidelines [2]), which en-
ables discovery of data tampering attempts. Preserving logs
in remote localization enables incident reconstruction even
after unrecoverable machine failure [3]. Moreover, pre-
serving three timestamps for every log (generation, server
reception, database insert) can indicate server downtime or
communication disruption, which can be relevant for fur-
ther investigation.
The role of the analysis layer is to generate alerts based
on incoming log entries by decoding key information and
filtering events that are relevant, while detecting malicious
behavior in the network. The first analysis is executed by
OSSEC HIDS [4] engine with a set of custom-written de-
coders and rules.
The need to decrease the number of repetitive alerts was
widely discussed in [5], [6] and some of the existing strate-
gies of alarm suppression were presented in [7]. The nor-
malization layer, implemented by dedicated software,
examines the output of the analysis layer and suppresses
excess alerts. The need to combine many sources of infor-
mation expressed in [8] is satisfied by performing nonlinear
correlation to detect more complex attacks. As a result, this
layer creates alarms that are normalized to a protocol, and
can be used by security system consumer.
2. Event Source Layer
2.1. Log Sources
Log messages containing knowledge about events taking
place in the operating system or the network can be ob-
30
Detecting Security Violations Based on Multilayered Event Log Processing
tained from various process sources. There are several
services and modules that gather information about se-
curity events and store it in the form of logs, shown in
Fig. 2. This article focuses on events generated by follow-
ing sources:
• auditd,
• Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE),
• sshd,
• OSSEC rootcheck,
• racoon,
• iptables,
• network devices,
• event logs coming from dedicated processes related
with the system’s security.
Services
Logs
/dev/log
UDP
Router
Switch
Firewall
syslog
Fig. 2. Event sources.
auditd [9] is based on pre-configured rules and generates
log entries recording a large variety of information about
the events occurring in the system. According to [10],
auditd can discover policy violations by monitoring file ac-
tivities and collecting system calls.
AIDE [11] is a file and directory integrity checker. It
creates a database from the state of the system, register
hashes, modification times, etc. This database is later used
to verify the integrity of files by comparing it against the
real status of the system. All of the usual file attributes
can also be checked for inconsistencies. AIDE generates
syscall ANOM RBAC INTEGRITY FAIL, when change in
the monitored file structure is detected and received by au-
ditd from kernel.
sshd [12] is an OpenSSH Daemon, which provides secure
encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network. It can refer to Pluggable Au-
thentication Modules (PAMs) [13], which provide a com-
mon authentication framework for applications and services
in a Linux system. The errors in communication can be
a valuable source for log analysis.
OSSEC’s rootcheck is an OSSEC HIDS module for rootkit
detection, which runs at regular intervals querying the sys-
tem for information and comparing the results with a list
of known rootkits and trojans. When the rootcheck module
finds discrepancies in information about a file, a process,
port or network interface, it will raise an alert about a sus-
pected rootkit.
racoon [14] is an Internet Key Exchange (IKE) daemon for
automatically keying IPsec connections to establish safe as-
sociations between hosts. Reported errors in communica-
tion can be used to detect suspicious behavior of nodes.
iptables [15] is used as a firewall to set up, maintain, and
inspect the tables of IP packet filter rules in the Linux
kernel.
Network devices (i.e., routers, switches, firewalls) send in-
formation about their activity in UDP messages.
2.2. Log Formats
Log records are an essential source of information and
can be written by a process to a dedicated text file, al-
though the majority of logs are a product of sending data
to local /dev/log socket, from where the messages are re-
ceived by a log collecting service called syslog. All infor-
mation collected by syslog should by written in a simple
syslog format described in RFC 5424 [16] with a such
structure:
<PRI> TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME APP-NAME: MSG
The value of the PRI part is assigned based on two proper-
ties, which are severity and facility. Severity is a numerical
value of event priority and varies from 0 (emergency) to 7
(debug). Facility value depends on the log supplier, where
different kinds of system services have taken their own
codes, e.g., kernel messages (kern) have 0 facility value,
authentication events (auth) have facility value equal to 4,
etc. In addition, every log contains the timestamp of the
logged event, hostname of the machine which produced the
message, program source of the event (optionally with PID
in brackets) and message content of registered log.
An example of a syslog protocol log is shown below:
Jul 7 14:37:10 pl.bipse.wil.si.kbk1
sshd[15308]: Accepted password for root from
192.168.56.1 port 56440 ssh2
Audit has an independent log processing system, which
writes events to /var/log/audit/audit.log file and also pro-
vides a rotation mechanism for its journals. However, with
the usage of audisp daemon the audit output can be redi-
rected to the standard /dev/log socket for further process-
ing. The audit log contains information about the type of
registered event (system call, login information, etc.), its
timestamp and a list of audit event fields suitable for given
occurrence.
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The example of audit log is as follows:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1441374914.091:1975):
arch=c000003e syscall=82 success=yes
exit=0 a0=1668900 a1=4a4fa8 a2=1647c00
a3=6d617473656d6974 items=5 ppid=1 pid=1840
auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none)
ses=4294967295 comm=“NetworkManager”
exe=“/usr/sbin/NetworkManager” key=“LINKING”
3. Transport Layer
3.1. Open Source Systems for Log Processing
A mechanism for centralized logging can be set up by con-
figuring existing open source solutions for log processing.
The leading software utilities are syslog-ng Open Source
Edition, developed by BalaBit IT Security Ltd.[17] and
rsyslog from Rainer Gerhards and Adiscon.
The syslog implementation used in a security system should
meet the requirements described in [18], such as high avail-
ability of service and confidentiality and integrity of trans-
mitted data. Both of the chosen solutions fulfill these as-
sumptions and offer the ability to send and collect remote
log messages by encrypted transmission using the Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) mechanism. Another key feature
that both rsyslog and syslog-ng provide is database sup-
port. In addition, syslog-ng represents a highly customiz-
able solution that can gather information from many dif-
ferent sources beside the standard operating system events,
e.g. additional text files and the content of binary files such
as /var/log/btmp, which contains records of failed user login
attempts). The syslog-ng’s database support is flexible and
allows storing logs in daily tables without additional admin-
istrational procedures. The main disadvantage of syslog-ng
is its fix-sized queue mechanism, which does not guaran-
tee avoiding log loss during server unavailability in case of
client’s queue overflow.
On the other hand, rsyslog is capable of collecting standard
system messages and events written to external text files
and transferring them via Reliable Event Logging Protocol
(RELP) to the central log server, ensuring zero message
loss among the network nodes. rsyslog also supports disk
buffers for not forwarded log messages, which protects log
journals from loss and inconsistency.
For the purposes of the designed system rsyslog was cho-
sen to create the centralized log processing system due to
the reliability of its built-in mechanisms for log transfer
between the hosts.
3.2. Proposed Architecture of the Transport Layer
The transport layer is based on client-server architecture.
On every client machine data is collected from typical
sources, such as the /dev/log socket (including the out-
put of audispd redirecting audit events), system services
like AIDE or sshd. Moreover, clients can gather informa-
tion from network devices by receiving UDP messages
and passing the relevant data further. Collected informa-
tion is sent to the log server via the RELP communication,
which guarantees no message loss. RELP mechanism uses
a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection, which
is an advantage over plain syslog communication, which
uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as a default.
The server machine receives messages from remote clients
and processes them next to the logs from the local sources
described above. Remote logs are written to separate files
in catalogues named after client’s hostnames, reflecting the
file structure on origin machine. The copy of all messages
is sent to the database, from where logs can easily be ac-
cessed with SQL queries. The database output stores all in-
formation included in the log, server receive timestamp and
database insert time as well. The rsyslog, based on proper-
ties from syslog header, filters messages and forwards them
to the named pipe /dev/ossec, from where they are received
by OSSEC HIDS analyzer. The flow of information in the
system is displayed in Fig. 3.
Client Server
Syslog Syslog
logs logs
UDP
/dev/log
/dev/ossec
/dev/log /var/log/*/var/log/*
log DB
Fig. 3. Event log flow.
4. Analysis Layer
OSSEC HIDS is a platform to monitor the status of net-
work elements. It offers the functionality of Host Intrusion
Detection System (HIDS), Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM), log monitoring, rootkit detection and
checking the integrity of system files. It is frequently used
as a part of more complex security systems, due to its flex-
ibility and facility in adapting to own needs [19], [20]. In
the proposed architecture OSSEC HIDS with custom rules
and decoders is used to build a real-time log analyst moni-
tor. This approach enables correlation of events from every
node in the network. The stages of the analyst process are
shown in Fig. 4.
Process steps are as follows:
• Pre-decoding – as mentioned, rsyslog is used as
a transport channel for logs, which adds a syslog
header. This step decodes the syslog format and pulls
information about hostname and time from log;
• Decoding – custom decoders extract information
based on program name, relevant for event type. It
detects data like login name, address and ports for
source and destination;
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Pre-decoding
Decoding
Alert
/dev/ossec
Signatures
Fig. 4. OSSEC HIDS flow.
• Signatures and alerting – a set of custom rules is
matched to the log event. Composite rules correlate
hostnames, IPs, users etc. Every rule has an assigned
priority level. When a single event matches more
than one rule, the generated alarm has the priority
of the rule with the highest level or with the level
of the first matched rule when levels have the same
value. If the incident violates adopted policies, an
alarm is raised. Generated alarms precisely define
the detected security events.
4.1. Pre-decoding
OSSEC HIDS recognizes different log formats. In the pro-
posed system, the most common syslog format is used.
Based on the syslog format, specified fields are decoded,
such as:
• hostname – DNS/IP address of component which
originated the event,
• time – time of the event from the element,
• message – message which is used in analysis,
• program – information which process generated the
event.
Table 1 shows the result of the pre-decoding of a sample
log.
Table 1
The result of the pre-decoding of a sample log
Time Jul 17 08:34:40
Hostname pl.bipse.nask.element2
Program sshd[19721]:
Message
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for
root from 192.168.56.1 port 51499 ssh2
4.2. Decoding
Based on the results of pre-decoding, the field named pro-
gram determines the process from which the log comes.
This approach minimizes the number of decoding attempts
from the various decoders to only those that meet the cri-
teria. The matching decoder will later be used to decode
relevant information, for example the source IP address of
the user. The decoding process consists of three stages:
• decoder selection,
• log content matching using regular expressions,
• decoding declared fields.
Example of decoding an sshd log is shown in Fig. 5. Based
on process name sshd, the sshd decoder is used in the first
stage. This decoder has a set of sub-decoders, that are
used in regular expressions matching to determine which
of them can decode specific field. It is possible to use sev-
eral decoders simultaneously. Figure shows that the sshd-
success decoder has been selected. The last stage presents
that fields root and IP address were chosen and decoded
as USER and SRCIP (names of fields used in the inner
OSSEC HIDS logic).
1
2
3
Jul 17 08:34:40 pl.bipse.nask.element2 sshd[19721]
sshd PAM
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for root from 192.168.56.1
port 51499 ssh2
sshd-success ssh-denied
Accepted keyboard-interactive/pam for root from 192.168.56.1
port 51499 ssh2
USER SRCIP
Fig. 5. OSSEC HIDS decoding process.
4.3. Event Correlation and Signatures
OSSEC HIDS distinguishes two categories of rules that
generate alarms:
• atomic – based on a single event which occurred in
the system,
• composite – correlated over time, based on patterns
of other logs.
Figure 6 shows the logic of matching a rule to a decoded
event. Log entries are analyzed in a sub-rule only after
matching its parent rule. This approach accelerates the
process of analysis and minimizes the tested rules amount.
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Log arrives
111 501 XXX
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133
123
144
Fig. 6. OSSEC HIDS rules match.
Pessimistic number of rules to process is the sum of all
parent type rules.
In the proposed solution the grouping of rules is a base for
event correlation. For example, events coming from two
different sources are decoded by two separate decoders and
getting in two independent branches of rules. However,
those rules have the same group id. While appearing in-
dividually none of the detected events generate alarms, but
their correlation leads to signs of an incident being detected
and raises an alarm. The grouping logic based on decoders
sshd and login is shown in Fig. 7.
Alert
No alert
sshd log login log
sshd login
110001 101002
authentication_failed
110016
Decoding
Signatures
Group
Correlation signatures
Fig. 7. OSSEC HIDS correlation and grouping logic.
4.4. Proposed Abuse Detection
Custom rules and decoders allow detection of events, which
can be categorized into groups of security violation alarms
like:
• file modification – files that are watched by auditd or
AIDE, mostly configuration files of system or secu-
rity processes,
• authentication abuse – local or remote, based on login
and sshd proccess,
• rejected connection attempts – system firewall reports
about rejected connection attempts, this information
can be grouped and detected as a host scan,
• successful system user login – for example user
apache or mysql,
• malfunctions services – for example, possible error
of racoon negotiation between elements or invalidity
of certificates,
• file system and hardware errors – can cause unno-
ticed relevant events in system, like overflow of hard
drives,
• sudo abuse – system user and group modification,
• occurrence of unknown errors – events which should
draw attention of the operators, those can be symp-
toms of attacks or reconnaissance,
• network equipment errors and events – errors and
changes in the network topology are crucial informa-
tion about inappropriate network activity for further
investigation.
5. Normalization Layer
Previous layers process relevant event logs that can pos-
sibly generate alarms. This layer adds extra functionality,
which makes events more useful and foolproof. This is per-
formed by custom-written software. Main objectives of this
layer are:
• alarm suppression,
• normalization for other security systems,
• guaranteed delivery,
• nonlinear correlation,
• rejection of irrelevant alarms.
5.1. Alarm Suppression
In the proposed solution OSSEC HIDS can aggregate and
correlate events. Such aggregation can easily generate too
many alerts if events incoming in a short time are a huge
number of identical logs. As OSSEC HIDS suppresses
identical logs, this layer suppresses OSSEC HIDS iden-
tical alarms. Each subsequent alarm which is propagated,
contains the number of events summed in the suppression,
so that the number of individual events is not lost. Sup-
pression affects only the repeating alarms. The suppression
time is configurable, depending on the type of event to
which it refers to. This process is shown in Fig. 8. The pro-
posed approach minimizes the amount of identical alarms
sent and processed by central alarm analyzer, which re-
sults in improvement of performance without losing any
information.
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Fig. 8. OSSEC HIDS alarm suppression.
5.2. Normalization for Security System Protocol
Security systems often use their own protocols to com-
municate between components. Additionally, redundant
information generates unnecessary network traffic, which
can lead to internal Denial of Service (DoS) of security
systems. Triggered alarms must be standardized to meet
the needs accepted as a norm for reporting security inci-
dents. Adopted policy may require additional data. At this
point, the normalization layer enriches the message with
additional data based on the configuration or correlating
this event with information from knowledge bases. This is
shown in Fig. 9.
OSSEC alert
OSSEC alert
OSSEC alert JSON
JSON
JSON
File Knowledge
base
Processing
Normalized data
Extra data
Protocol header
Normalized alarm
Fig. 9. Normalization for other security systems.
5.3. Guaranteed Delivery
Ability to communicate with another component that is
a consumer of alerts requires normalization of forwarded
information. The second step is to ensure that the detected
event has been received by the central processing system.
Each of the outgoing events has an identifier of an inci-
dent and its time validity. The mechanism checks whether
the consumer has sent a reception acknowledgment or the
validity of the message has expired. Based on this feed-
back information, it is possible to send a message again
and guarantee delivery.
5.4. Nonlinear Correlation
The normalization layer adds a second correlation that can
combine facts from various areas of events. This layer, by
focusing on brokering, is able to expand the analysis based
on the rules of event occurrence. This can provide his-
torical events analysis and detection of patterns in alarms
based on concept of states. Combining the facts of unde-
sirable incidents occurring in various parts of the network
and applying security modeling, could result in producing
security rules that may protect other nodes, which are not
endangered yet.
5.5. Rejection of Irrelevant Alarms
The normalization layer adds the ability for the complex se-
curity system to work in various modes, which may require
additional alarm suppression. To reject alarms that are ir-
relevant, when system’s state is taken into consideration,
following modes can be distinguished:
• learning mode – detected incidents are a base for
rule creation, which will preserve similar events from
propagating in normal mode,
• reconfiguration mode – alarms are temporarily sup-
pressed when the system is under configuration and
modifications could result in false-positives,
• normal mode – every event classified as an alarm is
propagated further, unless there was a corresponding
rule created in the learning mode.
6. Summary
The article presented a multilayered approach to managing
and handling security incidents based on event logs. Each
layer presented key aspects of its functioning with examples
of implementation. Use of ready-made solutions allows
to focus attention on upper layers associated with event
processing logic. The division of responsibilities into layers
allows easier modification and implementation as part of
security systems.
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Abstract—Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems play a crucial role in national critical
infrastructures, and any failure may result in severe damages.
Initially SCADA networks were separated from other net-
works and used proprietary communications protocols that
were well known only to the device manufacturers. At that
time such isolation and obscurity ensured an acceptable se-
curity level. Nowadays, modern SCADA systems usually have
direct or indirect Internet connection, use open protocols and
commercial-off-the-shelf hardware and software. This trend
is also noticeable in the power industry. Present substation
automation systems (SASs) go beyond traditional SCADA
and employ many solutions derived from Information and
Communications Technology (ICT). As a result electric power
substations have become more vulnerable for cybersecurity
attacks and they need ICT security mechanisms adaptation.
This paper shows the SCADA honeypot that allows detecting
unauthorized or illicit traffic in SAS which communication
architecture is defined according to the IEC 61850 standard.
Keywords—cybersecurity, IEC 61850, honeypots, SCADA.
1. Introduction
An electric power substation is a part of a critical infras-
tructure, an electrical grid, which delivers essential services
that many industry sectors and millions of individual con-
sumers depend on. Substations are used to distribute elec-
trical energy to consumers, transform voltage to different
levels, supervise and protect the distribution network. In
the modern substations theses functions are performed with
the support of a substation automation system (SAS).
SAS realizes common tasks of a Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and also provides addi-
tional features enhancing operation and maintenance effi-
ciency, e.g. alarm processing or substation integration [1].
Figure 1 presents a typical architecture of SAS that is di-
vided on three levels: station, bay and process. In the
station level there is a so-called Human Machine Interface
(HMI) used to control, supervise and monitor the substa-
tion, a workplace for engineering and configuration pur-
poses and interfaces for the remote communication, e.g.
with a control center. The bay level consists of control, pro-
tection and monitoring units of each bay and the process
level provides devices that directly interface the primary
substation equipment, i.e. smart sensors, actuators.
The devices in the bay and process levels are mostly intelli-
gent electronic devices (IEDs). IED is a device that imple-
ments particular function in a substation and has a micro-
processor and communication ports to be able to transmit
data and execute control commands. The examples of IEDs
are circuit breakers, voltage regulators, protection relays
and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). Big substa-
tions may have more than 100 bay level IEDs and a sim-
ilar amount of process level IEDs. Those IEDs are usu-
ally made by different vendors. To provide interoperability
between them the IEC 61850 standard defining common
communication architecture has been proposed.
Control center
Router HMI
Engineering
workplace
Ethernet switch
Ethernet switches
Station level
Bay level
Process level
Protection
IED
Protection
IED
Control
IED
Control
IED
Breaker
IED
Breaker
IED
Merging unit
IED
Merging unit
IED
Fig. 1. A typical architecture of SAS.
In most countries the electrical grid contains typically very
few substations and a failure of one of them may have se-
vere consequences. Thus any single substation has to be
carefully protected. In particular, a special attention should
be devoted to the cybersecurity of SAS. The application of
Ethernet and other Information and Communications Tech-
nology (ICT) solutions, as indicated by IEC 61850, makes
SAS more exposed to cyberattacks.
A disclosure of cybersecurity incidents in SCADA systems
confirms that they are not free of security issues. The
prominent example of an attack on the SCADA system was
an attempt to sabotage Iran’s nuclear project by means of
a computer worm known as Stuxnet. Stuxnet was released
in 2009. Chen et al. in [2] show an overview of the
Stuxnet’s architecture. They point on the considerable ef-
fort needed to develop such a malware as well as on the
fact that the attack would not be possible to succeed with-
out insider knowledge and the support from a large team of
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experts. The Stuxnet targeted attacks are able to penetrate
into the isolated part of the SCADA system that were tradi-
tionally separated from the parts connected to the Internet.
Stuxnet contains modules that attack PLCs in the target
system and may cause physical damage to the equipment.
Fortunately, the awareness of cybersecurity threats is grow-
ing. According to the recent ICS-CERT report [3] in 2014
there were reported 232 incidents and 167 vulnerabilities
concerning SCADA systems. It is widely recognized that
the protection based on network isolation and an obscu-
rity of proprietary communication protocols is no longer
suitable for today’s such systems. From the analysis of
SCADA security standards presented in [4] it results that
the most important cyber countermeasures are authentica-
tion and cryptography. On the other hand the most fre-
quently mentioned threat in those standards is a malicious
code. The leading SAS vendors try to address these security
issues offering their products with additional security fea-
tures adapted from ICT systems such as firewalls, antivirus
software, advanced account management systems or intru-
sion detection and prevention systems supporting SCADA
signatures.
A useful security mechanism that is becoming more popular
in ICT systems are honeypots. As defined by Spitzner [5]
a honeypot is an information system resource whose value
lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource. The
honeypot is a trap for the attackers. One of the honeypot’s
aim is to maintain the attacker’s interest and thus observe
the attack methods. This way previously unknown attack
methods can be revealed and analyzed to improve the sys-
tem security. Honeypots surely can help to better protect
the SCADA systems. Their application is considered in the
one of big research project concerning the cybersecurity of
critical infrastructures [6].
This paper presents the honeypot named SHaPe that is able
to emulate any IED conforming to the IEC 61850 standard.
SHaPe can be used to detect unauthorized or illicit traf-
fic in SAS, which communication architecture is defined
according to IEC 61850.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the related work concerning SCADA honey-
pots is discussed. In Section 3 the main principles of the
IEC 61850 standard are presented. Section 4 describes the
SHaPe honeypot. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the paper.
2. SCADA Honeypots
The literature mentions only few honeypots designed es-
pecially for SCADA systems. Each of them belongs to
one of the two traditional honeypot classes [7]: low-in-
teraction or high-interaction. A high-interaction honeypot
usually uses a real resource and let an attacker to inter-
act with it, e.g. log into the operating system. A low-in-
teraction honeypot operates by emulating a resource or
some part of it making an attacker convinced that he in-
teracts with the real resource. On the one hand the high-
interaction honeypot is able to induce and thus detect any
type of attack against the particular resource while the effi-
ciency of the low-interaction honeypot is limited by the
accuracy of the emulation. On the other hand the low-
interaction honeypot is usually easier to deploy and main-
tain and involves a lower risk of the honeypot to become
compromised.
One of the first initiatives concerning SCADA honeypots is
the SCADA Honeynet Project [8] that was started in 2004.
It aims to create a SCADA honeypot based on the low-
interaction honeypot Honeyd [9]. Honeyd simulates a num-
ber of network protocols such as HTTP, SMTP and FTP but
it can be extended to simulate other network protocols us-
ing simple scripts. The developers of the SCADA Honeynet
Project create a number of scripts emulating a PLC device
with HTTP, FTP, Telnet and Modbus services. They also
implement a Java applet that shows the status of a SCADA
device. The project being at the proof of concept stage has
not been developed since 2005.
Based on the SCADA Honeynet Project, Digital Bond [10]
develops a low-interaction SCADA honeypot that emulates
a popular PLC device with SNMP and all services provided
by the SCADA Honeynet Project honeypot. Moreover, Dig-
ital Bond proposes a security mechanism called SCADA
Honeywall. It uses IDS with special SCADA signatures to
detect known attacks and is able to stop the outbound traffic
from the compromised honeypots. The SCADA Honeywall
can be placed in front of either a low-interaction honeypot
like the one provided by Digital Bond or a high-interaction
honeypot using e.g. a real PLC.
Two different honeypot systems that have been used to
collect statistical data about the SCADA cyberattacks are
described in [11]. One system is a high-interaction honey-
pot that utilizes an actual PLC device and a physical server.
The PLC mimics a temperature controller in a factory and
has temperature, fan speed and light settings that can be
modified. The physical server that is connected with the
PLC operates as a HMI and hypothetically modifies the
PLC settings. The second system is a low-interaction hon-
eypot realized on the Amazon EC2 cloud Web service. One
Amazon EC2 instance is configured as a Web page emu-
lating the interface of a water pressure station. The another
Amazon EC2 instance connected with the first one simu-
lates PLC with DNP3 and Modbus services.
Another low-interaction SCADA honeypot emulating PLC
is presented in [6]. It implements three communication
protocols: Modbus, FTP and SNMP. Moreover it has a spe-
cial module for detecting probing activity at the remaining
TCP ports. The honeypot also provides additional features
such as filtering and aggregating the security events.
One of the latest SCADA honeypots is Conpot [12] on
which work began in 2013. Conpot is a low-interaction
honeypot that at the default configuration emulates Sie-
mens SIMATIC S7-200 PLC. It provides an implementa-
tion of Modbus and SNMP. The response times of emulated
services can be artificially delayed to mimic the behavior
of a system under constant load. Conpot can be deployed
with a custom HMI. It is an open source software that can
38
SHaPe: A Honeypot for Electric Power Substation
be easily extended to emulate more complex SCADA sys-
tems. The project is actively developed under the auspice
of the Honeynet Project.
At the end, it should be noted that beside the aforemen-
tioned typical SCADA honeypots there are other more gen-
eral honeypot solutions that may be employed to protect
SCADA systems. For example, GhostUSB [13] is a low-
interaction honeypot that emulates a USB storage device.
Although it does not focus on the SCADA network proto-
cols it can be used in the SCADA system to detect malware
that propagates through USB devices, e.g. Stuxnet.
Concluding, the SCADA honeypots known in the literature
allow monitoring traffic involved with a HMI and typical
PLC devices. They focus on the traditional SCADA com-
munication protocols such as Modbus, SNMP, FTP and
HTTP. Taking into account that these protocols are not
included in the IEC 61850 standard none of the existing
SCADA honeypots is suitable for modern SASs compliant
with this standard.
3. Overview of IEC 61850
IEC 61850 is an international standard that defines layered
communication architecture for a SAS to provide an in-
teroperability between IEDs from different vendors. The
communication architecture is based on abstract informa-
tion and service models.
3.1. Information Model
The IEC 61850 information model is presented in [14]. It
is an object oriented model that specifies a set of basic
data types and data objects with strict naming conventions.
The data objects have a fixed hierarchical organization il-
lustrated in Fig. 2.
Physical device (Network address)
Logical device (Multifunction IED)
Logical node (XCBR)
Logical node (CSWI)
Data (Pos)
Data (Loc)
data attribute (stVal)
data attribute (q)
Fig. 2. The IEC 61850 information model.
At the top level of the hierarchy there is a physical device
that represents an IED connected to a SAS network. The
physical device is identified by its network address. It may
contain one or more logical devices. The logical devices are
used to form a group of some power system functions which
are defined as logical nodes. Typically, the physical device
has one logical device. However the possibility of having
multiple logical devices allows a single physical device to
act as a proxy or gateways for several IEDs.
The logical nodes contained in the logical device are the
key objects in IEC 61850 representing the smallest entities
of a SAS functionality used to exchange information be-
tween IEDs. A logical node is a named grouping of data
objects that are logically related to the specific function.
IEC 61850 defines more than 100 kinds of logical nodes
covering the most common applications of SAS equipment.
They are classified into 19 groups. The names of all logical
nodes from the same group begin with the same character.
For example the logical node XCBR that is used to model
switches with short circuit breaking capability belongs to
the Switchgear group which all logical nodes have names
beginning with the letter X.
The semantic of the logical node is defined by its data and
data attributes. Each data in the logical node has a unique
name determining its purpose. IEC 61850 specifies about
500 data types with different semantic definitions. A data
object may have multiple data attributes each one having
name and attribute type. Data attribute names are standard-
ized and carry specific semantic. For example the logical
node XCBR has several data objects, e.g. Pos that describe
a position of the circuit breaker, Loc indicating a switchover
between local and remote operations or OptCnt represent-
ing an operations counter. In turn, the data object Pos has
many data attributes, e.g. stVal representing a position of
the real breaker that is an enumerated type taking one of the
following values: intermediate-state, off, on or bad-state.
3.2. Service Model
The IEC 61850 service model is described in [15]. Like
the information model it is also object oriented. The ser-
vice model defines several classes with related services.
The class GenServer represents the external behavior of
a device. Each GenServer object contains one or more
instances of GenLogicalDeviceClass class. GenLogicalDe-
viceClass together with three other classes GenLogicalN-
odeClass, GenDataObjectClass and GenDataAttributeClass
represent the generic logical device, logical node, data and
data attribute, appropriately. GenDataAttributeClass has an
important property named functional constraint that indi-
cates what services can be performed on the particular data
attribute. For example value ST of the functional constraint
means that the data attribute represents status information
whose value may be read, but cannot be written.
In the service model there are also defined functional
constraint data and functional constraint data attribute.
The functional constraint data is an ordered collection of
data attributes of the data object having the same func-
tional constraint. The functional constraint data attribute is
a data attribute having the specific functional constraint.
An ordered set of elements being either a functional con-
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straint data or a functional constraint data attribute is called
a data set and is represented by the DATA-SET class.
Data sets allow for more efficient information exchange
between IEDs.
The services related with the aforementioned classes are
the following:
• GenServerClass:
– GetServerDirectory: retrieves a list of all logi-
cal devices;
• GenLogicalDeviceClass:
– GetLogicalDeviceDirectory: retrieves a list of
all logical nodes;
• GenLogicalNodeClass:
– GetLogicalNodeDirectory: retrieves a list of all
instances of a given object class,
– GetAllDataValues: retrieves a list of all data at-
tribute values (optionally having a given func-
tional constraint) of all data objects;
• GenDataObjectClass:
– GetDataValues: retrieves a list of all data at-
tributes values,
– SetDataValues: sets a value of a given func-
tional constraint data or functional constraint
data attribute,
– GetDataDirectory: retrieves a list of all data
attribute names,
– GetDataDefinition: retrieve a list of all data at-
tribute definitions (names, types and functional
constraints);
• DATA-SET:
– GetDataSetValues: retrieves a list of the values
of all data attributes of the data set,
– SetDataSetValues: sets values of all data at-
tributes of the data set,
– CreateDataSet: creates a data set with a given
list of members being either a functional con-
straint data or a functional constraint data at-
tribute,
– DeleteDataSet: deletes a given data set,
– GetDataSetDirectory: retrieves a list of all data
set members.
IEC 61850 defines also other classes with different services
that are described in detail in [15]. All services are divided
on several categories. For example one category contains
services supporting the device self-description. Another
category is related with fast peer-to-peer exchange of sta-
tus information between IEDs and yet another involves the
control of an IED.
3.3. Mapping to MMS
The objects defined in the information and service models
are independent of any protocol stack. However to enable
real communication between IEDs these abstract objects
need to be implemented in a form that can practically op-
erate in a SAS network. IEC 61850 has established that
the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocol
over TCP/IP should be used for this purpose. Nonetheless
another protocol can be chosen in the future to follow the
evolution in ICT.
MMS is a public ISO 9506 standard that specifies the ways
in which real time process data and supervisory control
information is transferred between networked devices and
computers. The key element of MMS is a Virtual Manufac-
turing Device (VMD) that models an MMS device (server)
from the viewpoint of an MMS client. The VMD defines
the objects (e.g. variables, domains) that are contained in
the MMS server, the services (e.g. read or write a vari-
able) a client can use to access or manipulate the objects
and the behavior of the server upon receipt of those service
requests. Tables 1 and 2 present the mapping of the IEC
61850 objects and services to MMS as defined in [16].
Table 1
The mapping of IEC 61850 objects to MMS objects
IEC 61850 object MMS object
GenServerClass VMD
GenLogicalDeviceClass Domain
GenLogicalNodeClass Named variable
GenDataObjectClass Named variable
DATA-SET Named variable list
Table 2
The mapping of IEC 61850 services to MMS services
IEC 61850 service MMS service
GetServerDirectory GetNameList
GetLogicalDevice-
Directory
GetNameList
GetLogicalNodeDirectory GetNameList
GetAllDataValues Read
GetDataValues Read
SetDataValues Write
GetDataDirectory
GetVariableAccess-
Attributes
GetDataDefinition
GetVariableAccess-
Attributes
GetDataSetValues Read
SetDataSetValues Write
CreateDataSet DefineNamedVariableList
DeleteDataSet DeleteNamedVariableList
GetDataSetDirectory
GetNamedVariableList-
Attributes
40
SHaPe: A Honeypot for Electric Power Substation
According to ISO 9506 a VMD and thus every instance
of GenServerClass must also implement the following
services:
• Initiate – establishes an application association, i.e.
an agreement between the MMS client and the MMS
server governing their communication,
• Conclude – terminates an existing application asso-
ciation in a graceful manner,
• Abort – terminates an existing application association
in an ungraceful manner that may result in the loss
of data,
• Reject – notifies about reception of an unsupported
service request,
• Cancel – cancel an outstanding MMS service request,
• Identify – obtains information and status about the
MMS server.
MMS services are grouped into two categories: the ser-
vices requiring confirmation (so-called confirmed services)
and the services that do not require such a confirmation
(so-called unconfirmed services). The confirmed services
contain an invocation identifier that identifies the service
instance.
3.4. Configuration Description Language
Proper substation operation requires appropriate configu-
ration of all its IEDs. IEC 61850 provides a Substation
Configuration Language (SCL) that allows to describe the
substation topology, the communication system, e.g. how
IEDs are connected to networks and subnetworks, how data
objects are grouped into data sets. SCL also allows to de-
scribe the particular IED capabilities in terms of logical
nodes and the relation between substation structure and the
SAS functions represented by the logical nodes. The SCL
is based on XML. Its specification is given in [17].
A configuration process of substation involves many SCL
files to be created. The structure and functions of the
substation is defined in a System Specification Descrip-
tion (SSD) file that for example may contain the required
types of logical nodes and data. The configuration of
all IEDs with the communication section and the sub-
station description is included in a System Configuration
Description (SCD) file. Each IED to be compatible with
IEC 61850 must have an IED Capability Description
(ICD) file describing its functional and engineering capa-
bilities or an Instantiated IED Description (IID) file includ-
ing its project specific configuration. Moreover, it must be
able to use the SCD file to set its communication con-
figuration that is saved as a Configured IED Description
(CID) file.
4. SHaPe
The IEC 61850 standard was published in 2004 and since
then it has gained popularity among electric utilities and
power system authorities in many countries. It can be taken
for granted that more and more substations will be up-
graded to conform the IEC 61850 standard. Thus a future
SCADA honeypot to be useful in the electric power indus-
try must support the communication protocols specified in
IEC 61850.
4.1. General Concept
SHaPe is a low-interaction honeypot that is able to emulate
any IED compliant with IEC 61850.
The low-interaction approach allows to achieve several im-
portant goals. Firstly, SHaPe can be easily configured to
emulate different devices. What is needed is to provide an
ICD or IID file with the requested IED configuration. The
SCL file can be prepared using some IEC 61850 configu-
ration tool or simply obtained from the existing IED if the
similar one has to be emulated by SHaPe.
Secondly, SHaPe does not require any specialized equip-
ment or much computing resources. A typical personal
computer may run several instances of SHaPe. Each in-
stance can listen on multiple IP addresses. Taking into
account that a traffic coming into honeypots is rather low
one machine should be enough to deploy a farm of SHaPe
honeypots emulating many IEDs of different types.
Finally, SHaPe as a low-interaction honeypot involves lower
risk of being compromised by an attacker than a high-
interaction solution [18].
4.2. Detection Scope
SHaPe emulates IED behaviour that is involved with
the MMS communication over TCP/IP connection. The
generic substation events based on GOOSE or transmission
of sampled values that according to IEC 61850 are mapped
to other protocol stacks are not handled by the SHaPe
honeypot. Nonetheless all IEC 61850 services mapped to
MMS are supported and executed by SHaPe. If a service
creates, modifies or deletes some object the state of the
emulated IED will be accordingly updated.
SHaPe allows for detecting many important events that may
appear during the communication with the emulated IED.
These events are the following:
• an establishment of a TCP connection,
• a termination of a TCP connection,
• an establishment of an MMS application association
(Initiate service),
• a graceful termination of an MMS application asso-
ciation (Conclude service),
• a receipt of a Reject service request,
• a receipt of an Identify service request,
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• a receipt of a GetNameList service request,
• a receipt of a Read service request,
• a receipt of a Write service request,
• a receipt of a GetVariableAccessAttributes service
request,
• a receipt of a DefineNamedVariableList service re-
quest,
• a receipt of a DeleteNamedVariableList service re-
quest,
• a receipt of a GetNamedVariableListAttributes ser-
vice request,
• a receipt of an unknown MMS request before estab-
lishing an MMS application association,
• a receipt of an unrecognized MMS request after es-
tablishing an MMS application association.
Note that all IEC 61850 services are captured by SHaPe in
terms of appropriate MMS services. Moreover, SHaPe de-
tects the establishment and termination of every TCP con-
nection and the receipt of MMS services related to VMD
except Abort and Cancel services.
4.3. Monitoring Multiple Network Addresses
One instance of SHaPe can emulate an IED of a particu-
lar type. However SHaPe is able to run many copies of
the emulated IED each one having assigned different IP
address. In this way SHaPe allows for easily increasing
the number of monitored IP addresses and thus the attack
surface involved with the particular type of IED.
For each running copy of IED SHaPe maintains a sepa-
rate state, i.e. the values of all data attributes in all log-
ical nodes. The IED state can be modified by some IEC
61850 services, e.g. SetDataValues or SetDataSetValues.
All MMS clients connected with the same IED copy see
the modifications made by any of them. SHaPe keeps the
modified state until there is no MMS client connection over
a predefined period of time. After this idle time the IED
state is restored to the initial one.
4.4. Implementation
SHaPe has been implemented as a module of Dionaea [19],
which is a general purpose low-interaction honeypot run-
ning on the Linux platform. Dionaea has several modules
that emulate different services prevalent in typical computer
networks, e.g. HTTP, FTP, SMB. None of these modules
can emulate a typical SCADA device. SHaPe is the first
Dionaea module that is designed for SCADA networks.
Dionaea provides two useful mechanisms for their modules:
a communication mechanism handling TCP connections
and a logging mechanism that registers security events.
Thanks to the communication mechanism SHaPe does not
have to operate directly on the TCP sockets as it can handle
appropriate events related to the transport communication
layer, e.g. establishing a new TCP connection, terminating
a TCP connection or receiving data. The events concern-
ing the establishment or termination of a TCP connection
are automatically forwarded to the Dionaea logging mech-
anism. For each establishment of a TCP connection the
following information is registered: the TCP connection
identifier, the timestamp, the source IP address, the source
port, the destination IP address and the destination port.
An event of the termination of a TCP connection contains
the identifier of the TCP connection and the timestamp.
The Dionaea logging mechanism saves event information in
a log file and optionally sends it to a specific XMPP server.
SHaPe uses this logging mechanism to register events re-
lated to MMS protocol layer in the same way as the TCP
layer events are registered. For each MMS protocol layer
event the following information is provided: the identifier
of TCP connection within the event has occurred, the event
timestamp, the type and body of the MMS request in which
the event has been detected. The type of MMS request indi-
cates one of the unconfirmed services (Initiate, Conclude or
Reject) or that a requested service is confirmed. In the latter
case SHaPe registers additional information – the subtype
corresponding to the particular confirmed MMS service and
the invocation identifier of the service instance.
To handle MMS requests SHaPe utilizes library li-
biec61850 [20] that for integration purposes has been
slightly modified.
Both Dionaea and libiec61850 are an open source software.
Also SHaPe is publicly available under GNU GPL at the
SHaPe project website [21].
5. Summary
In this paper the honeypot named SHaPe is proposed.
SHaPe opposed to other SCADA honeypots supports the
IEC 61850 standard. Thus it can be used to protect a mod-
ern SAS conforming to this standard.
SHaPe can be easily configured to emulate any IED by pro-
viding an appropriate SCL file. One SHaPe instance may
listen on multiple IP addresses maintaining many copies
of the particular IED. Several SHaPe honeypots allow to
create a network of different IED decoys significantly in-
creasing the chance of detecting an unauthorized or illicit
traffic in SAS.
SHaPe has been implemented as a module of Dionaea
which is a general purpose low-interaction honeypot. To
handle MMS requests according to IEC 61850 SHaPe uses
library libiec61850. SHaPe along with Dionaea and li-
biec61850 is an open source software publicly available
under GNU GPL.
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Abstract—Usable user authentication is an important re-
search topic. The traffic signature-based approach is a new
authentication technology that identifies the devices used by
online users based on traffic signatures, where the traffic sig-
nature is a statistic of the video stream delivered by the au-
thentication server to the user device. This approach has two
advantages. First, users need not do any operations regarding
the device identification. Second, users need not be sensitive
to the privacy loss and computer theft. In this paper, an au-
thor evaluates the uniqueness and reproducibility of the sig-
nature by introducing a function that quantifies the distance
between two signatures. Through number of experiments is
demonstrated that the process interference approach has the
advantage of generating new signatures that are sufficiently
distinguishable from one another.
Keywords—user authentication, traffic signature, HTTP stream-
ing, packet capture, variance plot.
1. Introduction
User authentication is mostly based on passwords. A pass-
word-hacking exercise, however, demonstrated that a large
number of passwords can easily be cracked [1]. Accord-
ingly, users who place high value on their accounts should
adopt a more robust authentication strategy. Since the
United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council officially recommended the use of multi-factor au-
thentication in 2005 [2], various authentication technolo-
gies have been proposed, where multi-factor authentication
requires a prover to provide more than one distinct factors
to a verifier and there are three distinct authenticating fac-
tors: what you have (e.g. house keys), what you know (e.g.
passwords), and what you are (e.g. fingerprints) [3], [4].
Current what you have authentication schemes add an addi-
tional hardware device to a desktop/laptop PC. Such a de-
vice is, for example, a security token, smartphone, or
trusted platform module (TPM). Unfortunately, they are not
widely used today because they are complex, lead to a loss
of privacy, reduce control of the computer, or need to be
protected against device theft [3]. Number of authors ar-
gue that users’ capabilities and understanding should be
factored into the design of security technologies [5], [6].
In [7] is proposed another what you have authentication
scheme, which identifies the machines users are operating
to access their accounts. Presented in [7] approach is based
on video traffic analysis. The authentication server delivers
a video stream and the user device records packet arrival
times to calculate a traffic signature. The server then ver-
ifies whether the obtained signature agrees with the one
obtained before or the one registered previously. Recently,
some online banks request users to show their countersigns,
when users try to sign-in using devices that are different
from those they used to use. The difference can be de-
tected using the client environment carried by the HTTP
protocol, which includes an IP address, a browser type,
etc. This scheme roughly distinguishes user computer plat-
forms, whereas author’s approach, shown in [7], precisely
distinguishes them based on their unique signatures. As
long as user machines are correctly identified, users do not
need to be aware of anything about the machine identifi-
cation since signatures are calculated and verified without
intervention from users.
Contrarily, the current three major what-you-have authenti-
cation technologies, which deliver codes via the security to-
ken, email (or SMS), or an app running on a portable device
(e.g. smartphone) [8], direct users to do some operations,
such as starting the device/app and typing in the code. In
addition, as opposed to previous authentication schemes, in
which a single device/app generates codes based on some
algorithm, the traffic signature is formed through the in-
teractions among numbers of elements, which include not
only hardware and software components of the user plat-
form but also the server, video coding techniques, commu-
nication protocols that affect statistics of video traffic [9].
Since the interactions are not simple, it is difficult to infer
the signature even if detail specifications of the user and
server machines are given.
Meanwhile, a TPM chip into which unique RSA keys have
been burnt can strictly identify the user machine [10]. This
PKI-based approach strongly connects a user device to its
owner, so that owners must pay careful attention to a pri-
vacy loss and unit theft. Some mechanisms that minimize
the risk when stolen are a priori integrated (e.g. platform
integrity). Unfortunately, these extra attention and mecha-
nisms may cause the usability problems. Contrarily, in au-
thor’s approach, users do not have to be sensitive to these
risks since the signatures appear only in the authentication
process and there is no personal identity-related information
on the user device.
The PKI-based approach is also costly. As discussed in [5],
authentication solutions must be accessible to all online
users not just in terms of knowledge and effort but also in
terms of cost. The authors in [5] quote that older users, who
have much to gain from online participation, might be un-
able or unwilling to own a smartphone, which is the second
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factor of choice in many authentication solutions currently
deployed or planned. Presented approach demands video
delivery. The HTTP-based streaming technologies are used
because they are inexpensive and widely used today [11].
They avoid NAT and firewall traversal issues and provide
cost effectiveness since there is not need dedicated stream-
ing servers for video delivery.
The previous author’s work [7] introduced the traffic sig-
nature and discussed its sensitivity to the user machine.
This paper evaluates the signature through numbers of ex-
periments and clarifies its uniqueness and reproducibility.
Section 2 introduces the traffic signature and briefly out-
lines the result in [7]. Section 3 defines the distance be-
tween two signatures, based on which uniqueness and re-
producibility are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 investi-
gates which components of the user machine or interactions
among them dominantly participate in forming the signa-
ture. The findings in this section are effective not only
in enhancing reproducibility, but also in allowing users to
have different signatures even if their machines consist of
the same hardware components. Finally, Section 6 presents
the conclusions.
2. Traffic Signature
First decay rate is defined, which is derived from the vari-
ance plot [12]. Decay rate β (m) indicates how fast traffic
variability declines at time scale m. It depends on various
factors (e.g., computer hardware and software implemen-
tation, protocols, propagation delays, and bandwidth) and
the dominant factors vary with m. The following describes
how to calculate β (m). Let Xk denote the number of arriv-
ing packets during the k-th time interval of length δ , where
δ = 10−5 s. The m aggregated series {X (m)k } are obtained
by dividing time series {Xk} into blocks of length m and
averaging the series over each block as
X (m)
`
=
1
m
`m
∑
i=`m−m+1
Xi, ` = 1,2, . . . ,bN/mc, (1)
where m is a positive integer, N is the size of series {Xk},
and bxc is the largest integer that does not exceed x. The
sample variance of {X (m)k } is given by
V (m) =
1
bN/mc−1
bN/mc
∑
k=1
(X (m)k − flX)
2, (2)
where flX = 1N ∑
N
i=1 Xi. Hereafter it is assumed that aggre-
gation levels mi, i = 0,1, . . . , take real numbers. The decay
rate at level mi is defined as
β (mi) = log
(
V (bmi+1c)/V (bmic)
)
, (3)
where m0 = 1 and mi+1 > mi. Throughout the paper,
log mi+1mi = log
N
50 ·
1
21 for all i, and N = 6 · 10
6. The traf-
fic signature is twenty decay rates β1,β2, . . . ,β20, where βi
is used to indicate β (mi) for simplicity.
2.1. Experimental System
Unless otherwise mentioned, all results in this paper are
obtained using the experimental system in Fig. 1. In the
figure, the client PC (C-PC) accesses France 24 live
(IP = 213.205.104.131), a news channel based in France,
using the Internet Explorer Flash Player add-on. This on-
line news is delivered at a constant rate (448 Kb/s) us-
ing the TCP protocol. In Fig. 1, all packets destined for
C-PC are copied to the attacker’s PC (A-PC) by the port-
mirroring hub, so that not only C-PC but also A-PC col-
lects video packets from the server with WinDump [13] to
calculate signatures. Hereinafter, signatures calculated on
C-PC (resp. A-PC) are referred to as user (resp. attacker)
signatures. The news channel France 24 live was used be-
cause there are 30 routers between the news server and
C-PC and the round-trip time is approximately 283 ms.
Such a long-distance communication generates highly vari-
able video traffic. Practical signatures should be stable in
this case.
France 24 live
Internet
Port-mirroring
hub
Client PC (C-PC)
Attacker’s PC (A-PC)
Fig. 1. The port-mirroring hub copies all packets destined for
C-PC to A-PC.
2.2. Previous Results
In this subsection the results presented in [7] are briefly
introduced. Four machines in Table 1 are used as C-PC
in Fig. 1. Although they are all Windows machines, their
software and hardware components are somewhat different.
Figures 2 and 3 show their attacker and user signatures, re-
spectively. Throughout the paper, ten samples are obtained
for each signature {βi}1≤i≤20 to see the stability of each
decay rate βi. From the figures, decay rates {βi}1≤i≤16 are
mostly stable, while {βi}17≤i≤20 are not. This is mainly
because the number of samples X (bmic)k decreases as an in-
crease in i. It can be seen that attacker signatures (Fig. 2)
are all similar. In contrast, distinct differences exist between
any two user signatures in Fig. 3.
Table 1
Four Windows machines a-d used in the experiment
C-PC Model Purchase OS
a XPS420 Jun. 2008 Vista, 32 bits
b XPS435T Jul. 2010 Windows 7, 64 bits
c XPS9100 Jul. 2011 Windows 7, 64 bits
d Inspiron Jan. 2012 Windows 7, 64 bits
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Fig. 2. Attacker signatures (measured on A-PC): (a), (b), (c), and (d) correspond to machines a, b, c, and d from Table 1, respectively.
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Fig. 3. User signatures (measured on C-PC): (a), (b), (c), and (d) correspond to machines a, b, c, and d from Table 1, respectively.
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Next the difference between user and attacker signatures
is shown. From Figs. 2 and 3, user signatures are dif-
ferent from attacker signatures typically at levels m satis-
fying log(m) < 2. Note that m = 102 corresponds to the
time scale of one millisecond since 102δ = 10−3 s. The
port-mirroring hub never affects variances at this large time
scale. The following is author’s explanation for this phe-
nomenon. The difference occurs because A-PC performs
only packet collection, while C-PC performs both packet
collection and packet processing. On C-PC, the two jobs
are executed in parallel on every packet arrival. The two
jobs interfere with each other and this interference makes
the execution time to obtain the current time fluctuate.
In brief, the difference is due to inaccurate packet arrival
timestamps caused by resource (memory, CPU, etc.) com-
petition between two jobs. Hence, signatures in Fig. 3 differ
only at small time scales. Furthermore, the TCP protocol
intensifies the competition because packets tend to arrive
in batches when the protocol is used. Since the interfer-
ence is influenced by various factors (e.g. I/O controllers,
device drivers, and job scheduling), it is conjectured that
different machine models in Table 1 generated different
signatures.
3. Signature Distance
Previous work does not quantify the difference between
two signatures [7]. This section first defines the distance
between them. Let {β ai } and {β bi } denote user signatures
of machines a and b, respectively. They are distinguishable
if there exists at least one integer i at which |β ai −β bi | is
sufficiently large. Therefore, the research is focused on the
distance between the i-th decay rates β ai and β bi .
Figure 4 shows the histogram of 100 β1 samples and the
normal Q-Q plot, which compares the 100 β1 samples
with the theoretical normal distribution. From the figure,
β1 has a distribution close to the normal distribution. The
normality tests were performed using 100 βi samples. If
1 ≤ i ≤ 14, both the Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling
tests do not reject the null hypothesis stating that the βi sam-
ples are normally distributed when the significance level α
is 0.01. Therefore, this paper uses only {βi}1≤i≤14 for au-
thentication and assumes that β ai and β bi for 1≤ i≤ 14 are
independent and each has a normal distribution.
Let µai and σ ai be the sample mean and standard devia-
tion obtained from ten β ai samples. If µai > µbi , the dis-
tance between β ai and β bi must be a decrease function of
Pr(β ai < β bi ), the probability that a sample of β ai is smaller
than that of β bi . Let F(x; µ ,σ 2) be the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of normal distribution N(µ ,σ 2). If
µai > µbi , the probability Pr(β ai < β bi ) is given by
Pr(β ai < β bi ) = F(0; |µai −µbi |,(σ ai )2 +(σ bi )2). (4)
Meanwhile, if µai < µbi , Pr(β ai > β bi ) is equal to the right
hand side of Eq. (4). Therefore, independent of whether
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Fig. 4. The histogram and normal Q-Q plot obtained from 100
β1 samples.
µai < µbi or not, di(a,b), the distance between decay ratesβ ai and β bi , is defined as
di(a,b) =− logF(0; |µai −µbi |,(σ ai )2 +(σ bi )2). (5)
Note that di(a,b) is a decrease function of Pr(β ai < β bi ) if
µai > µbi .
Also the D(a,b), the distance between two signatures {β ai }
and {β bi }, is defined as
D(a,b) = |{i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 14}|di(a,b)≥ Li}| . (6)
Briefly, D(a,b) is the number of integers i that satisfy
di(a,b) ≥ Li, where threshold Li, which is obtained later,
determines whether the i-th decay rates of two signatures
are the same or not. Two distance functions d and D have
the following features: di(a,b) = di(b,a), D(a,b) = D(b,a),
di(a,b)≥ di(a,a)=− log0.5(≈ 0.3), D(a,b)≥D(a,a) = 0,
and they do not satisfy the triangle inequality.
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3.1. Signature Verification
Algorithm 1 shows the signature verification procedure As.
In the algorithm, { β bi } indicates the most recently obtained
sample signature of machine b. Let G be the set of all
user machines that request signature verification. Given
a(∈ G) and {βi}, procedure As returns “accept” if {βi} is
considered as a signature of machine a; otherwise, it returns
“reject”. If accepted, { β ai }= {βi}.
Algorithm 1: Signature verification procedure As.
Require: For any b ∈ Ga, D(a,b)≥ 1.
1: procedure As(a,{βi})
2: while Ga is not empty do
3: Select b ∈ Ga
4: Ga← Ga \{b}
5: for i = 1 to 14 do
6: if di(a,b)≥ Li then
7: if (µai −µbi )(βi− β bi )≤ 0 then
8: return reject
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end while
13: return accept
14: end procedure
The verification is performed by comparing the signa-
ture {βi} with signatures of other machines. Let Ga be
the set of machines that are used for verifying a signature
of machine a. The procedure works under the condition
that for any b∈Ga, {β ai } and {β bi } are distinguishable, i.e.
D(a,b)≥ 1, for any b ∈ Ga. (7)
In the 7th line of Algorithm 1, an inequality
(µai −µbi )(βi− β bi )≤ 0 (8)
implies that the magnitude relation between µai and µbi is
different from that between βi and β bi . Note that Perror, the
probability that inequality (8) holds, is
Perror = 10−di(a,b). (9)
This seldom occurs if di(a,b)≥ Li (in the 6th line of Algo-
rithm 1) holds for a large Li. Thus, the procedure considers
that {βi} is not a signature of machine a and returns reject.
Procedure As returns accept after it makes t comparisons,
where t = ∑b∈Ga D(a,b). Therefore, Pf orge, the probabil-
ity that an attacker successfully forges a signature that is
accepted by the procedure, is
Pf orge = 2−t (10)
if the attacker has no information about the signature of
machine a. The forgery probability exponentially decreases
with t.
Algorithm 1 needs statistics µai , µbi , σ ai , and σ bi for cal-
culating D(a, b) and di(a, b). It is recommended that
µai , σ ai , and Ga should be updated by using the latest sam-
ples because these statistics may be affected by various
software updates (e.g. Windows update).
3.2. Requirements
The traffic signature-based authentication has the same tar-
gets of challenge as biometric-based authentication, where
biometric information (e.g., fingerprint, iris, etc.) is re-
quired to hold three requirements [14]:
• R1 – it is sufficiently different between any two users,
• R2 – it is reproducibly captured repeatedly,
• R3 – it is hard to be faked.
This paper focuses on R1 and R2. Before verifying whether
traffic signatures satisfy R1 and R2, there is need to deter-
mine the values of {Li}, which are criteria for determining
whether the i-th decay rates of two signatures are different
or not. This paper decomposes Li into two parts as
Li = Ls +∆Li, (11)
where Ls(> 0) is the distance required by security strength
and ∆Li(> 0) denotes the fluctuation range of distance di
caused by changes in CPU and network loads, etc. Require-
ment R1 demands that an integer i that satisfies di(a,b)≥ Li
for any a and b should exist, and R2 insists that ∆Li should
be sufficiently small. In the next section, ∆Li values are
experimentally derived.
First the value of Ls such that the authentication system
satisfies the following capability is determined. A user
accesses the system every one minute and As returns reject
once in a year on average. Assume that ∆Li = 0 and that for
all b∈Ga and for all i satisfying di(a,b)≥ Ls, di(a,b) = Ls.
Then, the mean of the binomial distribution indicates that
60 ·24 ·365 ·
(
1− (1−10−Ls)t
)
= 1, (12)
where t = ∑b∈Ga D(a,b). From Eqs. (9) and (10), both Ls
and t should be enlarged as much as possible for minimizing
both Perror and Pf orge. From Eq. (12), the Ls and t at the
same time can’t be reduced. If t = 20, from Eq. (12),
Ls ≈ 7. In this case, from Eqs. (9) and (10), Perror ≈ 10−7
and Pf orge ≈ 10−6 (i.e. the security strength corresponds to
a six-digit code). Hereinafter, Ls = 7 is used.
4. Signature Analysis
4.1. Four Machines
This section discusses whether traffic signatures satisfy in-
equality (7) by using machine set G = {a,b,c,d}, which
consists of four machines listed in Table 1, under the condi-
tion that fluctuation ∆Li = 0. Figure 5 exhibits distances di
derived from user signatures of machines in G. It can be
seen from Figs. 3 and 5 that di, 1≤ i≤ 14, correctly quan-
tify signature differences. Let us see the distance between
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Fig. 5. Distances di for all machine pairs in Table 1 – “a-b” in-
dicates di(a,b).
signatures of machines a and b (“a-b” in Fig. 5). From
the figure, di(a,b) > Li(= 7) at i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Therefore,
D(a,b) = 5. Similarly, D(a,c) = D(a,d) = 5, D(b,d) = 2,
and D(b,c) = D(c,d) = 1. Accordingly, (7) holds for all
sets Gx, x = a,b,c,d when Gx = G \ {x}. Figure 5 also
shows that for any x,y 6= a, D(a,y)≥D(x,y). Namely, ma-
chine a creates the most characteristic signature. This may
be because from Table 1, machine a is the oldest PC (there-
fore, it may be composed of many unique devices) and its
Windows version is different from those of the others.
4.2. Fluctuation Range
Next the fluctuation range ∆Li discussed in Subsection 3.2
is estimated. Let ∆di be the decrease in the distance di(x,y)
caused by the increase in the load of machine x, i.e.
∆di = di(x,y)−di( x,y), (13)
where x denotes machine x whose load has been raised. The
author estimates the distribution of ∆di through experiments
with various machines x, and then determine ∆Li such that
∆di is not greater than ∆Li with probability 0.95 (Pr(∆di ≤
∆Li) = 0.95).
From Eq. (13), mean µyi and variance (σ
y
i )
2 of machine y
are necessary to obtain ∆di. These values are independent
of β xi and β x˜i . However, y should be as normal as possible.
Therefore, one can assume that variance (σ yi )
2 is equal to
the mean of variances (σ xi )
2 of various machines x, i.e.,
(σ yi )
2 = m
(
(σ xi )
2) , (14)
where this paper uses m(Zi) and s(Zi) to indicate the mean
and standard deviation of samples {Zi}. On the other hand,
µyi can be determined by assuming that due to the load
increase, the distance decreases to Ls, i.e.
di( x,y) = Ls. (15)
From Eqs. (13) and (15), we have
di(x,y) = ∆di +Ls. (16)
In short, the load increase lowers the distance from Ls +∆di
to Ls. Using Eqs. (5) and Eqs. (14), (15) and (16) are re-
written as
− logF
(
0; |µ x˜i −µ
y
i |,(σ
x˜
i )
2 +m(σ xi )
2) = Ls (17)
− logF
(
0; |µxi −µ
y
i |,(σ
x
i )
2 +m(σ xi )
2) = ∆di +Ls. (18)
Given µ x˜i and (σ x˜i )2 + m(σ xi )2, (17) has two solutions µ
y
i ,
so that (17) and (18) yield two ∆di values for each x. The
24 ∆di values are obtained using various desktop and lap-
top PCs x. For measuring signatures of x, the CPU, mem-
ory, and hard disk utilization rates are raised by playing
a video (whose bitrate is 2.4 Mb/s) stored on the hard disk.
The Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling tests do not reject
the normality of 24 ∆di samples for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 14.
Thus, this paper assumes that ∆di has a normal distribution.
Using mean m(∆di) and standard deviation s(∆di), ∆Li is
given by
∆Li = m(∆di)+ z0.95s(∆di), (19)
where z0.95 satisfies F(z0.95;0,1) = 0.95; i.e., Pr(∆di ≤
∆Li) = 0.95. Table 2 shows m(∆di), s(∆di), and ∆Li de-
rived from ∆di samples. From the table, fluctuation ranges
∆Li depend on i and are between 2.5 and 5. If ∆Li val-
ues in Table 2 are used for calculating Li in Eq. (11), we
have D(x,y)≥ 1 for all x,y∈G in Subsection 4.1 except for
D(c,d). Therefore, in equality (7) does not hold. In other
words, the four machine models do not satisfy requirement
R1 in Subsection 3.2. In Section 5, author improves signa-
ture uniqueness to fulfill the requirement.
Table 2
Means m(∆di), standard deviations s(∆di),
and fluctuation ranges ∆Li for i = 1,2, . . . ,14
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
m(∆di) –0.1 –0.2 0.3 –0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
s(∆di) 2.6 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2
∆Li 4.2 2.9 4.1 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.7
i 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
m(∆di) 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.9 1.3 –0.4 0.0
s(∆di) 2.4 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.3
∆Li 4.2 3.0 3.4 5.0 5.0 2.5 3.8
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Fig. 6. User signatures for (a) g1, (b) g8, (c) g16, and (d) g32.
5. Uniqueness Improvement
So far the case where different machine models yield
different signatures was considered. This result suggests
that replacing some hardware or software components of
C-PC might produce signatures that satisfy requirements
R1 and R2. This section discusses the way how to change
user signatures without adding a hardware device to C-PC.
Note that as mentioned in the previous section, changing
user signatures is often necessary for security.
5.1. Process Interference
One approach for uniqueness improvement is to increase the
number of WinDump processes on C-PC. Let gk denote
machine g on which k WinDump processes are running.
Figure 6 shows user signatures for g1, g8, g16, and g32.
As shown in the figure, each number k creates a unique
signature.
Figure 7 exhibits distances di between signatures of g1
and gk, k > 1. The figure demonstrates that the process
interference-based approach generates many distinguishable
signatures since D(g1,gk) ≥ 1 for k ∈ {4,8,16,32}. Fig-
ure 7 also provides the following attractive facts:
• distances di(g1,gk) at 1≤ i≤ 4 increase with k,
• numbers i that satisfy di(g1,gk)≥ Li increase with k.
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Fig. 7. The impact of the number of WinDump processes on
distances di – “1-4” indicates di(g1,g4).
The author conjectures that these phenomena arise due to
process interference. Every time a packet arrives at C-PC,
a packet processing process and k WinDump processes all
start at once, so that they severely compete for CPU and
buffer resources if k is large. Number k represents the de-
gree of competition. As k increases, packet arrival times-
tamps become more inaccurate, and this inaccuracy result
in the emergence of unique user signatures.
The process interference approach is neither CPU nor mem-
ory intensive. Therefore this approach can be considered
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as a key technology for traffic signature-based user authen-
tication.
5.2. Other Approaches
This subsection explores other possible approaches for pro-
ducing unique signatures and investigates whether they are
available under various hardware and software configura-
tions. Experiments were made with 14 machines e-r, whose
system information is listed in Table 3. The research is
focused on Windows machines because most of personal
desktop and laptop PCs use Windows OS. For compari-
son, Mac and Linux machines are included in the table.
On Mac and Linux machines, tcpdump [15] runs instead
of WinDump. Since their packet analysis mechanisms are
different [16], experimental results may depend on which
of them is used. The table also shows the maximum dis-
tances (maxi di) between signatures measured before and
after each of the following three operations:
Snaplen: The snapshot length of each packet collected by
WinDump or tcpdump is increased to 4096 bytes (the de-
fault is 68 bytes). As a result of this, a larger data amount
are stored in the hard disk.
Interfer: Eight WinDump (or tcpdump) processes are ex-
ecuted so that they severely compete for CPU and memory
resources. Figure 6 is the result obtained by this operation
with machine g in Table 3.
Load: The machine workload is raised by executing eight
VLC media players [17], all of which play a video file on
the hard disk.
In Table 3, symbol } implies that the operation has an
ability to create distinguishable signatures, and ◦ indicates
that distinguishable signatures may be obtained if the oper-
ation is adequately tuned (e.g. the snapshot length further
increases). The table shows the following three results:
• the snapshot length-based approach may not yield
long distances,
• the load-based approach is not suited to laptop PCs
since the online news may abnormally terminate,
• the process interference-based approach is the most
effective and stable approach.
However, this approach should be adequately tuned since
maxi di depends on the machine configuration. Some ma-
chines require a large number of WinDump (or tcpdump)
processes.
An advantage of the process interference-based approach is
that a variety of recent and ongoing computer technologies
keep producing unique and unpredictable signatures. Even
if detail hardware and software specification of C-PC is
given, obtaining user signatures through computation must
Table 3
Three operations are performed to see whether they can
yield distinguishable signatures under various machine
configurations of C-PC. Symbols } and ◦ indicate
maxi di ≥ Li and 2 < maxi di < Li, respectively. Numbers
in parentheses denote maxi di
PC OS CPU Snaplen Interfer Load
e Vista Q9450 ◦ (5)
f
Win 7
i5-2400S (2) } (54)
g i7-930 } (18) } (51)
h i7-960 ◦ (5) } (104) ◦ (3)
i i3-2120 ◦ (6) } (69) ◦ (3)
j i7-2600 } (62) } (90)
k i3-2130 ◦ (3) } (37)
l
Win 8
i5-3350P } (16) } (56)
m i7-4770 } (15) } (37) } (13)
n (1)
Win 7
AMD } (12) } (66) (4)
o (1) Atom } (38) (4)
p (1) Win 8 i5-3317U } (24) } (59)
q Linux i7-3770K (3)
r MAC i7-2630 ◦ (5)
Notes:
(1) n, o, p – laptop computers.
(2) maxi di = 2 at 16 processes.
(3) maxi di = 2 at 64 processes.
(4) The online news abnormally terminates.
be a difficult task. At the same time, however, new com-
puter technologies make maxi di variable, so that the num-
ber of WinDump processes may need to be revised. The au-
thor considers the following recent technologies must have
impacts on di:
Timestamp precision: WinPcap (a Windows library used
by WinDump) by default obtains the timestamp through
kernel function KeQueryPerformanceCounter(), which pro-
vides a time reference with microsecond precision. By mod-
ifying a registry key, timestamps are generated through
faster i386 instruction RDTSC, which accesses TimeStamp
Counter (TSC), whose precision is equivalent to the CPU
frequency. RDTSC works only on Intel CPUs and is ex-
pected to provide nanosecond time resolution [18], [19].
Multiprocessing: A packet received by a NIC is stored in
the NIC driver buffer. The timestamp of the packet is mea-
sured after the capture driver is invoked through a hard-
ware interrupt. If there are pending interrupts, the driver
is executed after all these interrupts are served. There-
fore, the timestamp is significantly inaccurate if there are
a large number of pending interrupts [18]. WinPcap works
on symmetric multi-processing (SMP) machines. Multiple
processors concurrently execute the same instance of the
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capture driver, so that each processor handles a different
packet stored in the NIC driver buffer. Accordingly, the
delay of the driver execution depends on the number of
processors [20].
Turbo Boost: Turbo Boost is a technology that enables the
processor to run above its base operating frequency when
workload on the processor calls for faster performance. The
timestamp accuracy is affected by the technology since it
dynamical changes processing capability.
5.3. Traffic Control
Some traffic control software tools effectively create unique
signatures (probably because they frequently consult the
current time). Traffic control is performed to reduce con-
gestion, latency and packet loss by prioritizing, controlling,
or reducing the network traffic. One of the traffic control
tools is dummynet [21]. It emulates a network link that
consists of a transmission link with fixed bandwidth B and
propagation delay tD and a finite FIFO queue with tail-
drop. For link emulation, dummynet delays each packet i
by (`i +Qi)/B+ tD, where `i is the length of packet i and
Qi is queue occupation when packet i was queued.
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Fig. 8. The impact of: (a) propagation delay tD and (b) band-
width B on the distance. “100 ms” indicates the distance between
two signatures measured at tD = 0 and tD = 100 ms. “3r− 5r”
indicates the distance between two signatures measured at B = 3r
and B = 5r.
Figure 8a shows distances between signatures measured at
tD = 0 and tD > 0, where dummynet on C-PC delays every
incoming and outgoing packets by tD. Since video quality
deteriorates greatly when tD = 500 ms, the TCP window
scale option [22], which allows larger windows to be used,
is set to work when tD = 500 ms. The figure demonstrates
that maxi di is too small to distinguish signatures for all tD
values. On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 8b, dummynet
bandwidth B is useful in raising maxi di greatly. From the
figure, maxi di exceeds 100 at multiple values of i. By
looking closely at Fig. 8b, it can be seen that in the case
of “∞− 3r”, maxi di > 100 at i ∈ {2,3,4,5,6,12}, where
“∞−3r” denotes the distance between two signatures mea-
sured at B = ∞ (i.e. the bandwidth is unlimited) and B = 3r,
where r is the average rate of the video stream. Note that
perceived video quality is not degraded as long as B is at
least three times greater than r. All approaches in Sub-
section 5.2. change user signature {βi} only at small time
scales i (e.g. i ≤ 5), whereas by changing bandwidth B,
{βi} varies at large i (e.g. 9≤ i≤ 14). This is an important
advantage of this approach.
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Fig. 9. A larger B requires a larger ∆B to satisfy D ≥ 1. The
solid line denotes max1≤i≤14 Li.
Figure 9 shows maxi di between two signatures obtained
when the dummynet bandwidths are B and B + ∆B Kb/s.
The solid line in the figure denotes max1≤i≤14 Li(= 12),
so that D≥ 1 if maxi di is above the line. From the figure,
one can roughly estimate how many distinguishable sig-
natures one can be obtained by changing the bandwidth,
because the figure explains how maxi di increases with
∆B and how the minimum ∆B that satisfies D ≥ 1 grows
with B. For example, one can get roughly ten distinguish-
able signatures in the range of 500≤ B≤ 1000 Kb/s since
from the figure, the smallest ∆B that satisfies D≥ 1 is ap-
proximately 50 Kb/s in the range.
6. Conclusions
For protecting users who place high value on their ac-
counts, various what you have authentication technologies
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have been proposed. However, they are not widely used
today mainly because security hardware added to the user
machines poses other new problems. Additional hardware
is not necessary if the user machine itself is identified. In
this paper, the feasibility of applying the traffic signature to
the user machine identification has been discussed, where
the signature is calculated from HTTP-based video traffic
transmitted by the authentication server. This paper focused
on uniqueness and reproducibility of the signature based on
the distance function defined in this paper and obtained the
following results:
Uniqueness was verified based on a criterion, which re-
quires that the distance between any two signatures is not
less than Ls +∆Li, where Ls = 7 and ∆Li is the fluctuation
range of the i-th decay rate. The security strength corre-
sponds to a six-digit code when Ls = 7. Although different
machine configuration models tended to provide different
signatures, these signatures did not always meet the crite-
rion. However, the process interference approach, in which
the number of executing packet-capture processes is used
as a parameter for controlling the accuracy of packet ar-
rival timestamps, was shown to be effective for producing
signatures that meet the criterion.
Reproducibility was verified by calculating signatures
from real Internet traffic delivered by France 24 live. Al-
though the traffic traversed 30 routers and experienced
a long propagation delay, signatures measured on vari-
ous machines were stable especially over small time scales.
Sample signatures showed that the fluctuation ranges ∆Li
were between 2.5 and 5. Therefore, 9.5≤ Ls + ∆Li ≤ 12.
When the machine load is highly increased by playing eight
video files in parallel, five machines out of fourteen gener-
ated signatures that exceed Ls +∆Li. Therefore, some ma-
chines need to reduce their loads before performing the
authentication. However, dummynet, a traffic control tool,
is expected to mitigate the impact of the load because
dummynet generated many signatures whose distances
from the original signature were significantly large (more
than 100).
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Abstract—Mobile Cloud Networks group together mobile
users and clouds containing content servers. Hence, they
are an ideal framework for media content delivery. Stream-
switching adaptive video players cope well with some limita-
tions of Mobile Cloud Networks as low bandwidth and band-
width variability in access network. Nonetheless, other lim-
itations, as cloud congestion, are difficult to be managed by
the video players. This paper presents a system for discover-
ing fault situations at the cloud (e.g., cloud congestion) and
notifying to the video player, which will take appropriate ac-
tions for saving the quality of media transmission. In pro-
posed implementation the video application is DASH-capable
and adaptation action may be both stream rate adaptation
and content server adaptation. The communication between
client and server uses “bidirectional” communication feature
of HTTP/2 thanks to the new deployed modules running DASH
over HTTP/2 in both client’s and server’s applications.
Keywords—adaptive video streaming, DASH, HTTP/2.
1. Introduction
Mobile Cloud Networks (MCN) are a great opportunity for
media delivery since they group together mobile users and
media content servers (in cloud networks) under the same
umbrella. However, the challenging issue still remains the
quality of the delivery coming up to the user’s expectations,
without escalating the cost [1]. In fact, most of the recog-
nized problems of MCN [2]–[5] directly affect the media
streaming and should be solved for offering integrated so-
lutions of media delivery. Specifically, the limitations of
MCNs that mainly affect media delivery are:
• low bandwidth in the wireless access networks [2].
Even when 4G technology increased the bandwidth
in mobile devices, the continuous raise of demand for
mobile applications presents bandwidth limitations at
users’ disposal;
• excessive latency in wireless access networks [3], due
to physical media delay caused by the low-quality
connectivity with cell tower, and the latency of the
protocol for access to the physical media;
• resource limitations of mobile devices [3], i.e., elec-
tric power, processing power and storage capacity.
In the case of video applications, an added resource
limitation in mobile devices is the poor display in
comparison to laptops or TV;
• non-optimal management of access network re-
sources [4], which influences negatively in the afore-
mentioned points causing inappropriate access to the
available bandwidth and increasing unnecessarily the
latency in access networks;
• congestion of cloud networks [5], defined as the over-
load of any of the cloud resources (e.g., processing
capacity, uplink bandwidth), which causes delay in
the services damaging the delivery of media con-
tent and, as a consequence of this, impoverishing the
quality of the media event.
Aforementioned limitations require extra-management
mechanisms into the cloud directed to ensure appropriate
user’s satisfaction of the media event [6]. This paper cen-
ters on one of the mentioned limitations. It presents a man-
agement framework for discovering Cloud congestion situ-
ations and informing the user’s video player about the pre-
dicted state of the cloud (avoiding to keep per-connection
information in the cloud). The user’s video player has then
information for interpreting the cause of the reduction of
bandwidth measured at the player. If the bandwidth re-
duction is caused by the cloud congestion, then the video
player could adapt the video content server by switching
the streaming to another server located in a different cloud.
If the bandwidth reduction is caused by congestion in the
user’s mobile network, then the video player could adapt
the streaming by reducing the media bitrate.
Even when the presented framework is independent of the
video player (client application), the solution fits well in the
case of stream-switching adaptive video players. Stream-
switching adaptive players (e.g., Dynamic Adaptive Stream-
ing over HTTP-DASH, Akamai HD Video Streaming –
AHDVS, Adobe Dynamic Streaming and Apple HTTP
Adaptive Live Streaming – HLS) request consecutive small
portions of video (called chunks or segments), each one
with the appropriate media rate (called representation rate).
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The player decides both the representation rate and the con-
tent server from where the next segment will be down-
loaded, so it may adapt to the current state of the network
and of the content server.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gathers the
state of the art of the proposed management framework
and stream-switching adaptive protocols, whereas Section
3 provides some exemplary simulation results that prove the
gain of considering the information about the state of the
cloud into adaptation decisions. Section 4 presents the end-
to-end framework considering both architecture and com-
munication between involved entities and Section 5 shows
implementation details of client’s and server’s applications
deploying the presented framework. The proposed imple-
mentation has been optimized from the point of view of
cloud management since authors avoid a separate channel
for signaling between client’s and server’s applications. The
communication uses the streaming channel instead, and it is
based on DASH over HTTP/2, which makes bidirectional-
like (initiated from the client or from the server) commu-
nication feasible.
An undoubted added value of this paper is the extension
of QTSamplePlayer [7] for interworking with HTTP/2,
which is available to the researchers in the web page:
http://www.nit.eu/offer/research-projects-products/
http2dash.
Results of the tests performed on the implemented software
are presented in Section 6. At last, Section 7 summarizes
the paper.
2. Background
Between all the limitations of MCN, stream-switching
adaptive protocols cope pretty well with low bandwidth
and bandwidth variability thanks to the adaptation mech-
anism that dynamically selects the media bitrate that fits
better with the current download rate. Mobile networks
with unmanaged and variable resources require from the
client’s application to constantly control the occupancy of
its buffer [8] in order to avoid, from one side, re-buffering
and, from the other side, suboptimal use of resources in the
wireless link.
Even if stream-switching adaptive protocols are relatively
new, the papers on this issue are countless. Until the
publication of some open standards, the stream-switching
adaptive protocols were, mainly, close solutions. Therefore,
many of the first papers were based on inverse engineering,
i.e., the analysis of existing solutions by testing them in
different scenarios. A good recompilation of such analy-
ses was made by Akhshabi et al. in [9], where the au-
thors compared the adaptation mechanisms used by the
most important service providers from the point of view
of how aggressive/conservative they are in different scenar-
ios. The authors of [10] compared the Smooth Streaming
protocol which downloads video chunks periodically with
traditional technique of continuous consecutive download.
With the publication of the open MPEG standard Dynamic
Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH), the research cen-
tered on improving the adaptation algorithm in order to
balance the stability of video playout and the stability of
buffer occupancy. This trade raises due to the variability
of download bandwidth. Since the instability of buffer oc-
cupancy is less harmful from the end user’s point of view,
the applications try, as the main goal, to trade off oscilla-
tions in video playout. In order to avoid such oscillations,
Dobrian et al. [11] outlined the importance of the variabil-
ity of the size of consecutive segments when estimating the
download rate and Seo and Zimmermann [12] proposed to
estimate the download rate from the rate measurements of
a number of downloaded segments. The number of seg-
ments to be considered should be dependent of the state
of the network. Other approaches for consolidating video
playout consisted of monitoring the connections at the TCP
level [8] or using not only measurements of download rate
but also other measurements, such as packet losses, delay
and TCP throughput [13], [14].
In MCNs the conditions, which the client’s application
should adapt to, are not controllable at the client’s terminal.
In other words, it is unlikely to differentiate the increase of
the end-to-end delay from the decrease of bandwidth [11],
so the congestion in the cloud is difficultly recognizable at
the client’s side. A more general vision about the situation
of the server and network could improve the adaptation de-
cisions. Some researchers have proposed to place the adap-
tation logic out of the end user’s video player. For example
Liu et al. proposed to deploy centralized video controllers
with a global view of network and server conditions that
may take decisions about adaptation for the clients [15].
Rejaie and Kangasharju proposed to introduce proxies for
managing the quality of the media streaming at the network
level [16]. At last, some papers showed several benefits of
controlling the adaptation logic at the server side. For ex-
ample, Sodagar [17] proposed to base adaptation decisions
on the state of the sending buffer instead of the receiv-
ing one. Anyway, it seems that the adaptation logic should
be located in the end user’s video application, mainly by
two reasons: the client application is in the best position
to detect and respond to the dynamics on time and, on
the other hand, there is a strong need for keeping minimal
per-connection information in the cloud and servers [15].
In this paper a mechanism for informing the client about
cloud congestion situations is proposed. With this informa-
tion, the client may optimize the adaptation decisions by
differentiating mobile access congestion from cloud con-
gestion distinguishing two adaptation actions: media bi-
trate adaptation when there is mobile access congestion,
and content source switching when there is cloud conges-
tion. Moreover, the content server keeps no information
about situation of the clients in presented solution.
3. Rationale
The simulation tests provided in this section aim to show
that the adaptation decisions based only on user’s side
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(video player) measurements are more error prone than
in-cloud decisions assuming that further are supported by
measurements at the network level (as it occurs in com-
mercial cloud systems). Let us remark that the current
simulation analysis does not aim to cover a wide range of
cases and scenarios for offering exhaustive results about the
necessity of considering the state of the cloud into adapta-
tion decisions, but they only aim to confirm (in an exam-
ple scenario) that more information (about the state of the
cloud) is useful for taking better decisions about the media
streaming.
With this scope, the downloading of segments and calculate
the time of download of each segment (segment download
time) in presence of background traffic is modeled. A pos-
teriori (when the simulations are finished), the behavior of
user- and cloud-based adaptation algorithms for the values
of segment download rate obtained in the simulations will
be compared.
The simulation scenario is shown in Fig. 1. The cloud
uplink is modelled by a single server with infinite FIFO
queue that serves (service time equal to 120 µs) the stream
under test, which is composed of “segments” of 333 packets
(105 of such segments), and the background traffic, which
is Poisson traffic with a rate that varies for different tests:
Rbg = {2, 3, 4, 5 and 6}× 103 packet/s. The packets of
each segment of the stream under test arrive to the queue
with an interarrival time equal to 12 µs (shaped packets
arrival without considering TCP effects) and the first packet
of each segment is sent only when the last packet of the
previous segment finished its service in the queue.
Stream under
test generator
Background
traffic generator
Receiver
CBR
(333 packets/segment,
interarrival time = 12 s)m
Poisson (different )l
T = 120 sm
Fig. 1. Simulation model for rationale.
Note that if no background traffic were in the queue, then
the complete segment would be downloaded in around
40 ms and the next segment could be sent immediately
after that. Whereas, if there were 6× 103 packet/s back-
ground traffic, then the segment would be downloaded in
around 0.22 s, which means 7.5×103 packet/s of total traf-
fic (stream under test and background) and server utilization
ρ ≈ 0.9.
The test is repeated for five values of background traffic
rate indicated above. The mean rate of the stream under
test (called base rate) equals {3.9, 3.3, 2.8, 2.2 and 1.6}×
103 packet/s, respectively for each aforementioned value of
background traffic rate, which means queue utilization ρ ≈
{0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85 and 0.9}, respectively. Let us remark
that for each segment of the stream, the download rate is
slightly different to the base rate due to the unpredictability
of Poisson traffic.
When the simulations are finished, the download rate of
each segment (105 segments in each one of the five tests),
ri, as the number of packets in the segment (333 packets)
divided by the segment download time are calculated.
With the obtained values of segment download rate, the
authors try to understand how the adaptation algorithm
works in the case when it has no information about the
state of the cloud (the server and the queue) and when it
has this information. During adaptation decisions, three
potential representations with rates: R1, R2 and R3, where
R2 is the base rate minus 5% (of the base rate) are as-
sumed. R1 is the base rate minus 15% and R3 is the base
rate plus 5%, as indicated in Table 1. Note that R2 is the
reference representation, i.e., the representation that should
be selected for all segments if the background traffic were
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) instead of Poisson.
Table 1
Probability of erroneous decision
P
Representation User-based Cloud-based
(packets×103/s) Perr Perr
0.70
R1 = 3.3, R2 = 3.7, 9.7×10−3 3.8×10−3R3 = 4.1
0.75
R1 = 2.8, R2 = 3.1, 1.1×10−2 4.5×10−3
R3 = 3.5
0.80
R1 = 2.4, R2 = 2.7, 1.2×10−2 5.2×10−3R3 = 2.9
0.85
R1 = 1.9, R2 = 2.1, 1.4×10−2 5.9×10−3R3 = 2.3
0.90
R1 = 1.4, R2 = 1.5, 1.5×10−2 6.5×10−3R3 = 1.7
For the adaptation algorithm which does not consider infor-
mation about the state of the cloud (called user-based adap-
tation algorithm), authors assume an algorithm that adapts
the representation bitrate of the next segment to the down-
load rate of the last segment. This is, the representation
selected for segment i, Ri, is calculated as:
Ri = max
n
{Rn|Rn < ri−1} , (1)
where ri−1 is the download rate of segment i−1.
The authors are conscious that the assumed adaptation al-
gorithm is too simple (compared to commercial ones), but
it is enough to compare user- and cloud-based adaptations.
This adaptation algorithm is applied to the 105 ordered
values of segment download rate ri, obtained in the sim-
ulations. In this case, the representation R1 (simulation
results for total load in the server ρ = 0.7) will be selected
for 472 segments (since 472 segments were downloaded
with rate lower than R2). The representation R3 will be
selected in 502 segments (since 502 segments were down-
loaded with rate higher than R3). All the other segments
will be requested with representation rate equal to R2.
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For analyzing the adaptation decisions, authors consider
that the adaptation decision is erroneous when the selected
representation for segment i, Ri, is higher than the down-
load rate of segment i: ri (resulted from the simulations).
This is, the decision is incorrect if Ri > ri. Let us remark
that Ri > ri could cause image freezing in video players
with short playback buffer. Note that Ri is a function of
ri−1, so the erroneous decision rate is closely related to the
correlation of the segment download rate. The probability
of erroneous decision for different values of ρ is presented
in Table 1 (user-based column).
The second algorithm analyzed is the so-called cloud-based
algorithm. It considers the information about the current
state of the cloud and (based on historical data) the average
conditions of the cloud. In the presented simulations, the
average traffic is the same during all the simulations, so
the average conditions (load, available bandwidth) of the
cloud does not vary. Therefore, we assume that the cloud-
based algorithm selects the same representation (R2) for all
the segments: Ri = R2, i = 1 . . .105. Also in this case, we
consider that taken decision for segment i was erroneous
when Ri > ri.
The probability of error (erroneous decisions divided by to-
tal decisions, i.e. 105) is presented in Table 1 for each of the
five tests (different values of ρ), together with the values of
the representation rates. As we can observe, the error for
user-based decision is always much higher than in the case
of cloud-based decisions since cloud-based decisions are
based on the knowledge of the situation of the cloud bot-
tleneck, unlike user-based decisions. For increasing values
of ρ , the probability of erroneous decisions raises, which is
explained by the higher variability of the state of the queue,
which causes higher variability into the download time of
the consecutive segments.
The authors are aware that the presented results are very
dependent on the assumptions (especially on the assumed
adaptation algorithms), but the aim of the simulation-based
comparison was only to show that user-based decisions
are less reliable since the user’s video application does
not have information about the bottleneck. A lector could
find other algorithms that provide better results, but the
conclusion would be the same. The cloud has information
about the cloud’s bottleneck that the user does not own, and
such information may be useful for taking right adaptation
decisions.
4. End-to-end Framework for
Cloud-aware Adaptation
In order to provide awareness about the state of the cloud
into adaptation decisions, authors propose that cloud sys-
tem performs measurements at the cloud premises (gener-
ally, in the cloud access), which will be used for predicting
the state of the cloud for the next few seconds (in pro-
posed implementation the state of the cloud is predicted for
the next 5 s). The information about potential restrictions
of the cloud is then passed to the content server, which is
responsible for sending it to the user’s DASH application
(client DASH application) by using the push function of
HTTP/2. The DASH application, on its turn, will request
the next segment by considering the state of the user’s
mobile access network (as measured by the DASH ap-
plication) and the state of the cloud (as indicated by the
information received from the content server). The deci-
sions taken by the client application can be to perform the
media bitrate adaptation or the content server adaptation
(switching to another cloud for serving the request). Me-
dia bitrate adaptation is efficient if the congestion is in the
wireless access since the unique possibility is to reduce
bitrate for reducing congestion but, in the case of cloud
congestion, better results by switching the content server
while maintaining the previous media bitrate (saving the
quality of the future streaming) can be obtained. Let us re-
mark that both media bitrate and content server adaptation
decisions should be in accordance with the original Media
Presentation Description (MPD) file managed by the DASH
application (different representations for media bitrate
adaptation and different BaseURL tags for content server
adaptation).
In order to obtain reliable information about cloud conges-
tion, the system performs the next operations:
• The Monitoring Resource Mediator (MRM) (see
Fig. 2) collects (in some time windows before a cur-
rent instant of time) bandwidth information avail-
able at uplink of the cloud and processor load in
the servers. Bandwidth information about aggregate
traffic avoids potential problems of scalability dur-
ing the measurements. This information is stored in
the monitoring database at the Cloud Manager (CM).
Let us remark that commercial clouds actually con-
tain MRMs that monitor the state of the links.
• At time t, the Traffic Forecast within the CM (using
the collected data read from the monitoring database)
provides small-term bandwidth forecast for the next
T seconds, i.e. [t, t + T ], and decides whether the
cloud will experience in that time an over-load (con-
gestion) that will be able to impoverish the quality of
the media transmission. In that case, the CM informs
the content server and the latter sends information to
the client DASH application. The system finishes the
above steps before time t, so that an over-load alert
can be sent to the DASH application at time t for
the period [t, t + T ], after which the above process
is repeated for the next period [t + T, t + 2T ]. Let
us remark that the time T is not synchronized with
the segment duration or segment download duration
but the two operations (DASH streaming and cloud
congestion control) work independently.
Figure 2 shows the entities involved in providing cloud-
awareness to the user’s terminal.
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Fig. 2. Framework for cloud-aware adaptation.
The MRM is the monitoring tool that provides information
about the traffic in selected points of the cloud (especially
in the uplink of the cloud) and about the state of the proces-
sors in the servers. Many enterprize clouds, open-source
clouds and CDNs provide a multimodal selection of possi-
ble monitoring metrics that span beyond the CPU utilization
and Bulk Transport Capacity up to more detailed per ser-
vice or user-defined metrics (e.g. [18]). In this case, the
measurements used for predicting over-load of the cloud
are the bandwidth of the aggregate (at cloud uplink) and
the number of new requests arrived to the cloud during
the last 30 s. The commercial Riverbed Stringray Traffic
Manager tool [18] provides the requested measurements.
Two different kinds of measurements are necessary for the
traffic forecast algorithm: the current bandwidth measure-
ments and the historical data (stored into the Monitoring
Repository), as shown in Fig. 2.
The Traffic Forecast module has to efficiently predict the
needed bandwidth capacity in the cloud based on observed
fluctuations of cloud resources and to conclude which situ-
ations may lead to cloud congestion. For the implementa-
tion of the traffic forecast algorithm, a similar approach as
in [19] is proposed but considering each http request (dur-
ing one video session) as a separate video channel. The
algorithm estimates the bandwidth required to the server
(bT ) during the next instant of time, T , according to esti-
mated values of active population (NT ) and target download
rate which, on mean, each user will require (R), as indicated
in Eq. (2).
bT = R×NT . (2)
Generally, the estimation of the population is based on
the past measurements of population that are downloading
content (active population) during a long period of time.
These population time series are processed by using dif-
ferent mathematical techniques (e.g. Box-Jenkins) in order
to eliminate periodicity and trends related to specific pe-
riods of time (e.g. daily periods) [19]. In this way, the
data can be used independently of the moment when they
were taken. The output of these operations can be charac-
terized by autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) model.
The characteristics of the past active population define the
population during the next instant of time.
In presented implementation the active population that will
download a content (NT ) to the server as the average of
the measurements of last 30 s (which is the reference value
of playback buffer for many video players) is calculated,
and it is assumed that during this short period there is no
periodicity trend that could have negative influence into
the prediction. Note that the estimations presented are very
sensitive to error since they use short-term measurements,
but let us remember that the implemented system is a proof
of concept. Its deployment in commercial networks should
consider more sophisticated (by using long-term processed
measurements) forecast algorithms.
The target download rate R is calculated as follows. Let
us assume that the server has c different contents with the
same popularity. Each content c contains i different repre-
sentations with rate equal to Ric. Then the average of the
target download rate is:
R =
1
C
×
C
∑
c=1
Ic
∑
i=1
Ric
Ic
. (3)
If the predicted bandwidth goes beyond a given threshold
(90% of the uplink bandwidth of the server in author’s
implementation), then the traffic forecast algorithm pre-
dicts cloud congestion in the next time slot. In this case,
the cloud manager contacts the content servers in order to
inform about the situation. The interface implementation
between CM and content server is based on JSON/RPC
protocol. The content server contacts the users’ terminals,
which the server is actually serving in order to inform about
the congestion situation. The server could decide to send
such information only to a number of clients (e.g. one of
five clients) in order to avoid avalanche situations (all the
clients switch to another cloud). The communication be-
tween server and clients is based on the push functionality
of HTTP/2. Details of such a communication are given in
the Section 5.
At last, the client DASH application is responsible for tak-
ing the final decision about adaptation. Such a decision
may include:
• media adaptation, i.e. switching media stream to
lower representation without changing content server,
as it is illustrated in Fig. 3,
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• content server adaptation, i.e. downloading further
segments from another content server (from the set of
available servers specified in MultiBaseURL element
into MPD) leaving representation unchanged.
DASH client Content server
Adaptation
decision
Congestion
alert?
stream#n: Request (Seg#x:Repr#y)
stream#n+1: Request (Seg#x:Repr#z)
stream#n+1: Response (Seg#x:Rep
r#z)
stream#n:Response Headers
stream#n+1:Response Headers
stream#n:PUSH PROMISE
stream#n:PUSH Response(cong.a
lert)
stream#n:RST STREAM
Fig. 3. Sequence diagram for push-based congestion alert.
For this, the DASH application should implement an en-
hanced adaptation algorithm that may adapt not only Media
bitrate but also content server (e.g. to select another cloud
for streaming the content) considering the information gath-
ered by the same application and the information arrived
from the content server. An example algorithm fulfilling
such functionalities was presented in [20]. The selection
of the server is, generally, a blind decision in the DASH
application. It is responsibility of the service provider to
inform the application about the characteristics of the new
servers, but this is out of the scope of this paper. In case
when DASH application switches the content server (con-
tent server adaptation), it should avoid to come back to
previously used server, from which the client downloaded
a previous segment, in order to avoid ping pong effect of
endless switching between two overloaded clouds.
The scalability of the solution is ensured due to the fact
that the unique interchanged information is about the cloud
congestion, which is not specific per video session. cloud
congestion can be predicted only by taking measurements
of the aggregate traffic and marked flows, which saves most
of the potential scalability issues in the monitoring tool.
Moreover, the network measurements are taken in specific
nodes, which are the bottlenecks of the cloud system (e.g.
uplink). These points are well-known to the cloud provider
and are constantly controlled by traffic manager tools.
5. Implementation Details of DASH
over HTTP/2 Module
HTTP/2, which is still under development within the IETF
HTTPbis Working Group, is a binary protocol that aims at
better utilization of network capacity than previous versions
while preserving compatibility with the transaction seman-
tics of HTTP 1.1. HTTP/2 introduces a framing layer be-
tween HTTP and TCP used for multiplexing several HTTP
requests into one TCP connection. HTTP/2 provides effi-
cient header compression in order to reduce the protocol
overhead [21] and also proposes server push mechanism,
which allows a server to send a response without an ex-
plicit request from the client. In [22], the authors employ
the server push to decrease media delivery latency in DASH
live video streaming. In presented approach, authors apply
the push feature to transfer information about cloud con-
gestion from server to client without the need for client’s
request.
Figure 3 presents the communication between DASH client
and content server assuming that the server received a con-
gestion alert from the CM. The client DASH application
downloads media segments in separate streams. The con-
tent server, after receiving a request for a segment, checks
if during the time, which elapsed from the previous request,
the CM signaled a congestion. If no, the server returns re-
quested segment. If yes (what is depicted in Fig. 3), the
server responses to the request with Headers frame and next
sends Push Promise frame to notify that the server intends
to initiate new stream for “pushed” data. Then, the server
sends RST Stream header to reset current stream, followed
by Push Response, which carries information about conges-
tion. Canceling the current stream allows for faster reaction
to congestion alert since the client does not need to wait
with adaptation process until the whole required segment
(Seg#x:Repr#y in Fig. 3) will be downloaded. Such process
delays downloading of the current segment by Round Trip
Delay required for transferring, one by one, Push Promise,
RST Stream, Push Response frames and a new request for
the segment. On the other hand, the client may ask for the
new adapted segment (Seg#x:Repr#z in Fig. 3) just after
receiving Push Response. Seg#x:Repr#z is the result of
adaptation decisions after receiving cloud congestion alert
(media bitrate adaptation or content server switching).
Let us remark that server push action can be executed only
when server receives a segment request from the client
(as the “supplementary response” to this request) since in
HTTP client-server scheme an exchange of messages is ini-
tiated solely by the client.
5.1. DASH HTTP/2 Client Implementation
In the above-mentioned papers [21] and [22], the au-
thors used implementations of SPDY protocol to develop
HTTP/2-compilant DASH applications. Although HTTP/2
and SPDY have equivalent functionalities (Google’s
SPDYv2 protocol was chosen as the basis for HTTP/2),
they are incompatible due to, for example, different header
compression mechanisms (GZIP in SPDY, whereas HTTP/2
uses dedicated HPACK scheme). Therefore, authors have
implemented own version of HTTP/2 DASH client using
nghttp2 library [23], which is compliant with IETF HTTP
2.0 Draft v13 [24].
For this purpose, the SPDY-based QTSamplePlayer, an
open-source DASH application provided by Bitmovin [7]
(which bases on libdash3 library) has been extended, by
implementing new class HTTP2Connection responsible for
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Fig. 4. Experimental setup for evaluation tests.
establishing and handling HTTP/2 connections. Moreover,
we modified DASHReceiver module of the QTSample-
Player to include adaptationAlert() method for interrupting
the current segment downloading process whenever a server
push occurs.
5.2. Content Server Implementation
The HTTP/2 content server was implemented based on
nghttpd server implementation provided by nghttp2 [23].
The authors deployed AlertModule, which contains JSON-
RPC server for receiving congestion alerts from the CM.
The havePushData() method of the AlertModule is called
by main thread of content server whenever a new request
for media segment arrives (which means opening a new
stream). This method checks if a congestion alert from
the CM exists and, in positive case, it records the label of
congestion alert in order not to propagate the same alert in
the future and returns data which should be pushed to the
client. When the response of the havePushData() is pos-
itive, the server triggers push procedure and, at the same
time, cancels the stream related with media segment re-
quest. Let us remark that additional functionality results in
a very low overhead comparing to standard HTTP/2 server.
This overhead is related with receiving a JSON message
(of small size) from CM and performing one extra step in
client’s request handling flow to check if there is a message
to be pushed.
Source code for both implementations (client and server),
are available on web page http://www.nit.eu/offer/research-
projects-products/http2dash.
6. Test Results
The experimental setup, presented in Fig. 4, includes two
physical hosts with three virtual machines (labeled as
server#bkg, server#1 and server#2) containing our afore-
mentioned implementation of content streaming server.
Each physical host emulates one separate cloud domain
characterized by own IP prefix.
The servers in the first cloud are connected through a link
that is constantly monitored (monitoring entity is located on
physical host output interface if#A, see Fig. 4). The avail-
able bandwidth in the output interfaces if#A and if#C was
restricted to 10 Mb/s and 8 Mb/s, respectively, by using the
Linux Traffic Control system (tc command). The servers
provide media content (Big Buck Bunny movie [25]) with
15 different representations, from 100 Kb/s up to 6 Mb/s,
divided into segments of two seconds duration.
The client applications, client#1 and two client#bkg, run
under Linux Ubuntu 14.04. The adaptation algorithm in
the DASH client applications is based on mean download
rate but it has been modified in order to switch the content
server whenever congestion information arrived from the
server (see [20]). Just after connecting with the server, the
clients increased its HTTP/2 flow control window from de-
fault value equal to 64 KB up to 1048 KB using a Settings
frame. In this way, streaming stop is avoid due to exhaus-
tion of client’s window space, and also we limit the number
of Windows Update frames generated by the clients, which
indicate how many bytes the server is permitted to transmit.
The server#1 starts streaming the content to client#1 (ar-
row no. 1 in Fig. 4) with the highest representation. At
second 60, both client#bgk start downloading the same con-
tent from server#bgk located at the same cloud domain as
server#1 (arrows no. 2 in Fig. 4), so the uplink of the cloud
becomes overloaded. The monitoring information of if#A
arrives to the CM (arrow no. 3 in Fig. 4), which determines
that there is bandwidth congestion since the occupancy of
the interface is higher than 0.9 (simple prediction algorithm
created for testing purposes). Then, the CM sends an alert
about cloud congestion to the content servers: server#1 and
server#bgk (arrow no. 4 in Fig. 4). The next request for me-
dia segment arrived to server#1 and server#bgk are used to
perform server push to the clients. The DASH adaptation
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mechanism at the client#1 terminal receives information
about cloud congestion and performs content server adap-
tation by switching the streaming to server#2, as it is sig-
naled by arrow no. 5 in Fig. 4. However, for demonstration
purposes both client#bkg applications received MPDs with-
out MultiBaseURL option, therefore they performed media
adaptation only (without content server adaptation).
Figure 5a shows download rate of each segment received by
client#1 from server#1 and server#2, as well as the repre-
sentation rate selected by the client for each segment. The
moment when server push occurred is indicated by a red
vertical line in Fig. 5a (pointed also by an arrow).
Figure 5b shows the segment download rate and selected
representation for one of client#bkg.
As may be observed in the results presented in Fig. 5a,
thanks to the cloud congestion notification, client#1 could
switch the content server while maintaining the same (high-
est) representation during the whole downloading process.
Moreover, thanks to prediction algorithm, the adaptation
algorithm is able to react fast to the congestion situation
(only 3 segments from the moment when server#bkg started
streaming to client#bkg). Both client#bkg compete for the
if#A bandwidth, so they download the content with lower
representation (Fig. 5b).
61
Jordi Mongay Batalla, Piotr Krawiec, Daniel Negru, Joachim Bruneau-Queyreix, Eugen Borcoci, Andrzej Bęben, and Piotr Wiśniewski
Figure 6 shows the same scenario but, in this case, the
cloud congestion information is not sent to the server, so
DASH application of client#1 performs media bitrate adap-
tation with a delay of 14 segments from the moment when
server#bkg started streaming (client#1 had to wait for col-
lecting enough measurement data to discover bandwidth
decrease). This delay may result in image freezing during
video playout, if only the client buffer size is not enough
to compensate degradation of downloading conditions.
By comparing Figs. 5 and 6, it may be concluded that
cloud-awareness improves the performance of the system
enhancing QoE due to the predictive feature that allows
to fast reaction from the DASH application. Moreover,
content server adaptation allows maintaining higher me-
dia bitrate by switching the transmission to another (non-
overloaded) cloud.
7. Conclusions
The system presented in this paper allows for communica-
tion between Cloud Manager and video player in the end
user’s terminal by means of the content server. Such a com-
munication is used for notifying situations of cloud con-
gestion foreseen for close time. This way, the client video
application may take proper decisions about adaptation tak-
ing into account both bandwidth limitations in the mobile
access and congestion situations in the cloud. The results
obtained by means of the system implemented on DASH-
capable video player and DASH-capable server, present the
applicability of the proposed system in situations of con-
gestion in the cloud and compare the same situation when
the DASH application does not own information about con-
gestion. In the latter case, the application might not adapt
bitrate in time, which would cause frozen image (in the
case of strong degradation in the cloud). Moreover, mak-
ing a distinction between cloud congestion and mobile ac-
cess congestion allows for dual adaptation (media bitrate
and content server), which may improve the quality of the
media event experience.
Two issues will be addressed in planned future work: the
use of bidirectional feature of HTTP/2 communication for
sending dynamic MPD from the server to the client’s DASH
application and new dual adaptation algorithms in DASH
application that integrate together rate measurements at the
video player and information about congestion arrived from
the Cloud Manager.
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Abstract—Burst ratio is a parameter that quantifies packet
loss patterns in transmission networks. It has been defined
for an end-to-end scenario, therefore burst ratio can be de-
termined only if the characteristics of the whole transmis-
sion path are known. In this paper, the burst ratio param-
eter applicability to cases when the transmission path con-
sists of a series of transmission channels with known packet
loss rate and burst ratio values is extended. The paper also
presents the results of simulations performed with NS2 soft-
ware, demonstrating the validity of the burst ratio analysis.
Consequently, the research makes it possible to determine the
value of the burst ratio parameter in concatenated packet
networks, which in turn supports delivering higher quality
VoIP services.
Keywords—bursty packet loss, E-model, quality of experience,
voice over IP.
1. Introduction
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications play
a crucial role in connecting people and businesses around
the world. It is a huge business for hardware manufac-
turers, network operators and service providers. In or-
der to assure end customer satisfaction, the transmission
networks must be designed well, and the quality of the
provided VoIP service must be constantly monitored and
maintained. In order to achieve this, all factors that affect
the application quality of experience (QoE) [1] must be
recognized.
The quality of VoIP carried over packet networks is in-
fluenced by multiple factors [2]. They include user-de-
pendent aspects (e.g. user expectations), terminal quality
(e.g. microphone sensitivity) and application settings (e.g.
audio codec). The quality is also affected by transmis-
sion network-dependent factors, which include throughput,
round-trip time and packet loss. To some extent, they can
be controlled by network design and maintenance.
One of the transmission network-dependent factors that in-
fluences the perceived quality of VoIP transmissions is the
burst ratio parameter [3]. It quantifies the packet loss pat-
tern by describing the extent to which the packets were
lost in bursts. The burstiness of packet loss affects the per-
ceived media quality. If the number of audio packets lost
sequentially is low enough not to be noticed by the human
cognitive system, or it can be concealed by the packet loss
concealment (PLC) technique [4], then the event has no im-
pact on the perceived quality. In contrast, long sequences
of lost packets can be easily perceived as an annoying qual-
ity deterioration. Therefore, the burstiness (burst ratio) of
packet loss can be correlated with the perceived quality of
VoIP service [5].
In order to provide a VoIP service of the best possible
quality, the burst ratio parameter needs to be well recog-
nized and analyzed. Thus far, it has only been defined for
end-to-end transmission scenarios. In this case, in order to
calculate the burst ratio of a transmission, the characteris-
tics of the complete, end-to-end transmission path must be
measured. This article describes the research into defining
the end-to-end value of the burst ratio parameter, when the
transmission is carried over multiple concatenated transmis-
sion channels and only the characteristics of each individual
intermediate channels are determined.
Although extensive research on the influence of bursty
packet loss on the QoE of VoIP has been carried out [6], [7],
the authors are the first to analyze burst ratio in concate-
nated channels. In work [8], the results of theoretical stud-
ies are presented in which the formula for burst ratio in the
concatenated scenario is derived. This article presents re-
sults of NS2 simulations [9] performed in order to validate
the equations in a real environment. The results demon-
strate the validity of the aforementioned theoretical consid-
erations.
The results help control the burst ratio parameter by de-
scribing the impact of individual transmission channels on
the burst ratio of the complete transmission path. The re-
sults will improve the quality and reliability of VoIP appli-
cations, thus improving end user satisfaction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 the burst ratio parameter is presented and described
in detail. In Section 3 we describe the methodology and
features of the simulations that were carried out to validate
the theoretical studies. Section 4 presents the results of the
validation of the equation for Burst Ratio in concatenated
channels. In Section 5 the verification of the simplified
form of the equation is presented. Potential applications of
the results are presented in Section 6. Finally, the conclu-
sions are given in Section 7.
2. Burst Ratio Overview
This section presents the definition and application of burst
ratio. It also contains results of our previous studies in the
field of extending the burst ratio parameter applicability to
multi-channel scenarios.
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In order to describe packet loss of a communication chan-
nel, the packet loss rate Ppl is used. It indicates the proba-
bility of losing a packet during transmission over the chan-
nel. However, it is not a complete channel description as
it does not capture packet loss patterns. Under the same
packet loss rate, the loss can be evenly distributed over
the whole transmission, or take place in bursts if multiple
consecutive packets are lost.
The parameter that describes the packet loss pattern is burst
ratio (denoted as BurstR). It is defined in [3] as the aver-
age length of observed bursts in a packet arrival sequence
(average burst length) normalized over the length of burst
expected for purely random loss (µ):
BurstR =
Average measured burst length
µ . (1)
Burst ratio describes the packet loss pattern by expressing
how much longer or shorter the measured bursts were than
in the hypothetical case when all the packets were lost ran-
domly under the same packet loss rate. Therefore, the burst
ratio quantifies the observed packet loss as:
• bursty if BurstR > 1,
• random if BurstR = 1,
• scattered if BurstR < 1.
The length of packet loss burst expected for purely random
loss (µ) is given as [10]:
µ = 1
1−Ppl , (2)
where Ppl stands for the probability of packet loss. The for-
mula shows that even for purely random loss the observed
burst length increases with higher packet loss, in the mul-
tiplicative inverse way. This is why the BurstR value can
differ dramatically for the same observed packet loss burst
length, depending on the packet loss rate µ .
Generally speaking, for the same packet loss rate, higher
values of burst ratio indicate that the packets are being lost
in series. Conversely, lower values of the parameter mean
that the packet loss was distributed more evenly over the
transmission.
It is common to model packet loss in digital transmis-
sion channels with time-discrete state models, Markov
chains [11], [12]. The approaches include two-state Markov
chain, Gilbert or Gilbert-Elliot models. When examining
the lossy transmission, authors are focusing on two-state
Markov chain due to its simplicity and flexibility. In two-
state Markov chain the successful transmission of a packet
over a channel and losing a packet are marked with two
different transmission channel states (Markov chain states).
An example of the chain is shown in Fig. 1. In this case,
if the channel successfully transmits a packet, it is in the F
(found) state. If the packet is lost, the channel is in the L
(lost) state. At any given time, the channel can only be in
one of these two states.
1-p
F
q
p
L
1-q
Fig. 1. In two-state Markov loss model F and L represent the
found and lost states of a channel, while p and q describe the
probabilities of switching the F and L states.
The two-state Markov chain is described with two param-
eters: p and q probabilities. The probability of losing
a packet if the previous packet was successfully transmitted
(transition from F to L) is described by p. Similarly, q de-
fines the probability of successfully transmitting a packet if
the previous one was lost (transition from L to F). Conse-
quently, probability 1−p describes the probability of losing
packets in series.
In two-state Markov chains a packet may be lost if the previ-
ous packet was successfully transmitted (with probability p)
or if the previous packet was lost (with probability 1−q).
Therefore, for two-state Markov chains the probability of
losing a packet is determined as:
Ppl = p
p+q
. (3)
For random loss, q = 1−p, the probability of losing a packet
is equal to p:
Ppl = p . (4)
A transmission channel modeled with the two-state Markov
chain exhibits the burst ratio following the formula [13]:
BurstR =
1
p+q
. (5)
Burst ratio is used in E-model [13], a commonly used an-
alytical method of voice quality assessment. E-model uses
numerous transmission parameters in order to calculate the
transmission ratio factor R, which can then be used to ob-
tain an estimated mean opinion score for the conversational
scenario.
Figure 2 presents how the estimated mean opinion score
value changes when the burst ratio parameter value varies
between 1 and 4. The figure was created with an as-
sumption that the G.711 codec without packet loss conceal-
ment (PLC) was used, a 1% packet loss rate was observed
and other E-model parameters were used at their default
values [14].
Figure 2 shows that there is a clear correlation between
the application quality and the burst ratio value. Therefore,
in order to calculate estimated mean opinion scores using
the E-model, the burst ratio parameter must be accurately
determined.
Originally, burst ratio was defined only for scenarios
where the transmission is monitored and analyzed end-to-
end. In [8] authors studied the burst ratio in a situation
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Fig. 2. Based on the E-model relationship between the estimated
mean opinion score (MOS) and burst ratio parameter (BurstR) for
1% packet loss and the G.711 codec without PLC.
where the transmission path consists of a series of chan-
nels, and each is monitored separately. In this case, the
burst ratio of the complete path must be calculated using
the measured characteristics of separate channels, as pre-
sented in Fig. 3.
Channel
1
Channel
2
Channel
N
Ppl
1
Ppl
å
Ppl
2
PplN
BurstR
1
BurstR
å
= ?
BurstR
2
BurstRN
Fig. 3. The problem of burst ratio in concatenated channels
network.
It was shown in [8] that if each channel can be mod-
eled with a two-state Markov chain, the burst ratio of the
complete transmission path consisting of N channels is de-
scribed by the formula:
BurstRΣ =
1−
N
∏
n=1
(1−Ppln)
1−
N
∏
n=1
(
1− PplnBurstRn
) , (6)
where Ppln and BurstRn are the parameters of the n-th
channel.
The exact value of the burst ratio can be determined with
the regular burst ratio equation. However, for channels
characterized by low packet loss the following formula can
be assumed:
N
∏
n=1
Ppln = 0 . (7)
In this case the packet loss of multiple concatenated chan-
nels is as follows:
Ppl∑ =
N
∑
n=1
Ppln . (8)
Based on this assumption, the burst ratio value of concate-
nated channels can be presented with the following, simpler
equation.
BurstR′Σ =
N
∑
n=1
Ppln
N
∑
n=1
Ppln
BurstRn
(9)
Analysis performed in [8] shows that this simplification is
a reliable approximation of Eq. (6). The error introduced
by the simplification depends on the characteristics of each
channel and increases with increasing packet loss rate and
burst ratio values.
As the assumption of modeling the channels with two-
state Markov chains is a simplification, the authors verified
the formula in a simulated network using Network Sim-
ulator 2 (NS2). The results of this verification are shown
below.
3. Simulation Environment
In this section the methodology used to verify the accuracy
of Eqs. (6) and (9) is described. The verification has been
performed by running extensive simulations in NS2 [9].
The fundamental part of the simulation environment was
designed during a seminar in Telekom Innovation Labora-
tories [15], which is a recognized research and develop-
A
S
1-A
S
1-B
S
n-B
S
n-A
B
X
1
Y
1
X
n
Y
n
Fig. 4. The generic topology used in the simulations.
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Table 1
Simulations parameters
Object Parameter Value Comment
Transport protocol UDP
Traffic generator CBR
VoIP traffic Packet size 50–1500 bytes
Value selected randomly
Inter-packet interval 0.002–0.06 s
(uniform distribution)
Start time delay 0.5–1 s
Backgroud traffic
Number of streams transported
1–10 Value selected randomly
by a single switch
(uniform distribution)
Transport protocol of a stream TCP, UDP
TCP packet size 1000 bytes
TCP window size 2–20
TCP congestion control algorithm Tahoe
TCP application FTP
UDP traffic generator Pareto
UDP Pareto shape parameter 1.4
UDP Pareto burst time 50–5000 ms
Value selected randomly
UDP Pareto idle time 30000–375000 ms
(uniform distribution)
UDP Pareto sending rate in burst 400–700 kb/s
UDP Pareto packet size 50–1500 bytes
Start time delay for each stream 0.5–1 s
Switches
Number of intermediate switches 2–10
Each simulation repeated
for every value
Queuing scheme of each switch DropTail, RED, FQ, SFQ Value selected randomly
Buffer size of each switch 2–20 packets (uniform distribution)
Links
Capacity 500–1000 kb/s Value selected randomly
Propagation delay 0–200 ms (uniform distribution)
Simulation Duration 10, 100, 1000 s
Each simulation repeated
for every value
ment institute in the field of quality of audio and multime-
dia applications.
NS2 is a commonly used [16] simulation environment for
testing and studying communication protocols and net-
works. It can be used to simulate TCP/IP protocol stacks,
traffic sources of various distributions and packet queuing
and dropping mechanisms.
The release NS2 2.35 was used in this research in order
to simulate packet transmission over a series of switches
and to analyze packet loss. Each switch serves a number
of packet streams and drops packets in case of a buffer
overflow. After each simulation the burst ratio calculated at
the end of the transmission path using Eq. (1) is compared
with the burst ratio value calculated from the transmission
parameters of each intermediate switch using Eq. (6). The
calculations are performed by analyzing the NAM trace
files generated by each NS2 simulation.
The topology used in the simulations is a path presented
in Fig. 4. It contains two endpoints (A and B) responsi-
ble for a VoIP transmission, n pairs of background traf-
fic servers (X1, Y1, . . . , Xn, Yn) and n pairs of switches
(S1−A, S1−B, . . . , Sn−A, Sn−B). VoIP traffic, marked with
black arrows, is sent from server A to server B. n back-
ground traffic streams, marked with white arrows, are sent
between servers X1 and Y1, . . . , Xn and Yn. VoIP traffic and
background traffic compete for resources of shared links,
which are built up by pairs of switches S1−A←→ S1−B, . . . ,
Sn−A←→ Sn−B. Consequently, at switches S1−A, . . . , Sn−A
the VoIP packets and the background transmission compete
for access to the shared links. If not enough bandwidth is
available to serve both streams, the switches drop pack-
ets. Therefore, in the simulation the transmission path of
the VoIP application consists of a series of links. How-
ever, packets may be dropped at shared links only. Other
links do not drops packets because they always have enough
bandwidth due to transmitting either VoIP or background
traffic only. At the end of the simulation, the packet loss
analysis of each switch which drops packets is performed.
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During the analysis the VoIP application packet loss rate
and the burst ratio value are calculated. Using these val-
ues and Eq. (6), the burst ratio of the whole transmission
(from node A to B) is calculated. The calculated value is
compared with the value calculated at node B based on the
analysis of VoIP stream packets that were not successfully
delivered, Eq. (1). The result of the comparison quantifies
the accuracy of Eq. (6).
It should be noted that in the simulations the packet loss
takes place in shared links only. Therefore, in the remaining
sections the terms “channel” and “shared link” are used
interchangeably.
The results of the simulations may depend on the topology
as well as transmission and network parameters. The com-
plete list of parameters identified and analyzed during the
simulations is presented in Table 1. The parameters were
randomly altered within a range of values during each sim-
ulation in order to reduce the influence of a specific param-
eter value on the results. The parameter values and ranges
of values were adjusted so the results of the simulations
were relevant for the study of burst ratio parameter.
In order to obtain meaningful results it was important that
the VoIP traffic was constantly generating packets. There-
fore VoIP traffic utilized the user datagram protocol (UDP)
with a constant bit rate. Additionally, the randomization of
the background traffic was of crucial importance in order to
assure a full spectrum of simulation conditions. Therefore,
the background traffic used UDP (with the Pareto distribu-
tion) and TCP protocols, both selected randomly for each
simulation. Moreover, the start time and the total num-
ber of transmitted packets within each transmission were
also randomized. As a result the VoIP traffic faced differ-
ent conditions in each simulation run. The wide spectrum
of conditions meant the VoIP traffic was characterized by
a wide range of parameters values BurstR and packet loss
rate Ppl.
This paper presents the results of a total 250,000 simula-
tions, each representing different network conditions. They
were carried out in order to demonstrate the validity of the
equations. As a result, the validation contains relevant and
fully conclusive results.
4. Accuracy of Burst Ratio
Calculation
In this section the simulation results run in order to vali-
date Eq. (6) are presented. The equation was numerically
verified by the authors in [8], where a transmission channel
was modeled by a two-state Markov channel. This section
contains simulations results, where the transmission envi-
ronment was modeled with real networks characteristics,
simulated using NS2.
The verification has been performed by comparing two
burst ratio values:
• the BurstR value measured at the end of the trans-
mission path using Eq. (1),
• the value calculated using Eq. (6), which incorporates
the characteristics of each intermediate transmission
channel, denoted below as BurstRΣ.
The comparison is presented as relative error δΣ, defined
as follows:
δΣ =
BurstRΣ−BurstR
BurstR
. (10)
If δΣ is equal to 0, Eq. (6) is perfectly accurate. A pos-
itive value of δΣ means that the experienced packet loss
is less bursty than that estimated using Eq. (6). A nega-
tive value of δΣ means that the burst ratio value calculated
with Eq. (6) underestimated the burstiness of the analyzed
traffic.
The number of shared links may have an impact on the
final results, because the VoIP traffic needs to compete for
resources in each link. The more shared links, the more
VoIP packets may be lost. In order to study this impact,
each simulation was rerun with two, six and ten shared
links.
The results published in this section present the relation-
ship between relative error δΣ (in %) and packet loss Ppl,
number of transmitted packets or BurstR of the complete
transmission. The error is analyzed in the form of a mean
and its confidence intervals. The mean value of the rela-
tive error is shown using black lines. The 95% confidence
intervals of the mean are marked with gray areas.
Figure 5 presents the relationship between the relative er-
ror δΣ of the burst ratio calculation using Eq. (6) and packet
2
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
-1
-1
-1
-2
-2
-2
Ppl [%]
[%
]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(a)
(b)
(c)
2 channels
6 channels
10 channels
Fig. 5. Relationship between the burst ratio calculation error δΣ
and the packet loss rate Ppl of the whole transmission. The
solid line represents mean relative error while the gray areas
present the 95% confidence intervals of the mean. The figures
were created with a packet loss range of 0–10%. The subplots
presents results for simulations of two, six and ten intermediate
channels.
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loss Ppl of the whole transmission. It can be observed that
for values of packet loss lower than 1%, the relative error is
negligible, regardless of how many intermediate channels
the transmission contains. As the packet loss increases, the
mean error and its confidence interval increase slightly as
well. The observed increase is dependent on the number of
intermediate channels. The higher the number of channels,
the higher the error for the same value of packet loss. How-
ever, the relative error never reaches 2%, which indicates
a high accuracy of the equation.
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Fig. 6. Relationship between the burst ratio calculation error δΣ
and the number of transmitted packets. The solid lines represent
mean relative error while the gray areas present the 95% con-
fidence intervals of the mean. The subplots presents results for
simulations of two, six and ten intermediate channels.
Figure 6 presents the relationship between the burst ratio
calculation error δΣ and the number of transmitted packets
during measurement. The figure shows that the mean error
initially slightly increases for the shorter observations and
then stabilizes at a level of 2% for two intermediate chan-
nels or 5% for ten channels. Figure 6 presents results for up
to 500,000 transmitted packets, which corresponds to ap-
proximately 2 hours 45 minutes observation of a transmis-
sion. Such a long observation is unrealistic and its results
are presented only for reference. More reasonable dura-
tion of observation is up to 5 minutes, which corresponds
to 0–15,000 of transmitted packets. In this range the error
never exceeds 4%, regardless of the number of intermediate
channels.
Figure 7 presents the relationship of the relative error δΣ of
the burst ratio calculation using Eq. (6) and burst ratio value
BurstR of the complete transmission. It can be seen that
regardless how many intermediate channels are used the rel-
ative error is low around BurstR = 1. For two channels, the
error value is negligible, regardless of the burst ratio value.
In the case of several intermediate channels, as the burst
ratio increases, the error decreases and for BurstR > 1.5 the
error becomes negative. In the worst case, for the scenario
of ten intermediate channels the error reaches −9%. It can
be seen that for fewer channels, BurstR of the complete
path reaches higher values. For ten intermediate channels
the highest value of BurstR slightly exceeds 2.5, while for
two channels it is over 3.5. This effect can be explained by
analyzing Eq. (9). The formula shows that BurstR value of
the complete path is approximately equal to the weighted
harmonic mean of all intermediate channels’ BurstR values.
As the result, the more channels are involved in the trans-
mission, the lower probability that end-to-end burst ratio
reaches high values.
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Fig. 7. Dependency of the burst ratio calculation error δΣ on
the BurstR value of the complete transmission. The solid lines
represent mean relative error while the gray areas present the 95%
confidence intervals of the mean. The subplots presents results
for simulations of two, six and ten intermediate channels.
All these results show that when Eq. (6) is used it provides
reliable results and a high precision of the measurement.
The accuracy of the calculation is always very high, but the
most precise results are achieved in the two-channel sce-
nario, when packet loss of the complete transmission path
is limited or the burst ratio of the complete transmission
path is not higher than BurstR = 1.5.
5. Accuracy of the Simplified Equation
As well as the regular burst ratio equation, validated above,
we also show a simplified version of the equation, Eq. (9).
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This simplification reveals that the burst ratio of the whole
transmission path can be approximated with a weighted
harmonic mean of properties of individual channels. This
equation was verified numerically in [8]. The results indi-
cate that the simplified equation’s inaccuracy increases with
higher values of packet loss and burst ratio of the whole
transmission. However, the verification was performed with
the assumption that the transmission channels can be mod-
eled with two-state Markov chains, which is a form of sim-
plification. This section presents the results of equation
validation performed in an environment that simulates real
characteristics of transmission channels.
The verification of the simplified burst ratio equation –
Eq. (9) is performed by calculating the simplification error
∆BurstR. It expresses the difference between the error of
the simplified equation and the error of the regular burst
ratio equation – Eq. (6). The values that are compared are
mean relative error (in %) and the 95% confidence interval
of the mean. Both were introduced in Section 4. The
comparison of mean error is performed by calculating the
difference between absolute values of mean error δ ′Σ of the
simplified burst ratio equation (Eq. 9) and mean error of
the regular burst ratio equation δΣ, as described in Eq. 10.
The comparison is presented below:
∆BurstR =
∣∣δ ′Σ
∣∣
−|δΣ| . (11)
If the calculated difference of the mean error is equal to
0, both Eq. (6) and Eq. (9) are equally accurate. When
0.5
0.5
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Fig. 8. Difference ∆BurstR between the calculation errors of the
regular equation δΣ and the simplified equation δ ′Σ in the domain
of packet loss Ppl of the whole transmission. The solid lines
represent the difference between mean relative errors while the
gray areas represent the difference between the 95% confidence
intervals. The subplots presents results for simulations of two, six
and ten intermediate channels.
∆BurstR is positive, Eq. (6) is more accurate, while if ∆BurstR
is negative, the simplified equation is more accurate.
The comparison of the 95% confidence intervals of the
mean is performed in a similar way, by subtracting the
value of the confidence interval for the regular equation
from the value of the confidence interval for the simplified
equation.
The figures published in this section present the calculated
differences of mean error using black lines. The gray areas
in the figures correspond to the confidence interval differ-
ences of the means.
Figure 8 presents the differences of mean errors and con-
fidence intervals in the domain of packet loss in the range
of 0–10%. It can be seen that regardless how many inter-
mediate channels are used, the difference is negligible in
that it never exceeds 0.5%. However, it should be noted
that there is almost no difference in the confidence interval
width (marked with gray fields).
The results clearly show the validity of the simplified equa-
tion. The difference in performance, compared with the
regular equation, is almost indistinguishable. However, the
regular equation almost always performs slightly better than
the simplified formula. Therefore, when the highest accu-
racy of the measurements is required, the regular equation
is used. However, when the top priority is ease of calcula-
tion, the simplified equation is applied.
6. Applications
As mentioned above, burst ratio is one of the parameters
used in the ITU-T E-model, which is used to assess the
quality of VoIP. Therefore, the formula presented has a wide
spectrum of potential applications, mainly facilitating the
VoIP MOS level assessment.
The formulas can be used during network planning. When
a network is being designed, a set of technical requirements
is specified for the network. They include packet loss,
round trip time and mean opinion score (MOS) of VoIP
transmission. When network topology is defined, the char-
acteristics of all the network elements are assumed. Even
if the topology is complex and the network contains hun-
dreds of elements, the VoIP transmission MOS assessment
between any endpoints may be required. Without proper
calculation of the burst ratio value between the endpoints,
a precise assessment of application quality is not possible.
Using the formulas presented and the E-model, MOS can be
easily and precisely assessed between any endpoints of the
designed network. Therefore, during the network design
phase, corrections may be applied to the network topology
to help provide the best quality of the VoIP service.
Another application of the formula is when a network is al-
ready operating and a re-design of the topology or routing
is required. In this case the formula may help assess the
impact of the changes on the quality of the VoIP transmis-
sion. A good example would be a network that contains
multiple elements which introduce packet loss. If only one
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of them could be upgraded, it would be important to se-
lect the optimal element to upgrade. By using the formula,
the network administrator can easily assess how end-to-end
VoIP quality would be affected, depending on which ele-
ments are upgraded.
The formulas can also be successfully used during monitor-
ing of networks. The measurements, as described in [17],
need specially configured environments. Therefore they
can only be performed within a single network, owned by
a single company. If a VoIP transmission path is established
via several different networks, which are administered by
different companies, the complete path monitoring is not
possible. In this case, the formulas can be used in order
to calculate the VoIP transmission MOS using monitoring
logs of the individual networks.
7. Conclusions
The results clearly show that the equations presented can
be successfully used to calculate the burst ratio parameter,
when the complete transmission path consists of multiple
concatenated channels. Although the equation has been de-
rived theoretically using two-state Markov models, in real-
life scenarios, simulated here using NS2, the equation is
still valid. Its accuracy is the highest when the number of
concatenated channels is limited to two, when the packet
loss of the complete transmission path is low, or the burst
ratio of the complete transmission path is not higher than
BurstR = 1.5.
Moreover, the results show that the simplified version of
the equation is almost as accurate as the regular equation,
therefore it can be used as an engineering tool. The simpli-
fied formula reveals that the burst ratio value of the com-
plete transmission path can be regarded as a harmonic mean
of the individual channels burst ratio values, weighted with
the their packet loss probabilities.
The results also demonstrate that the equation is valid and
therefore can be used in QoE measurements and network
performance assessment. Moreover, the formula has a wide
spectrum of potential application. As such, it would be
useful in improving the quality of VoIP applications.
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Abstract—Because of the decision, taken during the ITU
WRC-07, to allocate the upper part of the so-called digital
dividend spectrum for mobile services on a co-primary ba-
sis with TV broadcast services, the involved stakeholders have
a great interest in avoiding any interference caused by sig-
nals transmitted in adjacent bands. In this context the paper
presents some experimental results of a study addressed to
assess the effects produced by an interferential LTE signal
transmitted from a user terminal when it is in proximity of
a television antenna that receives DVB-T signals. The study
has been conducted in the context of collaboration between
Fondazione Ugo Bordoni and ISCTI, the scientific and tech-
nical body of the Italian Ministry of Economic Development,
using high professional laboratory equipments and consider-
ing different experimental simulation test setups. Several sim-
ulation scenarios have been analyzed and results in terms of
protection ratio and protection distance have been carried out.
Keywords—DVB-T, LTE, TV Interference, UHF Measurements,
uplink.
1. Introduction
Mobile telecommunications are currently experiencing the
fourth generation technology, whose base is the standard
3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE), and this is leading to
large economical investments as well as innovative tech-
nological developments such as new high-speed and high-
quality services, convergence towards all-IP networks and
very effective radio network performances in terms of spec-
trum efficiency, peak data rate and latency.
In December 2008, the LTE specification was published
as part of Release 8 and the first implementation of the
standard was deployed in 2009. The first release of LTE
supported radio network delay less than 5 ms and multiple
input multiple output (MIMO) antenna techniques achiev-
ing rather high data rates. Later on, in December 2009,
Release 9 has been introduced improving several functional
features that were already present in Release 8.
As a result of these technological developments, improve-
ments in speed and capacity have been made available
from telco operators to customers, boosting the market to
propose services and applications more and more hungry
for bandwidth. On the other hand, the device prolifera-
tion like smartphones and tablets, as well as the glob-
ally interconnection of devices, envisaged by Internet of
Things (IoT), are going to cause, in the next future, a sig-
nificant data traffic explosion with the consequence that
demand could outstrip supply. This consideration is feed-
ing the debate among regulators on how timely cope with
technical and regulatory developments which might influ-
encing the allocation, management and use of the radio-
frequency spectrum, as witnessed in the last World Radio-
communication Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland,
in 2012 (WRC-12).
According to the spectrum reforming process, currently in
progress all around the world, the frequency bands desig-
nated for the new services in Europe are the ones at present
used by UMTS and GSM, as well as new bands at 2.6 GHz.
However, the best frequency band option to open up these
services has been, definitely, the digital dividend portion of
the UHF spectrum (from 790 to 862 MHz in ITU Region 1,
consisting of Europe, Africa and parts of the Middle East),
resulting from the digital switchover (DSO) process from
analog to digital television (DTV) that was concluded at
the end of the year 2013 in almost all European countries.
Furthermore, during WRC-12 in order to meet the demand
of additional bandwidth, it was decided to allocate further
UHF spectrum to mobile services. The planned new spec-
trum allocation involves the frequency band from 694 to
790 MHz, and is proposed to come into force in 2015, in
order to enable the conclusion of the necessary technical
studies regarding the availability and assignment of the new
band, before allowing its use.
As a consequence of these decisions LTE will operate
alongside broadcast applications (UHF TV channels) and,
for this reason, potential coexistence issues might arise.
The digital TV antenna, as well as LTE user terminals,
always receives the wanted signal in the presence of un-
wanted signals generated by other radio systems. On the
basis of the outlined spectrum allocation, a certain number
of coexistence scenarios have been identified. Depending
on the severity of the interference, this may cause degra-
dation of receiver quality, e.g. artifacts in case of digital
TV reception or loss of throughput in case of mobile radio,
up to complete failure in receiving the wanted signal. It
is a matter of fact that the most important factors, which
characterize the influence of this interference, depend on
the frequency offset between interferer and victim signals
as well as on the power level of both wanted and unwanted
signals.
In this paper the considered coexistence scenario involves
an LTE transmitter, which acts as interferer on the digi-
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tal TV receiver. In particular, the adopted LTE equipment
is a mobile terminal transmitting an uplink signal in the
832-862 MHz band, where, as described in ECC Decision
09-03 [1], the harmonized ITU Region 1 plan for the dig-
ital dividend band has allocated the new mobile services
adopting the FDD duplex technique for downlink and up-
link communication services, with the uplink one located
in the upper part of this band.
Experimental tests have been carried out in the Isti-
tuto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie
dell’Informazione (ISCTI), sound and television broadcast-
ing laboratory of Ministry of Italian Economic Develop-
ment (MiSE) through high-professional devices, consider-
ing several operative setup configurations. The paper will
provide, in Section 2, an overview of the uplink LTE trans-
mission and potential influences it could cause on signals
transmitted on DVB-T channels, as well as the performance
parameters that should be considered for assessing the cor-
responding interfering effects (protection ratio and protec-
tion distance). In Section 3 are illustrated the considered
experimental setups, including a short description of in-
terfering and victim signals, the measurement methodol-
ogy and the features of the most relevant equipment used
(DVB-T receivers and MATV masthead amplifiers). Suc-
cessively in Sections 4 and 5, are reported the resulting
measurements carried out during the experimental activity
as well as relative considerations about the protection dis-
tance, which guarantees the quality of service (QoS) levels
required by operators. The paper ends with some conclu-
sive remarks reported in Section 6.
2. LTE Influence on DVB-T Reception:
Uplink Analysis
2.1. Overview
Since spectrum-sharing criteria normally depend upon pa-
rameters of both interfering and interfered systems, as well
as their operating environments, the identification of the
appropriate interference protection criteria to be adopted is
often a confusing, time-consuming process.
This is due to several regulatory and technical terms used
to identify the potential interference, including: permis-
sible interference, accepted interference, harmful interfer-
ence, protection ratios, allowable performance degradation,
interference protection criteria, spectrum sharing criteria,
and so on.
In 1990, the ITU-T SG1, with the adoption of Rec. ITU-R
SM.669 [2], made an attempt to reduce this complexity by
the definition of a matrix of protection ratios for various
combinations of interfering and wanted signal modulation
types, but the interference protection criteria presented in
this Recommendation have become largely obsolete. In fact
it is mainly addressed to analog and early digital modula-
tion techniques which are in many cases being supplanted
by more complex, digital modulations. Furthermore, efforts
are focused primarily on modulation with little regard to ra-
dio service requirements or factors linked to the operating
frequency.
On the contrary, most spectrum sharing studies today focus
primarily on radio services and specific frequency bands.
As a result of various compatibility studies conducted
within the European Conference of Postal and Telecom-
munications Administrations (CEPT), the frequency plan,
resulting from the decisions approved by the WRC-07, em-
ploys a duplex direction that is reversed when compared to
the normal European convention. Normally, mobile bands
are planned with the uplink (base stations receive/mobile
terminals transmit) in the lower band and the downlink
(base stations transmit/mobile terminals receive) in the up-
per band. However, due to concerns regarding interference
from mobile transmission to Digital Terrestrial Television
(DTT) services operating below 790 MHz, it was decided
for the 800 MHz band to reverse the duplex direction, so
that the downlink is in the lower band. The reason of this
choice is to protect the DVB-T broadcast signal transmit-
ted on UHF channels (in particular on channel 60), from
interference produced by the uplink transmission of mo-
bile Electronic Communication Networks (ECN) terminals,
which is the most critical aspect for DVB-T receiving sys-
tems, due to the unpredictable position of the LTE terminal.
Thanks to the adoption of the above mentioned frequency
allocation a virtual guard band of 42 MHz is provided.
In addition, the remaining 11 MHz duplex gap could be
exploited by other unspecified services (see Fig. 1).
59 60
8 MHz
Broadcasting
channels
Mobile services
downlink
(6x5 MHz blocks)
Mobile services
uplink
(6x5 MHz blocks)
Duplex
gap
Guard
band
1 MHz
30 MHz 11 MHz 30 MHz
Fig. 1. CEPT channelization proposal for the digital dividend
band in case of FDD duplexing technique implementation.
Many studies have been performed to verify the coexis-
tence conditions between LTE downlink and DVB-T sig-
nals [3]–[5]. On the contrary, many less studies have been
conducted with regard to the interferential effects produced
by the LTE uplink signal [4], [5] also because of the higher
frequency offset that should theoretically ensure a greater
protection. Most of them provide results carried out using
computer simulations [6] others consider a limited number
of experimental setup configurations [7], [8].
The present work focuses on results obtained through labo-
ratory measurements, referred to the coexistence of DVB-T
services, operating in the upper part of the TV UHF band
(470–790 MHz), with uplink LTE mobile communication
services, operating in the digital dividend band, including
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an extended set of experimental configurations involving
a MATV masthead amplifier. The analysis has been con-
ducted for a selection of reference scenarios, evaluating
the Protection Ratio (PR) and the Protection Distance (PD)
parameters, with the aim to provide an overview of po-
tential drawbacks resulting from the usage of LTE mobile
equipments nearby TV antennas, in order to give an idea
of appropriate countermeasures to be adopted to mitigate
these undesired effects.
2.2. Protection Ratio Concept
As defined in Report ITU-R BT.2215-4 [9], the PR is the
minimum value of the signal-to-interference ratio, usually
expressed in decibels, required to obtain a specified recep-
tion quality under specified conditions at the receiver input.
In this work, the wanted signal is a DVB-T one whilst the
unwanted signal is a LTE uplink one.
PR measurements have been carried out for different power
levels of the DVB-T signal at the DTT receiver antenna. In
this way, it has been possible to simulate the magnitude of
the interference in different operating conditions, trying to
cover the widest range normally present at the input of the
TV sets.
Usually, PR is conditioned by different parameters of the in-
volved signals, i.e. the frequency offset between the wanted
and the interfering signals, the power of the victim signal,
as well as by the specific receiver features because usually
it has different ability to discriminate interfering signals
operating on frequencies adjacent to the ones used by the
wanted signal. For this reason, the results of the laboratory
measurements have been repeated for different typologies
of DVB-T receivers, by configuring the LTE signal at dif-
ferent frequency offset from the carrier of the DVB-T chan-
nel under test, evaluating, for each of them, the minimum
power level of the LTE signal which affects the quality of
the DVB-T video signal or, alternatively, a critical value
for the BER of the victim signal higher than 2 ·10−4 after
Viterbi decoding or higher than 10−11 after Reed-Solomon
decoding.
Another relevant parameter to determine the signal QoS is
the overloading threshold corresponding to the carrier-to-
interference (C/I) ratio value where the TV signal is lost.
This parameter was not deeply investigated in this work
however some minimal considerations are reported in the
conclusions.
2.3. Protection Distance Concept
From a technical point of view, the PD is defined as the
minimum spatial distance, expressed in meters, between
an interfering device (LTE user equipment, for the uplink
analysis conducted in this work) and the receiving antenna
of the system to be protected (DVB-T receiver) in order to
ensure that the interfering signal power levels at the front-
end antenna of the receiver are still low enough to guarantee
an acceptable QoS of the wanted signal.
Wanted signal
Interfering signal
Radio-TV
station tower
Cell
tower
UE - BS
communication
link
Fig. 2. Reference scenario for evaluating the PD parameter.
Recommendation ITU-R SM.337-5 [10] provides a gen-
eral method to evaluate this parameter, as well as the fre-
quency separation between the interfering and the victim
antennas in order to bind the interfering signal under an
acceptable radiated power level. According to this method,
the PD can be evaluated under the simplified hypothesis
that the LTE mobile terminal is in line-of-sight with the
DTT receiving antenna (see Fig. 2) and that the path at-
tenuation of the radio signals can be calculated using the
free space propagation model, as it is also suggested in
Rec. ITU-R P.525.2 [11].
3. Experimental Scenario
3.1. Experimental Setup
The measurements have been carried out using the exper-
imental setup shown in Fig. 3, in accordance with the
method suggested in ECC Report 148 [12]. The DVB-T
signal is generated by the Rohde-Schwarz SFU broadcast
test system and is modulated by the MPEG-2 transport
stream provided by the Rohde-Schwarz DVG generator.
On the other side, the LTE uplink signal is generated
by the Rohde-Schwarz SMBV100A vector signal gener-
ator. The DVB-T and LTE signals are combined using
a directional coupler (Agilent model 775D) operating in
the 450–940 MHz frequency band (see Fig. 4), which is
able to ensure an effective decoupling of about 60 dB
between the two signal generators, if it is used as shown
in Fig. 3.
The output of the coupler has an impedance of 50 Ω and
needs a 50–75 Ω impedance adapter in order to avoid mis-
match reflection to the input of the TV receiver or to the
masthead amplifier, in case it is present in the MATV chain.
In the experimental setup option including a masthead am-
plifier, the output of this device is connected to a variable
attenuator in order to simulate the losses of a real TV dis-
tribution system in order to guarantee a good DVB-T signal
power level (–50 dBm) at the input of the TV receiver.
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Fig. 3. Functional schematic of the test bed.
Fig. 4. Directional coupler.
3.2. System Parameters Adopted: Interfering and Victim
Signals
As above mentioned, in this experimental context the LTE
uplink signal acts as the interferer. It has been config-
ured in accordance with the provisions of the WRC-07, and
with reference to the regulation fixed by European author-
ities. According to 3GPP TS 36.211 [13], the LTE signal
at 800 MHz is characterized by FDD duplexing technique
and the spectrum dedicated to uplink transmissions ranges
from 832 to 862 MHz (see Fig. 1).
The adopted frame structure is Type-1, and the transmission
scheme for LTE uplink signals is the Single Carrier Fre-
quency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA). The main
LTE uplink signal frame specifications for the PHY layer
are reported in Table 1.
In addition, taking into account of a typical scenario, three
different LTE uplink carrier frequencies have been consid-
ered: 837 MHz (from 832 to 842), 847 MHz (from 842
to 852) and 857 MHz (from 852 to 862). In any case,
Table 1
LTE uplink signal frame specifications for the PHY layer
LTE uplink signal frame parameter Value
Duplex scheme FDD
Radio frame structure Type-1
Duration of radio frame 10 ms
Number of subframes (TTI) 10
Duration of a subframe 1 ms
Number of time-slot per subframe
2
(Resource block or RB)
Duration of a time-slot 0.5 ms
Bandwidth of a RB 180 kHz
Number of subcarrier per RB 12
Bandwidth of a subcarrier 15 kHz
Bandwidth for each operator 10 MHz
for the LTE signal, a traffic load level of 100% has been
configured.
The victim signal considered in this study is a reference
DVB-T one compliant with the ETSI Rec. EN 300 744 [14]
whose main features are summarized in Table 2.
Measurements have been carried out for different signal
levels at DTT receiver antenna input or at the input of
a masthead amplifier, if it is present. QoS of five DVB-T
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Table 2
Main settings of the victim signal
Mod-
OFDM
Code Guard Band- Data
ulation
sub-
rate interval width ratecarriers
64QAM 8 K 3/4 1/4 8 MHz 22.39 Mb/s
Table 3
TV channel frequencies considered
in the experimental setup
DVB-T
Central Start End
channel
frequency frequency frequency
[MHz] [MHz] [MHz]
60 786 782 790
59 778 774 782
58 770 766 774
57 762 758 766
56 754 750 758
multiplex channels have been tested spanning from channel
56 up to channel 60 (carrier spacing 8 MHz), as reported
in Table 3.
3.3. DVB-T Receivers Typology
During the experimental study, two DVB-T receivers, im-
plementing different tuning techniques (CAN and silicon
tuner), have been tested:
• CAN tuner (also known as superheterodyne) is placed
in a metal enclosure to prevent interferences and
the RF input signal is mixed with a Local Oscilla-
tor to obtain an Intermediate Frequency (IF) signal.
The superheterodyne architecture used in this kind of
tuner leads to an image frequency 72 MHz above the
tuned signal;
• Silicon tuner uses Large Scale of Integration (LSI)
chips. The receivers using this kind of tuner are not
affected by the problem of image frequency, because
the input signal is directly converted in base band or
in a very low IF.
3.4. MATV Masthead Amplifier Features
Masthead amplifiers are used in television receiving sys-
tems to increase the level of signal received at a television
set for single or multi user systems. They are mounted
on the roof mast or on the roof space, very close to the
aerial, and are connected to the TV set by a coaxial cable
or a more complex distribution network.
The amplifiers commercially available before the migration
of mobile services in the UHF television band show am-
plification features almost constant up to the end of the
digital dividend band (862 MHz), today unnecessary and
even harmful, because the presence of unwanted signals
could force it to operate in nonlinear mode.
Usually, in order to prevent the amplifier to operate in the
nonlinear area, its gain is fixed to a value which allows,
at its output and for each DVB-T channel, a signal level
adequately lower than the maximum value provided by the
manufacturer. This is necessary in order to reduce the po-
tential signal degradation caused by saturation distortion
and intermodulation signals production. To this aim, inter-
national regulation bodies suggest to use, for each DVB-T
channel, the following formula [15], [16]:
Pout = Poutmax−ampli(dBm)−M(dB) (1)
where: M(dB) = 10 log(N − 1), N = number of received
DVB-T channels (2 or more), Poutmax−ampli = maximum out-
put power indicated by the manufacturer (usually expressed
in dBµV over 75 Ω).
For example, in case of N = 30 DVB-T channels, M is
equal to 14.6 dB and Pout measured for the DVB-T channel
having the highest received power level should be fixed at
Pout = Poutmax−ampli(dBm)−14.6.
In this experimental study, measurements have been carried
out using two typical commercial MATV masthead ampli-
fiers, which will be indicated in this work as AMP1 and
AMP2, designed to cover UHF band up to 862 MHz. In the
following are reported some features of these amplifiers.
AMP1 is a broadband amplifier. Its technical specifications
are reported in Table 4. Figure 5 shows the measurement
Table 4
Main parameters of AMP1
Parameter Value
Noise figure 7.5 dB
Max output 125 dBµV
Minimum gain 10 dB±2
Maximum gain 30 dB±2
Power supply 12 VDC
Impedance 75 Ω
Fig. 5. 1 dB compression point for AMP1.
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of 1 dB compression point for AMP1, which occurs in cor-
respondence to an input level of –16.0 dBm and an output
level of 11.2 dBm (measurement carried out for a frequency
value of 786 MHz and a gain value set to the maximum).
Table 5
Main parameters of AMP2
Parameter Value
Noise figure 8 dB
Max output 121 dBµV
Minimum gain 30 dB±2
Maximum gain 53 dB±2
Power supply 12 VDC
Impedance 75 Ω
AMP2 is a high gain broadband amplifier. Its relevant tech-
nical specifications are reported in Table 5. Figure 6 shows
the measurement of 1 dB compression point for AMP2. It
occurs in correspondence of an input level of –21.5 dBm
and an output level of 29.7 dBm (measurement carried out
for a frequency value of 786 MHz).
Fig. 6. 1 dB compression point for AMP2.
In order to take into account, as much as possible, of the
potential effects of signal degradation due to intermodula-
tion distortion, during the measurements, AMP2 has been
set out not only near the maximum gain, but also at 10 dB
below the maximum (in practice the signal at the input of
the amplifier is first regulated with an attenuation of 10 dB
and then amplified with its maximum gain of 52 dB).
3.5. Measurement Methodology
In order to determine the power levels of LTE uplink signal
causing quality degradation of DVB-T channels, a proper
procedure has been adopted and repeated for each experi-
mental measurement, based on the assessment of the sub-
jective quality of the received TV signal in terms of picture
failure (PF). As a preliminary step, the attenuation in dB
of all passive elements in the test bed chain has been de-
termined, in order to take them into account during the
evaluation of the power levels, of the desired and interfer-
ing signals, at the input of the TV receivers or masthead
amplifiers as well. Furthermore, a suitable MPEG stream
feeding the DVB-T generator and transmitted to the TV
receiver has been chosen from the ones available on the
MPEG stream generator. After selecting the DVB-T chan-
nel to be tested, its power level, the LTE uplink signal car-
rier frequency and, in case of using the masthead amplifier,
its gain value, the power level of the LTE signal has been
progressively increased until picture failures of video signal
within an interval of 30 s of observation occurred. When
this effect appeared, the resulting LTE power level shown
on the generator, reduced of the attenuation due to trans-
mission chain passive elements, has been recorded. Note
that the reported results depend on the spectral character-
istics of the adopted LTE and DVB-T signals as well as
on the noise platform introduced by LTE signal generator,
which represents a co-channel interference for the DVB-T
signal under observation. Any variant of these experimen-
tal configurations (e.g. DVB-T signal degradations due to
propagation with multiple paths or absence of additional
noise), could lead to conclusions different from those ob-
tained in this paper.
4. Experimental Results for the
Protection Ratio
As above mentioned, on the basis of the described experi-
mental scenario, two different TV receivers have been used
for carrying out the laboratory measurements, the first one
operating with a CAN tuner (TV RX1) and the second one
with a silicon tuner (TV RX2). These measurements have
been performed in absence and presence of two different
masthead amplifiers, with the three following configura-
tions:
• configuration A1 – amplifier 1 (AMP1) with a gain
of 30 dB (max. allowed),
• configuration A2 – amplifier 2 (AMP2) with a gain
of 52 dB (max. allowed),
• configuration A3 – amplifier 2 (AMP2) with a gain
of 42 dB.
The measurements have been repeated for each TV receiver
with DVB-T power level settings specified in Table 6.
The larger number of measurements carried out in presence
of the masthead amplifier was necessary to have a better
discrimination of the intermodulation effects due to the am-
plifier nonlinearities when the DVB-T signal power level is
stepping up.
For each configuration, the protection ratio and the protec-
tion distance have been evaluated.
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Table 6
DVB-T Power levels fixed in correspondence
of measurements points
Case
DVB–T Power levels Measurement
[dBm] point
Without masthead
–35 (max. permitted)
TV receiver
amplifier
–50
input
–65 (min. permitted)
With masthead
–35 (max. permitted)
Masthead
amplifier
–45
amplifier–55
input–65
–75 (min. permitted)
4.1. Measurements in Absence of Masthead Amplifier
In absence of the masthead amplifier, the results obtained
with TV RX 1 (equipped with CAN tuner) highlight the
presence of an image frequency signal effect 72 MHz below
the LTE signal carrier. This impairment may significantly
affect the quality of the tuned DVB-T signal, causing the
above mentioned picture failures on the video image.
The degradation of DVB-T signal QoS, for the channel in-
fluenced by this effect, occurs in presence of an LTE sig-
nal power level about 20 dB below the ones noticed for
channels not affected by the image frequency impairment.
Specifically, for DVB-T signal power levels close to the sen-
sitivity threshold of the receiver, the PR parameter assumes
a constant value around –55 dB.
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Fig. 7. PR measurements using TV RX1 and LTE signal at
fcLTE = 847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power, without
masthead amplifier.
Depending on the carrier frequency of LTE uplink inter-
ferer signal, the effects of the image channel moves from
DVB-T channels 57 (central frequency 762 MHz) and 58
(central frequency 770 MHz), in correspondence of an LTE
carrier frequency of 837 MHz, to channels 58 and 59
(central frequency respectively at 770 and 778 MHz, see
Fig. 7), with an LTE carrier frequency of 847 MHz, up to
channels 59 and 60 (central frequency respectively at 778
and 786 MHz) with an LTE carrier frequency of 857 MHz.
These effects are shown in Fig. 8 for a DVB-T signal
power level fixed at –50 dBm and become even more evi-
dent for decreasing values of the DVB-T signal power level
(see Fig. 7).
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Fig. 8. PR measurements using TV RX1 and –50 dBm DVB-T
power level, for different values of fcLTE , without masthead am-
plifier.
-30
-35
-40
-45
-50
-55
-60
56 57 58 59 60
DVB channels
C
/I
 [
d
B
]
f = 847 MHz
cLTE
DVB-T power = -65 dBm
DVB-T power = -50 dBm
DVB-T power = -35 dBm
Fig. 9. PR measurements using TV RX2 and LTE signal at
fcLT E = 847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels,
without masthead amplifier.
On the contrary, experimental results obtained with the TV
RX 2 receiver (equipped with silicon tuner) show that the
interference effects are negligible. In particular, the LTE
signal power levels that cause impairments on the DVB-T
signal are quite high, as it is evident in Fig. 9, and there-
fore the reduction of DVB-T signal QoS is evident only in
specific environmental conditions, for example when the
LTE user terminal is very close to the aerial.
4.2. Measurements with TV RX1 and Masthead
Amplifiers
In this experimental setup a masthead amplifier is intro-
duced in the test bed chain after LTE and DVB-T sig-
nals have been combined. Two different amplifiers (AMP1
and AMP2) have been used, operating in the above men-
tioned three different experimental configurations (A1, A2
and A3). Results have been carried out for both TV RX1
and TV RX2. In this section the results with TV RX1 are
illustrated.
In configuration A1, the effects of the image frequency are
more evident for low power levels of the DVB-T signal
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(less than –50 dBm), with an increase of the protection
ratio of about 20 dB. For higher power levels of the victim
signal (i.e. –35 or –45 dBm), because of approaching the
nonlinear behavior (saturation) of the amplifier, the effects
of the image channel are less noticeable (Fig. 10).
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Fig. 10. PR measurements using TV RX1, LTE signal at fcLTE =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP1
(gain = 30 dB).
In configuration A2 the effects of the image frequency are
still evident. In this case, however, the impact is limited
to very low values of DVB-T signal power levels (around
–70 dBm), since for higher values the consequences of
the saturation condition of the amplifier are very consid-
erable. In fact, the behavior is strongly influenced by the
amplifier: as soon as the LTE signal at its input exceeds
a specific threshold power level (around –35 dBm), the am-
plifier starts operating in the nonlinear area, consequently
resulting in a significant reduction of the video signal
quality (Fig. 11).
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Fig. 11. PR measurements using TV RX1, LTE signal at fcLTE =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP2
(gain = 52 dB).
Finally, using the A3 configuration, the result is similar to
the one obtained with the amplifier at the maximum gain.
However, in this case, the DVB-T signal is more protected
because, for same power levels of a DVB-T signal at the
input of the amplifier, the protection ratios are 10 dB lower
of one’s obtained in configuration A2. In this case it was
not possible to perform measurements with the DVB-T sig-
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Fig. 12. PR measurements using TV RX1, LTE signal at fcLT E =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP2
(gain = 42 dB).
nal power equal to −75 dBm, because at the output of the
amplifier the signal resulted severely corrupted even in ab-
sence of the interfering LTE signal due to the presence of
comparable power levels of device noise (see Fig. 12).
As a conclusive analysis concerning the TV RX1 receiver,
Figs. 13 and 14 illustrate a comparison between LTE and
DVB-T signal power level measurements in presence and
absence of masthead amplifiers. The analysis is referred to
an LTE signal centered at 847 MHz and considering the
DVB-T signals received on channels 59 and 60.
without amplifier
AMP1
AMP2 (52 dB)
AMP2 (42 dB)
DVB-T channel 59; fcLTE = 847 MHz
20
10
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
L
T
E
 p
o
w
er
 [
d
B
m
]
-75 -70 -65 -60 -55 -50 -45 -40 -35
DVB-T power [dBm]
Fig. 13. LTE power level causing interference vs. DVB-T power
level in presence and absence of the masthead amplifier, using TV
RX1, for DVB-T channel 59 and fcLT E = 847 MHz.
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Fig. 14. LTE power level causing interference vs. DVB-T power
level in presence and absence of the masthead amplifier, using TV
RX1, for DVB-T channel 60 and fcLT E = 847 MHz.
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The resulting curves provide a clear evidence of the non-
linear effects of the amplifiers and the corresponding values
of LTE signal power levels causing this harmful condition.
4.3. Measurements with TV RX2 and Masthead
Amplifiers
Also in this case, the analysis has been conducted adopt-
ing the above mentioned three different experimental con-
figurations (A1, A2, A3) for AMP1 and AMP2 in combina-
tion with the TV RX2 receiver. The test results illustrated
in the graphs reported in Figs. 15, 16 and 17 show a uni-
form behavior in terms of protection ratio for any consid-
ered DVB-T signal power level, regardless of the considered
TV channel.
However, the LTE signal power level that causes QoS
degradation increases with the power level of the DVB-T re-
ceived signal, reaching the highest levels for DVB-T signal
powers of –35 and –45 dBm. The latter two experimental
configurations lead to poorly significant results. In fact, as
shown in the next section, for such values of the interferer
signal the mobile terminal should be located very close to
the antenna TV (few centimeters, not in far field condition)
in order to originate a perceptible interference.
As for TV RX1, even in this case an analysis illustrating
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Fig. 15. PR measurements using TV RX2, LTE signal at fcLTE =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP1
(gain = 30 dB).
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
56 57 58 59 60
DVB-T channels
C
/I
 [
d
B
]
f = 847 MHz; AMP2 (52 dB)
cLTE
DVB-T power = -55 dBm
DVB-T power = -35 dBm
DVB-T power = -65 dBm
DVB-T power = -75 dBm
DVB-T power = -45 dBm
Fig. 16. PR measurements using TV RX2, LTE signal at fcLTE =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP2
(gain = 52 dB).
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Fig. 17. PR measurements using TV RX2, LTE signal at fcLT E =
847 MHz, for different values of DVB-T power levels, with AMP2
(gain = 42 dB).
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Fig. 18. LTE power level causing interference vs. DVB-T power
level in presence and absence of the masthead amplifier, using TV
RX2, for DVB-T channel 60 and fcLT E = 847 MHz.
the lowest LTE power levels causing interferential effects
at different power levels of DVB-T signal (channel 60),
with and without masthead amplifiers, has been provided
(see Fig. 18). From this graph nonlinear effects of the am-
plifiers and saturation points are evident and it is clear how
the presence of an amplifier affects the QoS of a DVB-T
system in presence of LTE uplink signals. As a conse-
quence of the C/I flat trend highlighted in Figs. 15, 16
and 17, a very similar behavior has been noticed also for
all the others considered TV channels.
5. Protection Distances Based on
Experimental Results
With the goal to assess the impact of the mutual position of
the mobile terminal with respect to the receiving antenna of
a TV set, the protection distance parameter between an LTE
mobile terminal and a DVB-T antenna has been measured
in some of the above considered experimental scenarios.
For this analysis it has been assumed the experimental
conditions mentioned in Subsection 2.2 (the mobile user
equipment is in Line-Of-Sight with the receiving DTT
antenna and the path attenuation can be calculated using
the free space propagation model [11]), adopting the LTE
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mobile terminal and the DVB-T receiver antenna parame-
ters reported in Table 7 (as suggested in the Rec. ITU-R
BT.419-3 [17]).
Table 7
LTE UE and DVB-T antenna parameters
Parameter Value
Max TX power 23 dBm
UE antenna gain –3 dBi
RX antenna gain (DVB-T) 9.15 dBi
UE antenna pattern Omnidirectional
In this context, three case studies have been analyzed:
Case 1 – TV RX1 without amplifier and LTE carrier fre-
quency at 837 MHz.
In this case, as illustrated in Fig. 19 the protection dis-
tance ranges from less than one meter up to about 20 m. In
particular, the worst condition is detected in correspondence
of the image frequency, with a DVB-T signal power level
equal to –65 dBm. It should be taken into account that
values less than one meter are considered as approximated
extrapolation of free space far field behavior.
Case 2 – TV RX1 using AMP2 with a gain fixed at 52 dB
and LTE carrier frequency at 847 MHz.
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Fig. 19. Protection distance for different DVB-T channels and
power levels, at fcLT E = 837 MHz, using CAN TV receiver, with-
out masthead amplifier.
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Fig. 20. Protection distance for different DVB-T channels and
power levels, at fcLT E = 847 MHz, using CAN TV receiver,
with AMP2.
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Fig. 21. Protection distance for different DVB-T channels and
power levels, at fcLT E = 847 MHz, using silicon TV receiver, with
AMP2.
In this case, as shown in Fig. 20, the protection distance
ranges from less than 10 m up to about 75 meters. The
worst condition is still detected in correspondence of the
image frequency and for DVB-T signal power level equal
to –75 dBm.
Case 3 – TV RX2 using AMP2 with a gain fixed at 52 dB
and LTE carrier frequency at 847 MHz.
In this case, as illustrated in Fig. 21, the protection distance
is around 10 meters for all channels and all considered
DVB-T power levels. Similar results have been assessed
for 837 and 857 MHz LTE carriers.
6. Conclusions
In the present study the problem of coexistence of DVB-
T and LTE mobile communication systems operating in
contiguous UHF frequency bands has been analyzed.
In particular, it has been investigated the interference ef-
fect that an LTE uplink transmission might produce on the
TV broadcasting service in specific scenarios, by means of
the evaluation of protection ratio and protection distance
parameters referred to experimental simulation laboratory
setups representing real operative situations.
The obtained results highlighted that the TV receiver fea-
tures, as well as the presence or absence of a masthead
amplifier in the receiving chain, may heavily influence, in
specific circumstances, the DVB-T signal QoS perceived by
the user. More in detail, for the protection ratio, the results
can be synthesized as follows.
In absence of the masthead amplifier, the CAN TV re-
ceiver determines the presence of an image frequency con-
tribution on DVB-T channels 57–60, depending on the LTE
signal carrier ranging from 837 to 857 MHz, with a con-
sequential increasing of the PR of about 20 dB for the
channel influenced by this effect. On the contrary, this
result does not occur for the silicon TV receiver where,
only in presence of DVB-T signal power levels close to
the minimum allowed or in presence of quite high LTE
signal power levels, reachable in extremely rare conditions
83
Massimo Celidonio, Pier Giorgio Masullo, Lorenzo Pulcini, and Manuela Vaser
(LTE mobile terminal located very close to the UHF TV
antenna), the reduction of DVB-T signal QoS is relevant,
independently from the considered TV channel;
In presence of the masthead amplifier, it has been ob-
served a behavior similar to the one described in the pre-
vious case, until the power levels of the victim signal are
under a threshold value, inversely proportional to the gain
of the amplifier. Once this value is exceeded, the nonlinear-
ity characteristic effects of the amplifier become predom-
inant and the picture failure of the video signal appears
even for very low power levels of the interfering LTE sig-
nal gathered by TV antenna. It must be underlined that in
this case the signal degradation affects almost all DVB-T
channels and not only a specific one. Furthermore the in-
crease of the power level of the LTE interference signal of
a few decimal of dB (0.2 to 0.5) leads to completely break
down the TV signal, reaching the condition of overloading
threshold.
About the protection distance parameter, it can be deduct-
ed that the lower is the received DVB-T signal power level
the higher should be the distance of the LTE transmitter
from the receiving UHF TV antenna in order to avoid in-
terference, mainly in correspondence of the channel that is
influenced by the image frequency, if the TV set equipped
with a CAN tuner is considered. This effect is even more
emphasized in presence of a masthead amplifier when, the
previous distance, is in the order of tens of meters, de-
pending on the gain of the amplifier. Obviously, in case of
a TV set equipped with a silicon tuner, due to the absence
of image frequency effect, the protection distance behavior
is almost constant for all considered DVB-T channels, with
a slight worsening in case of DVB-T power levels close
to the minimum allowed values at the input of masthead
amplifier. From these results it is clear that some interfer-
ence problems exist, which could be mitigated by adopting
appropriate countermeasures including the installation of
a low pass filter in the head-end of the MATV plant.
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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been used
in numerous applications to remotely gather real-time data
on important environmental parameters. There are several
projects where WSNs are deployed in different locations and
operate independently. Each deployment has its own models,
encodings, and services for sensor data, and are integrated
with different types of visualization/analysis tools based on in-
dividual project requirements. This makes it difficult to reuse
these services for other WSN applications. A user/system is
impeded by having to learn the models, encodings, and ser-
vices of each system, and also must integrate/interoperate data
from different data sources. Sensor Web Enablement (SWE)
provides a set of standards (web service interfaces and data
encoding/model specifications) to make sensor data publicly
available on the web. This paper describes how the SWE
framework can be extended to integrate disparate WSN sys-
tems and to support standardized access to sensor data. The
proposed system also introduces a web-based data visualiza-
tion and statistical analysis service for data stored in the Sen-
sor Observation Service (SOS) by integrating open source
technologies. A performance analysis is presented to show
that the additional features have minimal impact on the sys-
tem. Also some lessons learned through implementing SWE
are discussed.
Keywords—environmental data, environmental monitoring, sen-
sor technologies, standardization, web-based visualization.
1. Introduction
In recent decades Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have
been dramatically advanced and adopted by many domains
to remotely monitor environments [1]. The development of
low-cost sensor technologies that are capable of capturing
various properties of physical phenomena has led to the
growing popularity of WSNs. This has made it easier to
observe many environmental aspects [2]. WSNs can also
reduce the time needed for collecting large amounts of data
on key environmental factors. Furthermore, WSNs pro-
vide access to the collected data via the Internet, thereby
allowing environmental scientists and decision makers to
gain a better real-time understanding about the observed
environment.
Analyzing sensed data requires a significant amount of time
and effort. Such analysis involves the discovery and inte-
gration of data from multiple sources (e.g. various and dif-
ferent types of sensors), assessing quality issues (e.g. miss-
ing/suspicious data), hypothesis testing, and visualizing the
test results to support decision making. Manual analysis
of large amounts of heterogeneous and spatiotemporal data
is difficult and complicated. Automatic integration, analy-
sis, and visualization of sensed data from multiple sources
can reduce the workload needed for addressing data quality
issues and understanding environmental conditions. Such
automation can also minimize human mistakes during the
analysis phase. However, different WSN systems provide
different encodings, models, and services for their sensor
data. This makes the integration of differing sensor tech-
nologies and network systems problematic. Furthermore,
the encodings, models, and services are typically designed
for a particular application, which makes it difficult to reuse
these services for other WSN applications. A standardized
model, encoding, and service for WSN data would avoid
the constant and inefficient need to “reinvent the wheel”,
and can facilitate the discovery and exploitation of sensor
data.
This paper describes a system architecture based on the
Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) Sensor Web Enable-
ment (SWE) framework [3], [4]. A middleware integra-
tion platform has been designed to collect and integrate
sensor data from disparate WSN systems, referred to as
the James Cook University (JCU) Sensor Federation (JSF).
JSF provides a flexible solution for automating the pro-
cess of transforming sensor data into the corresponding
SWE encoding and storing the data in the Sensor Obser-
vation Service (SOS) via the web service interface. Fur-
thermore, additional features have been added to the ex-
isting SOS web service interface to provide web-based ac-
cess to the data and statistical analysis tools. Several real
world WSN projects of varying scales and complexities
have been integrated into one SOS using JSF to demonstrate
the system’s versatility. A performance analysis indicates
that the additional features have minimal impact on the
system.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the SWE framework, provides a brief overview of the
WSN projects that authors have been involved with, and
presents the motivation for the work presented in this pa-
per. Section 3 describes the JSF system architecture, and
proposes a middleware integration platform for the automa-
tion of transforming data from multiple WSNs into the
SWE encodings. Section 3 also shows how SOS is in-
tegrated with open source freely available technologies to
support web-based data visualization and statistical analysis
of the data stored in the SOS. Section 4 analyses the per-
formance of the enhanced SOS and discusses some of the
issues authors had when implementing a SWE system. Sec-
tion 5 provides some concluding remarks and avenues for
future work.
2. Related Work and Problem
Motivation
2.1. Sensor Web Enablement
Historically, WSN applications have been completely pro-
prietary. A specific vendor would provide all of the sen-
sor technologies, hardware, software, and network infras-
tructure. This predicament meant that WSNs were very
technical, application-specific, inflexible, and expensive to
purchase and maintain. There was limited scope to inte-
grate heterogeneous sensor technologies (i.e. sensors from
different vendors). Furthermore, the sensed data was for-
matted/encoded according to the vendor’s own standards,
which restricted data sharing and reuse.
In recent years, the concept of the Sensor Web has gained
momentum [3]–[10]. The Sensor Web’s aim is to make all
sensors interoperable (regardless of the vendor) so that het-
erogeneous sensor technologies can be combined to create
low-cost, non-proprietary WSNs. Furthermore, collected
data becomes available to the Sensor Web which promotes
data sharing and reuse. The data can be reused by other
consumers for purposes that may be unrelated to, or extend
upon the original motivation for collecting the data. This
is possible as the WSNs and the data they collect adhere to
a set of mutually accepted standards.
The OGC is made up of representatives from academia,
industry, and enthusiasts to develop the standards behind
the Sensor Web. The OGC SWE framework provides a set
of standards that enables all types of sensors, transducers
and sensor data repositories to be discoverable, accessible
and usable via the Web [3], [4]. The SWE framework
consists of following standards and services:
• Observations and Measurements (O&M) – defines
XML schemas for accessing and exchanging obser-
vations, measurements, procedures, and metadata of
sensor systems;
• Sensor Model Language (SensorML) – defines stan-
dard models and XML schemas for describing the
processes within sensor and observation processing
systems. SensorML provides a functional model of
the sensor system, where all components including
sensors, transducers, actuators, and processors are
modeled as processes;
• Sensor Observation Service (SOS) – enables the
querying of observations, sensor metadata and repre-
sentations of observed features, registration/deletion
of sensors, and inserting new observations of a reg-
istered sensor. SOS is essentially a data repository
at the heart of an SWE WSN;
• Sensor Planning Service (SPS) – defines interfaces
for queries that provide information about the capa-
bilities of a sensor and how to task the sensor;
• Sensor Alert Service (SAS) – provides a standard
web service interface for publishing and subscribing
to alerts from sensors; and
• Web Notification Services (WNS) – provides a stan-
dard web service interface for asynchronous delivery
of messages or alerts from SAS and SPS web ser-
vices.
The SWE architecture has reached broad acceptance by
sensor network application developers. Schade et al. [11]
applied the SWE framework to volunteered geographic
information sensing and event detection techniques.
Shafi et al. [12] introduced an automated detection/alert
system based on the SWE framework (SOS, SAS and
WNS) that detects radiation leakage and sends a notifi-
cation to its subscribed users. Hu et al. [13] extended the
SensorML model to support sensor observation capabil-
ity information, i.e. depth, quality, frequency, and range,
that enables the accurate discovery of qualified sensors.
Srimathi et al. [2] proposed a sensor grid architecture that
combines a metamodeling tool, the SWE framework, and
sensor grid (Hadoop framework). Back et al. [14] presented
a conceptual design for bridging two domains: a supervi-
sory control and data acquisition system and a Geographic
Information System (GIS), where the SOS is used to provide
a standardized service model for GIS.
Churcher et al. [15], [16] describe their experiences with
applying SWE to a telecare application involving a number
of projects using bespoke sensor hardware, interfaces, and
communications. Guru [17] show how they are using the
a river catchment WSN to evaluate specifications for SWE
in terms of its ability to facilitate water resource manage-
ment tools. Markovic et al. [8] also describe a system
for river pollution monitoring and alerts using architecture
based on SWE. Lee and Reichardt [18] discuss how open
standards for sensor interfaces and data formats can aid in
speeding up the identification of threats to homeland secu-
rity. Samadzadegan et al. [19] developed a system archi-
tecture for monitoring air quality observations using SWE
standards (i.e., SOS, SAS, SPS and WNS) for integrat-
ing/interoperating heterogeneous sensors and discovering
air pollution to send a notification.
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2.2. Proposed Sensor Network Projects
The authors have been involved in several projects where
WSNs were deployed in different locations and operate in-
dependently. The WSN projects differ in size, complexity,
and application. These WSN projects include:
Smart Environmental Analysis and Technologies (SE-
MAT) [20]: The SEMAT project revolved around con-
structing smart sensor networks that can be deployed in
aquatic settings for the purposes of conducting marine stud-
ies. Authors have undertaken SEMAT deployments at De-
ception Bay and Heron Island in Queensland Australia. The
system was designed to take a heterogeneous, low-cost ap-
proach, which allowed for near real-time access to data. In
each deployment, five buoys containing on-board electron-
ics (Gumstix Computer-On-Module) equipped with various
sensors from Dataflow Systems (temperature, light, water
pressure, and salinity) were positioned in shallow water en-
vironments. The buoys communicated sensor data back to
the end user via a base station located near-by on land. This
project grappled with significant WSN issues including lim-
ited power supply, communications over and underwater,
and problems with marine fouling and water ingress.
Digital Homestead Project: This project involved build-
ing a low-cost and smart WSN suitable for applications in
a digital homestead (i.e. remote farming properties) and ur-
ban environments. The project’s initial WSN deployment
at Rowes Bay in Queensland Australia used and Seeeduino
Stalker with eight DS18B20 temperature sensors, DHT22
humidity sensors, and analogue light sensors placed un-
der different types of roofing materials for observing the
energy efficiency measures. This study is being used to
explore renewable energy solutions that can benefit biodi-
versity maintenance through planned urban landscapes.
Greening Federation Place: This project’s goal was to
demonstrate how heritage buildings in tropical environ-
ments can evolve into sustainable buildings while retaining
cultural significance. Federation Place is a heritage listed
building located in Townsville Australia. A WSN contain-
ing DS18B20 temperature sensors was deployed at Federa-
tion Place to examine the thermal properties of the building
and identify fine scale sources of temperature variation.
Over time, difficulties arose as a result of each of the indi-
vidual WSN deployments using different types of sensors
(with different capabilities) and requiring different setup
configurations. From a software perspective, each of the
projects contained its own models, encodings, and services
for sensor data. Also, differing amounts and types of data
were available to describe each deployment’s characteris-
tics, e.g. the positioning of nodes and sensors are available
for the SEMAT deployments, but not for the Rowes Bay
deployment. Furthermore, each deployment was initially
integrated with different types of visualization and analysis
tools based on individual project requirements [21].
As the number of projects grew and their complexity in-
creased, the need for standardization of sensor configu-
ration, data, storage, communication, and a generic web-
based user interface for data visualization and analysis be-
came apparent. The solution required was more compre-
hensive than the existing solutions proposed by the liter-
ature in Subsection 2.1 due to a number of factors. The
existing proposals from the literature were either for a spe-
cific project, or proposed frameworks that were too broad
to be applied in practice. A system that could be used
over multiple disparate WSN projects with completely dif-
ferent applications was desired. The system also needed to
remove the manual process of generating documents that
adhere to SWE standards (i.e., SensorML, O&M). When
performed manually, this process is tedious, repetitious of
work conducted in other WSNs, and is often error-prone.
Automating this process would increase the speed of setting
up a WSN and reduce the possibility of errors in the SWE
documents. Furthermore, to authors’ knowledge little or no
literature exists on providing a general web-based interface
and statistical analysis features that can interact with the
SWE framework.
3. JSF System Architecture
In order to integrate and interoperate sensor data from
the disparate WSNs described in Subsection 2.2, the SWE
framework was extended by creating a middleware inte-
gration platform. The intention is to provide an interface
(referred to as the SWE API) for each WSN deployment
that facilitates interoperability according to SWE standards.
The SWE API provides common encoding/decoding func-
tions that can be used by any WSN. Encoding functions
specific to a particular WSN are abstracted from the SWE
layer and are implemented in an extension level. For exam-
ple, with the SEMAT Heron Island deployment, the Heron-
SOSEncoder implements functions specific to the Heron Is-
land deployment, by extending the SWE SOSEncoder. The
point of this approach is that changes to any particular WSN
do not affect how any other WSN application interacts with
the SWE framework. Furthermore, the system automates
the generation of the SWE documentation (i.e., SensorML,
O&M) to ease WSN set-up time or changes in the WSN
configuration, thereby reducing the potential for errors in
adhering to SWE standards.
The authors also decided to extend SWE’s SOS standard
by providing a generic web-based user interface and statis-
tical analysis functionality. The combination of the WSN
projects and our extended SWE functionality is referred to
as the JCU Sensor Federation (JSF). Figure 1 presents the
proposed JSF system architecture. The system is comprised
of:
• A Data User – this is the individual user/stakeholder
who is interested in accessing and viewing the data
from any WSN connected to the system;
• A SOS with support for web-based data visualization
and statistical analysis – this provides storage of sen-
sor metadata and sensor observations. The extended
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Fig. 1. The JSF system architecture for the integration and in-
teroperability of sensor data from multiple data sources.
functionality allows for automated input, integration,
visualization, and analysis of sensed data. Environ-
mental scientists can use these features to enhance
the decision making process and/or the discovery of
new information from the environment under obser-
vation;
• A Middleware Integration Platform – this hides the
heterogeneity of models, encodings, and web service
interfaces for sensor data. This enables a user to
access the sensor data via the Internet without hav-
ing to learn individual models and service interfaces,
and also facilitates the integration and interoperabil-
ity of the heterogeneous data through automating the
process of generating SWE-compliant documents;
• Individual WSN Projects – the projects undertaken
as part of the work presented in this paper. These
include the SEMAT deployments at Deception Bay
and Heron Island, the Digital Homestead deployment
at Rowes Bay, and the Greening Federation Place
deployment (refer to Subsection 2.2). Conceivably
the number of projects can scale with the system.
A major benefit of employing the SWE framework is for
easy discovery and use of the data. The decision was made
to not utilize different SOSs for each deployment as a dis-
tributed approach reduces this benefit. For example, the
distributed approach would require a user to send requests
to different SOS URLs. Furthermore, users would need to
be informed every time a new SOS is added to the system.
Having a single SOS provides a single service interface to
multiple WSN deployments’ data/metadata. Therefore, the
proposed architecture brings all of the WSN deployments
together in one SOS.
3.1. The JSF Middleware Integration Platform
Sensor data stored in a SOS must be available via the SOS
web service interface. However, this process requires sig-
nificant effort in practice to achieve. For example, regis-
tering a sensor via the SOS web service interface requires
three steps:
• the sensor data need to be mapped into the respective
message encoding (i.e., the InsertSensorDocument),
• the document needs to be formatted based on a SOS
protocol binding, e.g., Simple Object Access Proto-
col (SOAP),
• the formatted document is then transferred to the SOS
via its web service interface.
Furthermore, it is necessary to have a common agreement
on how to apply SWE within a specific domain. This is
because there are different SWE specifications available,
where the encodings, models, and services are different.
For example, SOS version 2.0 provides the ability to store
observation metadata and data through different transac-
tions, whereas this ability is not available in SOS ver-
sion 1.0. That is, SOS version 1.0 requires metadata to
be transferred every time an observation is to be stored.
However, SOS version 2.0 only requires the metadata to
be stored once. Therefore, only the observation data is re-
quired, which reduces the amount of data transferred and
makes transfers faster. Also, the SOS implementations can
vary based on the needs of a particular domain (e.g. proto-
col bindings). Due to the aforementioned reasons, and that
SOS version 2.0 has a richer array of functionality, for JSF
the SOS version 2.0 is used.
JSF was developed to integrate the sensor data from mul-
tiple WSNs using the SWE architecture. JSF manages
adapted SWE specifications of an individual domain ap-
plication to map, format, and store its sensor and sensed
data. JSF provides the ability to extract sensor data from
a domain WSN application, and transforms the data into
the corresponding request document using its SWE API
implementation. Then, the encoded document is formatted
and transferred using the Transaction API, which provides
binding protocols (i.e. XML binding or SOAP binding) and
the HTTP functions (request/response). This abstracts the
underlying WSN projects from SWE and also automates
the process of generating SWE-compliant documents.
Figure 2 shows the design of the JSF middleware integra-
tion platform. This platform consists of three layers:
• Extraction layer – extracts sensor network data from
web services or databases and converts the data into
a corresponding SWE API function,
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SOS
Deception Bay Heron Island Rowes Bay Federation Place
Transaction API
InsertSensorDocument
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DeceptionBaySOSEncoder HeronBaySOSEncoder RBSOSEncoder FPSOSEncoder
DeceptionBaySOSExtractor HeronExtractor RBExtractor FPExtractor
Fig. 2. JSF middleware integration platform design (the arrows denote the direction of the flow of information).
• Transformation layer (SWE API) – maps data into
a corresponding SOS request document (i.e., Insert-
SensorDocument, InsertObservationDocument, In-
sertResultTemplateDocument, or InsertResult),
• Transaction layer – binds/transfers the encoded docu-
ments to a corresponding SOS web service interface.
Consider the SEMAT Deception Bay deployment. The data
is first extracted by the DeceptionBayExtractor (i.e. the
Extraction layer) and appropriate SWE API function is
called. The data is then encoded into a SOS-compliant
document by the DeceptionBaySOSEncoder (i.e. the Trans-
formation layer). Finally, the SOS request document is
transferred and stored in the SOS according to the SOS
web service (i.e. the Transaction layer). A similar process
occurs for data from any of the other WSN deployments,
i.e. Heron Island, Rowes Bay, and Federation Place.
3.1.1. The SWE API
The SWE Application Programming Interface (API) pro-
vides standardized and portable system abstractions that al-
lows JSF to transform data into SWE encodings (i.e. the
Transformation layer). The SWE API consists of the fol-
lowing components:
• Interface layer – provides five interfaces for the SOS
API. Each interface corresponds to the individual
SWE standards (SWEFrame SOSEncoder, SWE-
Frame SMLEncoder, SWEFrame OMOLEncoder,
SWEFrame SASEncoder, and SWEFrame SPSEn-
coder);
• Abstract layer – is associated with a particular SWE
implementation that provides a list of commonly used
functionality for the particular SWE implementation,
i.e. encoding data, query request documents, and
binding and transmission operations;
• Implementation layer – is an extension of the Abstract
layer that maps sensor network data from a particular
system type into the SWE documents.
A deployment must first be registered with JSF. During
registration, an API is created for the deployment. A de-
ployment’s API implementation contains two properties
“identifier” and “version”. The combined value must be
unique in order to store it into the API container. The
registered implementation can be retrieved from the con-
tainer by passing the respective identifier and version onto
the container interface. The Abstract layer can simply be
extended to add a new encoding, binding, or transmission
process.
Figure 3 presents an example of an SWE API implemen-
tation for the data from the SEMAT Heron Island deploy-
ment. It shows the identifier, version, and methods for
each class, and relationships between classes. The Heron-
SOSEncoder class uses all of the other classes. Individ-
ual classes represent each corresponding SWE component,
e.g. HeronSOSEncoder for SOS. These classes transform
sensor data into their respective SWE encodings (e.g., the
getInsertSensorDocument functionality maps sensor data
into the SOS InsertSensorDocument).
The HeronSensorMLEncoder implements the AbstractSen-
sorMLEncoder that maps the sensor data into an In-
sertSensorDocument. The HeronOMLEncoder implements
the AbstractOMLEncoder that maps the observation data
into an InsertObservationDocument, where its observation
metadata and data can be mapped in separate documents by
the HeronResultTemplateEncoder and HeronResultEncoder
respectively. The HeronSosEncoder provides a single in-
terface to access to the aforementioned implementations.
To describe a sensor in a SWE-compliant way requires the
following attributes:
• Identification – this requires the user to supply
uniqueID (“urn:ogc:def:identifier:OGC:uniqueID”)
and offeringID (urn:ogc;def:identifier:OGC:offer-
ingID), where an uniqueID attribute is used for
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AbstractSensorMLEncoder AbstractSOSEncoder
AbstractResultEncoder
AbstractResultTemplateEncoder
AbstractOMLEncoder
HeronSensorMLEncoder
identifier = “Heron_SensorMLEncoder”;
version = “1.0”;
HeronSOSEncoder
identifier = “Heron”;
version = “1.0”;
HeronResultEncoder
identifier = “Heron_ResultEncoder”;
version = “1.0”;
HeronResultTemplateEncoder
identifier = “Heron_ResultTemplateEncoder”;
version = “1.0”;
HeronOMLEncoder
identifier = “Heron_OMLEncoder”;
version = “1.0”;
Extends Extends
Extends
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#getlnsertSensorDocument:InsertSensorDocument
#getlnsertSensorDocument:insertSensorDocument
#getlnsertionCapabilitiesDocument:insertionCapabilitiesDocument
#getlnsertResultDocument:InsertResultDocument
#getlnsertResultTemplate:insertResultTemplateDocument
#getlnsertResultTemplate:insertResultTemplateDocument
#getlnsertResultDocument:insertResultDocument
#getlnsertObservationDocument:InsertObservationDocument
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1
Fig. 3. Class diagram of the SWE API implementation for the SEMAT Heron Island deployment.
Table 1
The integration of the heterogeneous sensor data models/encodings using the SWE encodings
WSN Sensor Data Model/Encoding SWE Encoding
Deception
Bay, Heron
Island and
Rowes Bay
Node model: name, latitude, longitude, buoy
model, power log and sensors
SensorML: identifier, position, outputs and
components
Sensor model: serial number, manufacturer, de-
scription, type, parameter number and unit of
measurement
SensorML: identifier, position and outputs
SensedData model: type, unit of measurement,
position, time, raw Data, calibrated Data and
power log
O&M: field and values
Federation
Place
Node model: name, latitude, longitude and
sensors
SensorML: identifier, position and components
Sensor model: name, type, observedProperty,
code, altitude and definition
SensorML: identifier, position, outputs and
observableProperty
Observation model: definition, code and type ResultTemplate: field
Data model: value and timestamp Result: value
querying sensor (system) metadata, and offeringID
is used for inserting the sensor’s sensed data.
This is the same value that must be used within
O&M in order to link the observation and sensor
metadata/data;
• Capabilities– this attribute is used to describe the
feature that the sensor is measuring (e.g. Ocean);
• Location – describes the sensor’s (system) geograph-
ical location, its format is defined by its “reference-
frame” definition;
• Inputs – describes the sensor’s (system) process
input;
• Output – describes the sensor’s (system) process
output;
• Components – other systems that is included within
the system.
A WSN deployment typically consists of sensor nodes,
where sensors are attached/installed. So proposed WSNs
are described as a sensor node (identification, capabilities,
location, inputs, outputs, and components) that combines
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Fig. 4. The enhanced SOS architecture with web-based data visualization and statistical analysis functionality.
all the sensors under the components attributes, where in-
dividual sensors are described (identification, capabilities,
location, inputs, outputs). The SEMAT Heron Island de-
ployment is described under the sensor node’s capabilities
attribute and individual sensor’s capabilities describe what
actual environmental factor the sensor is measuring, e.g.
temperature, light. Note that SensorML documents can be
quite large. The InsertSensor document for the Heron Is-
land deployment contains over 800 lines of code.
Table 1 shows how the SWE API integrates the hetero-
geneous sensor data models/encodings using the SWE en-
codings. The SWE API implementation for the Deception
Bay, Heron Island and Rowes Bay deployments converts the
Node and Sensor model into SensorML, and the Sensed-
Data model into O&M. The API implementation for the
Federation Place deployment transforms the Node and Sen-
sor model into SensorML, and the Observation and Data
model into InsertResultTemplate and InsertResult. The pur-
pose of this table is to show how each deployments own
characteristics can be maintained, while the SWE API maps
these characteristics to the appropriate corresponding at-
tributes in SWE.
3.2. SOS Design and Implementation
As previously mentioned, the authors required a generic
web-based user interface to operate across all the WSN
deployments using JSF. Therefore, an existing SOS imple-
mentation (52◦ North SOS version 2.0) is extended to sup-
port web-based data visualization and statistical analysis of
the collected data. This was achieved using the following
open source technologies and APIs:
• Apache Common Math API – provides mathemat-
ics and statistics, i.e. descriptive statistics, sim-
ple/multiple regression, rank transformation, covari-
ance, correlation, and statistical tests;
• Weka API – enables Java to support several data min-
ing tasks including data pre-processing, clustering,
classification, regression, and feature selection;
• Highstock library – provides general timeline charts
with navigation options, e.g. scrolling and date
picker;
• Google Maps API – allows for the embedding of
Google Maps on a web page.
The system provides additional features to the existing
SOS web service interfaces (i.e., InsertObservation, In-
sertResultTemplate and InsertResult) that analyses and
visualizes the data based on the system configuration.
The SWE encodings/documents are provided by the OGC
(net.opengis.* package). 52◦ North SOS does not provide
support for all the semantic definitions to describe at-
tributes such as FeatureOfInterest, Location, Format, etc.
These attributes are described using the 52◦ North API
(ogc.n52.sos.ogc.om.features*).
Figure 4 illustrates the enhanced SOS architecture and how
the system operates. At the heart of the architecture is the
52◦ North SOS. SWE compliant documents are pushed to,
or retrieved from the SOS via SWE’s web service interface.
When a sensor transfers sensed data, the system stores the
data in a temporary location. This sensed data is formatted
according to the O&M SWE standard.
The system runs a batch-process at predefined intervals to
iterate through new data to generate and store a JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) file for each O&M document. The
interval is determined by a configuration file. For example,
in this instance the configuration file contains t=300 which
means that batch process runs every 300 s.
Individual statistical analysis implementations can integrate
data from multiple sensors by providing a list of sensor
identifiers supplied by the offering parameter. Note that
the offering parameter is O&M’s equivalent of the sensor
identifier in sensorML. This parameter can be accessed by
invoking the isOfferingListed function in O&M. The system
also checks for any statistical analysis implementations that
use the sensed data through the offering property within the
O&M document during the iteration. The result of each
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Fig. 5. The main web page shows the geographical location of the WSN deployments on the Google Maps, and sensor/observation
data provided by the SOS.
Fig. 6. An example deployment page for the web-based user interface.
analysis process is mapped with the Java Map interface,
which is transformed into a JSON file and stored in the
repository. The JSON files provide a light-weight data in-
terchange format to facilitate asynchronous browser/server
communication. This technology is used for mapping de-
ployment data via the Java Map interface.
The web-based user interface provides graphical visual-
ization of the sensors, observation data, and the analysis
results. When the user interface requires information, it
can access the data from the 52◦ North SOS using SWE’s
web service interface. Alternately, when statistical analy-
sis/aggregation data is required, the user interface can ac-
cess the repository.
The user interface consists of two primary sections:
• Main web page – provides an overview of registered
deployments, presents the deployment locations on
a Google Map, and allows the user to select and
navigate to a specific deployments web page,
• Deployment web page – provides access to all details
specific to an individual deployment, and presents
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the user with options to graphically visualize sensed
data and analysis results, or to export the data to
a file.
Figure 5 shows the user interface’s main web page. The
main page of the interface consists of four frames:
• Map – illustrates the geographical location of various
WSN deployments and sensor nodes as markers on
Google Maps. A user can view a deployment’s para-
metric information by clicking on the corresponding
marker in the map;
• Deployment – displays a list of WSN deployments
associated with a particular project (e.g. SEMAT)
and shows each deployment’s name, geographical
location, type, and description. A user can also view
information specific to a WSN deployment by click-
ing the corresponding deployment button;
• Service – provides the SWE service information;
• SOS offering – shows a list of the sensed data pro-
vided by the SOS.
Figure 6 shows an example of what is shown in the user
interface when a specific deployment has been clicked on.
This page consists of the following components:
• Visualization metadata – provides a brief description
about the deployment’s purpose;
• Sensors – shows a list of sensors associated with the
deployment and allows a user to click on a specific
sensor to view its metadata and sensed data;
• Sensor metadata – displays sensor metadata informa-
tion (e.g., the sensor type, description);
• Analysis – lists any analysis processes being con-
ducted on the collected data, and provides the user
with several options regarding the types of statistical
analysis that can be performed;
• Analysis result – provides graphical illustration of the
analysis results;
• Data graph – provides graphical illustration of the
sensed data. Note that numerous sensor data sets
can be overlayed on the same graph;
• Time control bar – allows the user to control the
analysis result by varying the time span.
Figure 6 shows the deployment page for the Rowes Bay
WSN. The interface is showing the data graphs correspond-
ing to the temperature sensors and the sensor metadata,
i.e. where each sensor is located in relation to the roofing
material. The user can graph each sensor’s data individ-
ually, or overlay all sensor data. The deployment page
also illustrates the statistical analysis results conducted on
the temperature data. The analysis section is charting the
minimum, maximum, variance, and average temperature of
each temperature sensor at hourly intervals. An user has
the ability to export the collected (and analyzed) data in
a series of formats for use in other software packages.
The web-based user interface is written in JavaScript and
HTML to increase flexibility and reusability. The interface
also provides the ability to add, modify, or remove a data
source (i.e. sensor and analysis results), and to configure
the visualization type (i.e. charting type) from the deploy-
ment web page using a system configuration file. A new
deployment web page can be added by creating a web page
and modifying the configuration file (i.e. setting its data
sources and visualization types). This is automatically con-
verted into the corresponding JavaScript functions to gen-
erate charts/graphs and Google Maps. In this manner, the
web-based interface essentially becomes “generic” in that
it can display data from any WSN regardless of its appli-
cation.
4. Performance and Lessons Learned
4.1. Performance of the Enhanced SOS System
To evaluate the integration of the statistical analysis and
visualization services with the SOS, the 52◦ North SOS is
compared with presented enhanced SOS. The test environ-
ment was setup with a virtual machine and a laptop. Both
SOS implementations were installed on the virtual machine
(Linux kernel 2.6.32, Red Hat 4.4.7, 2.93 GHz CPU and
1 GB RAM) with Java 1.7 and Tomcat 7. JSF was installed
on the laptop (Mac OS X 10.7.5 2.8 GHz CPU, 4 GB RAM)
to simulate test data sets (InsertObservationDocument).
The effects of the additional features in the system perfor-
mance were observed. 100 simulated sensors were regis-
tered on the both SOS implementations, and the enhanced
SOS was configured to provide descriptive statistics on
the sensed data transferred by these sensors every minute.
A test function was implemented in the middleware to
encode and transfer the InsertObservationDocument with
100 data points for each sensor.
Figure 7 presents the results of the performance comparison
between the 52◦ North SOS and the enhanced SOS. The
X-axis and Y-axis gives the number of sensors and the time
(in seconds) respectively. The test results show that the In-
sertObservation, InsertResultTemplate and InsertResult ser-
vice time of the enhanced SOS are approximately 0.5, 0.1,
and 0.3 seconds slower respectively than the original SOS
for every transaction. This indicates that the additional fea-
tures of proposed enhanced SOS have minimal impact on
the original service performance of the 52◦ North SOS.
4.2. Lessons Learned from Implementing SWE
In this section some of the practical challenges the authors
faced when using SWE are briefly described and how they
managed to overcome these issues.
A major hurdle for implementing a SWE-compliant WSN
is that SWE takes time to learn (i.e. a few months). The
SWE documentation is complex. An SWE implementer
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Fig. 7. A performance comparison between the 52◦ North SOS
and the enhanced SOS.
has to go through every part of the documentation or
a least the relevant sections in order to successfully get
a SWE-compliant WSN operational.
The process with moving a WSN towards SWE is found
to first focus on getting a SOS running. The next step is
understanding how to push a SensorML document into the
SOS using the sensor’s identifier (and also usually a seman-
tic web resource). Once a sensor is registered with SOS,
the sensor’s identifier is used to push a sensor observation
into the SOS. SOS will then use the sensor’s identifier to
automatically link observation data with the corresponding
SensorML document.
A major issue that hinders an SWE implementation is that
SWE is very pedantic with its expectations about data and
message formats. SWE requires specific data to be pro-
vided in a particular order with an explicit structure, and
also with an exact semantic resource. If any data or mes-
sage does not strictly adhere to these formatting rules, the
information is not recognized and causes errors. This lack
of flexibility can make implementing SWE a challenge. In
some instances SWE will raise the error to the user’s atten-
tion. On other occasions it may appear that data has been
stored correctly (as no errors are flagged). However, as the
format is incorrect, the data is unable to be retrieved. This
lack of storage safeguard can cause frustration if a signifi-
cant quantity of data has been incorrectly stored and can no
longer be recovered. Therefore, extensive testing of format-
ting is required before employing the system for use with
real data.
A further frustration with SWE is that SOS asks you to
describe a large number of characteristics. None of these
characteristics are optional. If you do not have this infor-
mation, you need to put in dummy values as placeholders.
Furthermore, SOS version 2.0 has a semantic web compo-
nent that requires you to define what the metadata is for
(semantic web resource). This may not be relevant in the
context of your system, or if you do not desire to use the
semantic web components. Additionally, it can be difficult
to locate some of these semantic resources.
JSF attempts to alleviate some of these issues as the SWE
API transforms the sensor data context of a deployment
into the SWE encoding (SensorML, O&M, etc.). As this
process is fully automated, it makes it easier to generate
the encodings. All you have to do is pass the parameters
(system name, process name, type of process) and the SWE
API creates the respective SWE-compliant document. This
ensures that data is properly formatted, data is not missing
(or dummy values are created), and semantic resources are
in place. This reduces the amount of work required and
the number of potential errors when operating the system.
5. Conclusion
The authors have been involved with multiple real-world
WSN projects including the SEMAT deployments at De-
ception Bay and Heron Island, the Digital Homestead de-
ployment at Rowes Bay, and the Federation Place WSN.
Each project differed in size, complexity, and application.
Different sensors were involved (i.e., temperature, humidity,
light, water pressure, and salinity) which provided differ-
ent data streams. Furthermore, each project used different
technologies to collect, log, transfer, and store the data.
A system has been required to speed up the deployment
process by automating common tasks, and a way to in-
tegrate, visualize, and analyze the data under a common
web-based user interface to support the decision making
processes of the end user.
This paper presented a system architecture based on the
SWE framework that facilitates the integration and interop-
erability of sensor data from dispersed WSN systems. The
authors proposed a middleware integration platform JSF,
which provides integration between the WSN systems and
the SWE framework. JSF manages adapted SWE specifi-
cations of an individual domain application to map, format,
and store its sensor and sensed data, and provides the abil-
ity to extract sensor data from a domain WSN application.
JSF transforms the data into the corresponding request doc-
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ument using its SWE API implementation, formats the data
(via a protocol binding), and then transfers the requested
document to the SOS. JSF facilitates the discovery and ex-
ploitation of sensor data from dispersed WSNs, and reduces
the amount of effort needed for developing a new WSN ap-
plication. As presented solution provides a standardized
framework, JSF can be reused for any type of WSN appli-
cation.
The paper also presented an enhanced SOS implementa-
tion for JSF that provides support for web-based data vi-
sualization and statistical analysis using open source freely
available technologies. Additional features were added to
the existing SOS web service interfaces that integrates data
from multiple sensors. The enhanced SOS provides func-
tionality for analyzing the data and allows the data and
the analysis result to be visualized graphically via a web-
based user interface. A performance analysis was con-
ducted to compare the impact that the additional function-
ality of the enhanced SOS has on the system compared to
a regular SOS implementation. The performance analysis
showed that the additional features have minimal impact on
the system performance, where each additional transaction
with 100 sensed data points increased its service response
time by approximately 0.5 s. Also some lessons learned
for implementing a WSN systems using SWE are briefly
described. Some impediments/difficulties for integrating
SWE are the initial learning curve, having to strictly adhere
to SWE document formats, having to supply extraneous
or unnecessary information, dealing with subtle errors in
SOS due to incorrect message formats or missing data, and
the tedious process of generating lengthy SWE-compliant
documents.
Future work involves extending the SOS server with
a semantically-enabled SOS server [22]. A significant is-
sue with the SWE architecture is the lack of semantically
rich discovery mechanisms. This makes it hard to explore
related concepts, subgroups of sensor types, or other de-
pendencies between the sensors and the data they collect.
Integrating SOS with semantic technologies will enable the
SOS server to query high-level knowledge of the environ-
ment as well as the raw sensor data. This can facilitate
knowledge sharing and exchange, and automated process-
ing of web resources.
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Abstract—Source localization problem consists of an ensem-
ble of techniques that are used to obtain spatial information
of present radiation in given medium of propagation, with
a constraint of the antenna geometry and the characteristics
of radiating sources. This condition gives multitude of cases to
study, hence several methods were proposed in the literature.
In this paper, a new algorithm for estimating the Direction of
Arrival (DoA) of narrowband and far field punctual sources is
introduced. By exploiting the spectrum of covariance matrix
of received data, the Lorentzian function on spectral matrix
to filter the eigenvalues is applied. This filtering process elim-
inates the eigenvalues belonging to signal subspace. Parame-
ters of Lorentz function are adjusted using first and second
statistics of eigenvalues. The algorithm requires the knowl-
edge of minimum eigenvalue and is performing when the di-
mension of antenna is relatively large which is confirmed by
several Monte Carlo simulations.
Keywords—array processing, Direction of Arrival, narrowband,
operator.
1. Introduction
In the context of array signal processing, source local-
ization [1] refers to the techniques implemented to detect
the location of present radiation in space. The origin of
these radiations is often considered to be punctual sources
due to far field assumption. The radius of propagation is
larger than the maximum antenna dimension [2]. These
techniques are valid for both electromagnetic and acoustic
waves, thus a source can be cosmic, a cell phone, a seismic
wave, sound in underwater and so on. Each source is char-
acterized by its frequency, for example it can be narrow-
band [2] or wideband [3]. Due to this diversity, this field
of research has attracted more interest due to its usefulness
in many applications including radioastronomy [4], geolo-
calization such as Global Positioning System (GPS) [5],
localization of mobile stations [6], radar and sonar [7] in
both civilian and military applications, underwater acous-
tics [8], medical signal processing and seismology.
Most of localization techniques exploit the space-time di-
versity, some methods are based on time delay, known as
Time of Arrival (ToA) [1]. This concept requires synchro-
nization between the transmitters and the receivers. Other
methods use the properties of propagating wavefront along
the antenna to calculate the Angle of Arrival (AoA) of
radiating sources [2]. This mechanism has the advantage
of no requirement of synchronization. In fact, to compute
the angle of single source, at least two aerials are needed
and the distance between them is a function of wavelength
of incoming wave. In case of multiple sources, the result-
ing wavefield is a superposition of each radiation. In this
situation, an antenna with larger number of sensors must
be used, thus the antenna beamwidth becomes narrower,
which gives the ability to separate two sources with small
angular difference.
In some cases, the problem of localization becomes diffi-
cult, for example, when some sources with different sig-
nal power are present, or the propagating signals have dif-
ferent carrier frequencies or when the source signals are
highly correlated [9]. The preliminary solutions are based
on preprocessing techniques [2] to decorrelate the wave-
forms. Additionally, some of these problems are caused
by the transmission channel. During the propagation many
phenomena can occur [10], for example a wave can be
scattered, when it hits objects having dimensions smaller
than the wavelength. This condition is known as Rayleigh
scattering [10]. When a wavefield enters a medium with
different electrical properties than the previous one, a re-
fraction occurs [10]. Another type of deviation can happen
when wave faces a smooth surface like metal, a reflection
takes place with the Angle of Incidence (AoI) equals the
angle of reflection in this situation.
The problem of localization depends on the environment
and search dimensions, one dimensional scan focuses only
on azimuth angle, this type requires only one dimensional
arrays geometry. For two dimensional localization, it is
mandatory to use two dimensional arrays such as circu-
lar [11], rectangular [2], L-shaped [12] and fractal arrays.
Concerning the mathematical aspects, some Direction of
Arrival (DoA) techniques are based on extracting signals
information from second order statistics [2]–[4], in the other
hand alternative approaches use high order statistics [13].
Covariance based methods (also called spectral matrix or
cross correlation matrix) can be divided into beamform-
ing and eigendecomposition techniques [2], subspace based
techniques have resolution power that is able to locate
sources under angular limit resolution of array. These tech-
niques use several spectral decomposition which are eigen-
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decomposition [2], QR or LU factorization and Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) [14].
Recent researches are focused on enhancing the eigen-
based approaches, when external factors impact the elec-
trical properties of sensors, such as temperature, humidity,
pressure and vibration. These variables generate coupling
effects between sensors, which degrade the performance of
DoA methods [15]. Another type of ongoing researches
offer a consistency of spectral techniques when the system
dimensions become larger [16], precisely number of sen-
sors and number of acquired samples. In the other hand,
as the dimensions tend to infinity, a computational com-
plexity increases, recent solution implements a non-regular
sampling of impinging signals, this method is known as
compressed/compressive sensing [17].
In this paper, authors introduce a new algorithm for localiz-
ing narrowband sources. Using the order of the covariance
matrix spectrum, a new operator that performs a filtering
operation on eigenvalues to isolate the noise subspace is
introduced which is orthogonal to signal subspace. From
mathematical definition this operator is the Lorentz func-
tion of Hermitian matrix, also known as Cauchy distribu-
tion [18]. This function needs adjustment of two param-
eters, the index of the function’s peak, which corresponds
to the smallest eigenvalue and the width that is related
to a threshold between signal and noise eigenvalues. The
authors use a theorem that offers a bound of minimum
eigenvalue using first and second order statistics of spec-
tral eigenvalues. The obtained bound is efficient, when the
antenna contains large number of sensors comparatively to
number of sources.
The proposed operator is validated through several Monte
Carlo simulations along with other techniques.
In the Section 2 of this paper, the statistical signal model
for DoA problem is described. In the Section 3, the au-
thor’s contribution is presented and in the Section 4 some
computer simulation results for performance analysis is
shown.
2. Statistical Data Model
Let us consider a geometry given Fig. 1 which consists of
one punctual radiating source and a uniform linear array of
N sensors placed along y axis, the system source antennas
are placed in the same horizontal plane (x,y,z = cte).
The sensors are located in the farfield region relative to the
source where the wavefront arriving are considered plane
waves. The uniform distance between the sensors is half the
wavelength of the emitting source d = λ/2 and the farfield
condition implies that the Line of Sight (LoS) r0 is much
larger than the length of the array r0  Lλ = (N−1)d. The
propagation model [21] is given by the equation:
~∇2~Ei(~r, t) =
1
c2
∂ 2~Ei(~r, t)
∂ t2 , (1)
where c denotes the velocity of propagation c = (µε)
−1
2
and ~∇2 is Laplace operator ~∇2 = ∆ = ∂
2
∂ x2 +
∂ 2
∂ y2 +
∂ 2
∂ z2 . By
Source
x
y
r c0 0= t
Farfield
region
N
N
( -3)N d 3
3
dd 2
2
1
Fig. 1. A farfield punctual source emitting radiations received
by a uniform linear array of sensors with azimuth angle θ relative
to the reference.
assuming the transverse mode of propagation by consid-
ering the z component of the wave vector ~Ei = (Ex = 0,
Ey =0, Ez 6= 0), the solution of the i-th source is given by:
Ez(~r, t)' si(t)e j(ωt−
~ki.~r) . (2)
The solution is only an approximation because the varia-
tion of the function si(t) is temporally negligible than the
oscillation of the carrier wave with frequency ω = 2pi fc
where c = λ fc [21]. This is also known as Slowly Vary-
ing Envelope Approximation (SVEA) in other fields. The
~ki is the wave vector having the components in spherical
coordinates as:
~ki =
−2pi
λi


sinϕi cosθi
sinϕi sinθi
cosϕi


, (3)
where (θi,ϕi) are the azimuth and elevation of the i-th
source respectively. The received wavefront is a superpo-
sition of all existing sources and the magnitudes of the
collected signals are proportional to ∑Pi=1 ~Ei. During the
acquisition time T = TsK, where Ts is the sampling period
and K is the number of measurements, the carrier frequen-
cies [21] terms are removed from the signals e jωt , so for
any measurement at instant t ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the signal at the
m-th sensor with position ~rm, is given by:
xm(t) =
P
∑
i=1
si(t)e− j
~ki.~rm +nm(t) , (4)
where nm(t) is the additive noise at the m-th sensor consid-
ered complex and random process with zero mean. While
considering the uniform linear array (ULA), the complex
vector of signals at instant t is:
x(t) = A(θ )s(t)+n(t) , (5)
with s(t) ∈ CP×1 is the source waveforms, n(t) ∈ CN×1
is the noise waveforms and A(θ ) ∈ CN×P is the steering
matrix given by:
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A =


1 . . . 1
e− jµ1 . . . e− jµP
. . . . . . . . .
e− j(N−1)µ1 . . . e− j(N−1)µP

 , (6)
where µi = 2pidλ−1 sin(θi) and θi is the AoA of the i-th
punctual source. The rank of the steering matrix A in Eq.
(6) is P such that the P sources are located in different
angular positions θi. In a compact form, the matrix of
received signals is X(t) = A(θ )S(t)+N(t) with the dimen-
sions X(t) ∈ CN×K , S(t) ∈ CP×K and N(t) ∈ CN×K . The
objective is to calculate a localization function f (θ ) from
which positions θi can be derived. Most of high resolu-
tion DoA techniques are based on second order statistics of
X(t), the spectral matrix < x(t)x+(t) > has the following
theoretical expression:
Γ = Γs +Γn , (7)
where Γs = AΓssA+, Γn = σ 2IN and Γss =< s(t)s+(t) > is
the correlation matrix of sources, if the waveforms are not
correlated, then [Γss]i j = δi jσ2i , where σ 2i is the power of
the i-th signal. In decreasing order, the spectrum of matrix
Γ is given as:
σΓ =
{
λ1 > λ2 > . . . > λP > λP+1 ' . . .' λN = σ 2
}
.
For example one of the high resolution DoA operators [19]
exploits the threshold between the smallest signal eigen-
value λP and the largest noise eigenvalue λP+1 to calculate
the projector in the noise subspace. This latter is obtained
by spectral decomposition, indeed the spectral matrix is de-
composed as Γ = UΛU+, where Λ is a diagonal matrix of
eigenvalues and U ∈ CN×N is the orthonormal matrix such
as ‖U‖F =
√
Tr{UU+}=
√
N. The first P columns of U
correspond to the largest eigenvalues to form a base of sig-
nal subspace Us ∈ CN×P and the remaining N−P columns
form a noise subspace Un = [uP+1, . . . ,uN ]. The projec-
tor into the noise subspace Pn ∈ CN×N is defined by the
relation Pn = UnU+n . For given steering vector a(θ ) with
testing angle θ ∈Ω = [θmin,θmax], the localization function
verifies
f (θ ) = a+(θ )Pna(θ ) =
{
0 if θ is DoA,
6= 0 otherwise. (8)
After performing an angular scan in the region Ω, the in-
dexes of the peaks of f (θ ) indicate the angles of arrival of
radiating sources.
3. Lorentzian DoA Algorithm
For real variable x∈R, the single peak normalized Lorentz
function centered at x0 is defined by [18]:
f (x) = 1
pi
β
(x− x0)
2 +β 2 , (9)
with parameters (x0,β ) such that:∫
R
f (x)dx = 1 .
At the abscissa x0, the function has maximum value of
f (x0) = 1β pi and equals half maximum at x = x0±β , which
makes the Full Width at Half Maximum (FWHM) to be 2β ,
the inflection points xc occur when the second derivative
is null:
∂ 2 f (x)
∂x2 =
−2β
pi((x− x0)
2 +β 2)2
+
8β (x− x0)2
pi((x−x0)
2 +β 2)3
= 0 .
(10)
This equation has a solution of xc = x0±
β√
3
, and f (xc) =
3
4piβ . Remark that at the inflection points the magnitude is
reduced, comparatively to the maximum value, by a factor
of 0.75.
Given the condition that the spectral matrix Γ is posi-
tive definite, then σΓ ∈ R+. Let us denote λ ∈ R+ the
scalar function representing the eigenvalues and λmin its
lowest value, the spectrum is considered to be binary
{λn ' λmin,λs}. We search for function that normalizes
the eigenvalue λmin and forces any signal eigenvalue λs
to zero, for this purpose the following version of Lorentz
function is used:
f (λ ) = 1
α(λ −λmin)2 +1
, (11)
where α is the scaling parameter of the width, this princi-
ple is illustrated in Fig. 2. From the Eq. (11), we need to
spread
FWHM =
2
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
min c max
(
(
–
)
+
 1
)
a
l
l
m
in
2
-1
Fig. 2. Lorentzian function with parameters {α,λmin} applied
to the spectrum of operator Γ.
calculate two parameters. The minimum eigenvalue can be
estimated using the power method, first the largest eigen-
value λmax = λ1 is computed, next the λmin is calculated
using the condition number τ = λmax/λmin. The random
vector φ ∈ CN×1 with norm ||φ ||∞ = 1 is chosen, and for
m≥ 2 the following iterations are performed:
φm+1 = Γφm,
µm = φ+m φm+1,
φm = φm+1φ+m+1φm+1
.
(12)
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When µm → λmax, the minimum eigenvalue is calculated
by the following equation:
λmin =
λmax
τ
=
λmax
||Γ||2||Γ−1||2
. (13)
The inversion of spectral matrix is required, the scaling
parameter α is necessarily related to a threshold λc that
differentiates the two subsets {λs,λn}. The authors impose
the condition that at abscissa λc, the function equals the
value ε = 10−3, this is equivalent to α(λc−λmin)2 ' ε−1,
consequently the chosen scaling parameter is given by:
α =
ε−1
(λc−λmin)2
=
103
(λc−λmin)2
. (14)
The threshold λc is proposed as the bound of minimum
eigenvalue λmin, this theoretical bound can be calculated
using only the trace of spectral matrix. The theorem of
the smallest eigenvalue bounds [20] is based on mean and
standard deviation of σΓ, before announcing the theorem,
the following variables are defined:
< λ >= tr(Γ)
N
=
1
N
N
∑
i=1
Γii , (15)
∆λ =
√
< λ 2 >−< λ >2 =
√
tr(Γ2)
N
−
(
tr(Γ)
N
)2
. (16)
Using these two statistics and for matrix with real eigen-
values, the bounds for smallest and largest eigenvalues are
given by the Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: For Hermitian matrix Γ∈CN×N (Γ+ = Γ), the
extremum eigenvalues are bounded by:
(
< λ >−∆λ
√
N−1
)
≤ λmin ≤
(
< λ >− ∆λ√
N−1
)
,
(17)(
< λ > + ∆λ√
N−1
)
≤ λmax ≤
(
< λ > +∆λ
√
N−1
)
.
(18)
The proof is presented in [20]. The smallest signal eigen-
value satisfies λs > λmin, for a relatively large array
(N > 2P). The proposed threshold is given by:
λc =< λ >−
∆λ
√
N−1
. (19)
Note: While having only two sensors Γ ∈ C2×2 and even-
tually single source the eigenvalues are exactly λmin =
< λ > −∆λ , λmax =< λ > +∆λ . This special case can
be used in the presence of single source P = 1 and N sen-
sors where the N/2 spectral matrices Γi for i = 1, . . . ,N/2
can be calculated, and theirs eigenvalues using the above
equations are computed.
After describing the theoretical expressions for the couple
{α ,λmin}, the Lorentz function is now adaptive to the vari-
ation of parameters describing the physical system. The
application of the proposed function on self adjoint oper-
ator Γ acts on its eigenvalues f (Γ) = U f (Λ)U+, then we
have the following result.
Proposition: Given Hermitian matrix Γ = K−1XX+, The
Lorentz operator defined by:
f (Γ) = (α(Γ−H)2 + IN
)−1
(20)
is an approximation to the projector into the noise subspace,
with H = λminIN , α = 10
3
(λc−λmin)2
and λc =< λ > − ∆λ√N−1 .
Indeed, developing the above equation, based on the rela-
tion f (Γ) = U f (Λ)U+, yields to the decomposition:
f = U IN
α(Λ−Γ0)2 + IN
U+ =
N
∑
g=1
ugu
+
g
α(λg−λmin)2 +1
=
P
∑
i=1
uiu
+
i
α(λi−λmin)2 +1
+
N
∑
j=P+1
u ju
+
j
α(λ j−λmin)2 +1
'
N
∑
j=P+1
u ju
+
j ' Pn . (21)
From numerical experiments, the obtained operator is not
an exact a projector because either the noise eigenvalues are
not normalized and have some fluctuating errors (example
f (λn) = 0.98), or the signal eigenvalues are not totally an-
nihilated (e.g. f (λs) = 10−3). The Algorithm 1 summarizes
the proposed method.
Algorithm 1: Lorentzian operator algorithm
Input: Γ ∈ CN×N (N > P).
1. Compute λmin using power method for example.
2. Compute statistics of operator Γ
m =
Tr(Γ)
N
and s =
√
Tr(Γ2)
N
−m2.
3. Compute parameters λc = m−
s
√
N−1
,
α =
103
(λc−λmin)2
and H = λminIN .
4. Calculate Pn = (α(Γ−H)2 + IN)
−1
.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Simulation Results
In this section, some computer simulations using a config-
uration of Uniform Linear Array of N = 11 sensors consid-
ered isotropic and identical are performed. The available
range for this type of array is Ω = [−pi2 ,
pi
2 ].
The distance between the sensors is half the wavelength
of the carrier waves. It is assumed the presence of P = 4
narrowband and far field sources impinging on array from
directions −80◦, 15◦, 20◦ and 56◦, the number of samples
is set to K = 200. The signals are chosen to be ergodic
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complex and zero mean random processes with uniform
power of 1 W. In all the tests, the perturbative noise is ad-
ditive and also complex zero mean random process uncor-
related between the sensors and independent of s(t). The
noise power is derived from SNR = 20log( 1σ ). Figure 3
represents an average of L = 100 Monte Carlo trials of
Lorentzian localization function, with N = 11, P = 4, θ =
[−80◦,15◦,20◦,56◦], K = 200, d = λ/2, s(t)∼ C N (0, I4)
and SNR = 5 dB.
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Fig. 3. Average of 100 trials of the proposed operator.
The obtained result proves that the function has the abil-
ity to separate the sources. In the second test, the pro-
posed operator with several spectra is compared. The au-
thors choose a critical situation where the transmitted sig-
nals and noise signals are equipowered SNR = 0 dB. Fig-
ure 4 presents an average of L = 100 trials of Lorentzian
function against the first three spectra, which are based
on subspace computation with L = 100 trials, N = 11,
P = 4, θ = [−80◦,15◦,20◦,56◦], K = 200, d = λ/2 and
s(t)∼ C N (0, I4) and SNR = 0 dB.
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Fig. 4. Lorentzian operator against three different spectra.
Lorentzian spectrum is compared with Multiple Signal
Classification (MUSIC) method [23], Ermolaev and Gersh-
man subspace [19] with parameter m = 10, and orthonor-
malized propagator [24]. Schmidt’s method and Ermolaev
subspace are identical in this case. They are successful
in locating all angle indexes, the OPM could locate the
farthest source at 80◦ but did not separate sources at 15◦
and 20◦. Lorentzian spectrum identifies all the AoAs with
higher magnitudes.
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Fig. 5. Lorentzian operator against three different spectra.
In Fig. 5 the presented function is compared with three
other techniques (with the same conditions as in Fig. 4).
The authors realize that Capon’s method (MVDR) [2]–[10]
failed to separate sources at 15◦, 20◦ and the shape of
its localization function is similar to the beamforming [2]
in these conditions. Maximum entropy method [10] with
parameter l = 1 and Lorentzian are approximately the same.
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Fig. 6. Probability of success of Lorentzian operator.
To evaluate the performance with respect to the dimen-
sion of the antenna in Fig. 6 the probability of success
over L = 100 trials with varying number of sensors starting
from N = 4 is presented, with L = 100 trials, P = 4, θ =
[−80◦,15◦,20◦,56◦], K = 200, d = λ/2, s(t)∼C N (0, I4)
and SNR = 5 dB. The result informs that the bound λc
in Eq. (27) is not valid unless the number of sensors N is
about triple the number of sources P, in fact the probability
of detection reaches 90% when N = 12.
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4.2. Experimental Results
In this second part of performance evaluation, the res-
olution power of the proposed operator using underwa-
ter acoustical data obtained from linear array of hydro-
phones [25] is tested. The received echoes are generated
by two acoustic sources. The Table 1 summarizes the data
description.
Table 1
Description of experimental underwater acoustic data
Data Value
Number of hydrophones N = 6
Interelement spacing d = 0.9 m
Length of the array Lλ = 4.5 m
Number of samples K = 4096
Sources wavelength λ = 5.32 m
Average power of data X(t) Tr(Γ)/N = 0.99 W
Eigenvalues of Γ [4.3648, 1.4835, 0.1225,0.0220, 0.0051, 0.0007]
Number of sources P = 2
Angular step
dθ = 0.1◦ in the range
[−pi/2, pi/2]
Estimated noise power σ 2 ' 0.0376 W
Estimated powers σ 21 ' 0.7188 W and
of sources σ 22 ' 0.3092 W
Estimated signal to noise SNR1' 25.62 dB and
ratios SNR2' 18.30 dB
The noise power or minimum eigenvalue is computed using
the equation:
σ2 =
1
4
6
∑
j=3
λ j . (22)
The powers of sources are calculated using the beamform-
ing as:
fBF(θ ) = 1N2 a
+(θ )Γa(θ ) , (23)
where the values of two largest peaks are approximately
equal to the powers of sources σ 21 and σ
2
2 . The imple-
mented steering vector a(θ ) ∈ C6×1 is defined by the rela-
tions:
{
a(θ ) = e−2pi jrT λ−1 sin(θ)
r = [0.00,0.90,1.80,2.70,3.60,4.50]
.
The seven DoA spectral techniques are applied to identify
the locations of the acoustic sources which are the Lo-
rentzian operator, MUSIC projector [23], Orthonormal
Propagator (OPM) [24], Ermolaev and Gershman op-
erator [19], Maximum Entropy Method (MEM) [10],
where the operator is computed using the fourth column
of Γ−1, Minimum Variance Distortionless Response op-
erator (MVDR) [2]–[10] and partial propagator method
(PAR) [26]. Figure 7 presents the obtained results [25].
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Fig. 7. DoA localization functions f (θ ) of acoustic sources from
experimental data.
The Lorentzian localization function has the highest val-
ues of peaks and the majority of the spectra present some
deviations of locations. To quantify these fluctuations, in
Table 2 the estimated DoAs using peak detection algorithm
are presented.
Table 2
Estimated DoAs of acoustic sources
Spectral technique
Source 1 Source 2
θ1 [◦] θ2 [◦]
Lorentzian –37.70 58.60
MUSIC –37.00 54.00
OPM –37.00 54.20
EG –37.00 54.00
MEM –40.80 53.80
MVDR –37.50 58.20
PAR –36.90 53.60
Mean values –37.70 55.20
The three subspace techniques MUSIC, OPM and EG
operators identify the acoustic sources with same values
of θ1 and θ2, the MVDR and Lorentzian functions present
the same result where the angular position of the second
source is different than the result of the first three subspace
techniques by 4◦. This difference is reduced for the partial
propagator method where θ2 = 53.60◦. The Maximum En-
tropy Method is efficient if the fourth column is chosen as
reference, however the peak of the first source is deviated
by approximately 3◦.
5. Research Perspectives
The proposed approach for DoA problem is based on band-
pass filter using single shaped Lorentzian function. The
similar solution was proposed using Gaussian function with
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exponential operator [27]. Another solution consists of us-
ing Heaviside function as low pass filter of eigenvalues,
one of the approximations is given by the equation:
f (λ ) = 1− 1
e−α(λ−λc) +1
, (24)
where λc is the threshold such as λP+1 < λc < λP and α is
a constant that controls the rate of decay as illustrated in
Fig. 8 where larger value gives fast transition.
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Fig. 8. Approximation of rectangular function f (λ ) applied
to eigenvalues of spectral matrix Γ with parameters λc, α =
{1, 3, 5, 7, 9}.
As perspective, a theoretical value of threshold λc and
fast approximation of exponential operator e−α(Γ−λcIN ) may
provide accurate results comparatively to conventional DoA
spectra.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a new high resolution algorithm for narrow-
band source localization problem using large array is pro-
posed. The main idea consisted of applying Lorentz func-
tion on spectral matrix of received data such as low pass
filter, where the cut-off value is the threshold between sig-
nal and noise eigenvalues, this mechanism requires a priori
knowledge of minimum eigenvalue, which is the index of
function’s peak. Theoretical threshold and scaling parame-
ter of Lorentz function were derived using first and second
order statistics of eigenvalues using only the trace.
Several computer simulations demonstrated the resolution
power of the proposed algorithm when the dimension of
the antenna is relatively large.
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Abstract—The article presents numerous problems with
standby batteries used in telecommunications systems, with
a particular emphasis placed on the assessment of their real
capacity. The methods used to evaluate the technical condition
of batteries and to measure their real capacity are presented.
Also, the a new test device which measures the actual battery
capacity is presented. The said measurement is based on the
discharge test method and is performed with the use of a new
TBA-A automated test unit. The article is targeted for elec-
tronic designers, managers and telecommunications hardware
maintenance personnel, as well as for other telecommunica-
tions systems experts.
Keywords—battery capacity measurements, maintenance, tele-
communications systems.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, a high degree of reliability is an aspect of key
significance in the delivery of telecommunications services.
This means that telecommunications systems should remain
powered even if a mains failure occurs. Lead-acid batteries
are the most popular back-up energy source and it is ex-
pected that such batteries will remain in use for a long time
to come, in spite of introduction, to the market, of new bat-
tery types and new reserve power source chemistries. The
above means that the problem of maintenance of good lead-
acid batteries still remains an issue of high importance.
2. Batteries Used in
Telecommunications Systems
Telecommunications systems should ensure continuous
availability of services. This applies both to commercial
services offered to the general public, and to emergency
services supplied over critical infrastructure networks. That
means that telecommunications systems should be powered
without any interruptions.
Telecommunications systems are powered by installations
relying on rectifier-based power systems (PS) and a num-
ber of batteries connected in parallel. The batteries should
be able to provide backup for a given telecommunications
system for a few hours or more. When the mains voltage is
present, PS supply energy to the telecommunications equip-
ment and to the batteries associated therewith. Under such
conditions, the rectifier provides float voltage (about 54 V)
to the batteries, preventing their self-discharge.
Figure 1 shows three basic configurations of power systems
dedicated to use on telecommunications sites. The simplest
structure, and thus the least reliable, is presented in Fig. 1a.
In the case of a mains failure, the powered equipment (PE)
is supplied from the battery until either the battery dis-
charges or the mains voltage is restored. Additionally, it
should be borne in mind that if rectifier or battery main-
tenance is performed, an additional, transportable backup
power source has to be connected. The configuration shown
in Fig. 1b is more reliable due to the added redundancy. It
allows to disconnect one rectifier unit or one battery with-
out any disturbances to the PE supply. The configuration
shown in Fig. 1c is the most reliable, but at the same time
the most expensive. It relies on two independent power
systems and two independent mains networks.
In order to increase the level of AC voltage supply reliabil-
ity even further a backup diesel generator may be connected
to the system via an automatic switch [1], [2]. Batteries are
the source of power during mains failures. Therefore, their
key features should include long battery life, low overall
costs of purchase and operation, as well as safety of use.
It should be noted that battery weight is not an important
factor in this particular case. Hence, lead-acid batteries ful-
fill all the requirements mentioned above. They are char-
acterized by high power density of up to 0.1 kWh/kg and
by low internal resistance. Despite of advanced technolo-
gies relying on other battery chemistries, i.e. NiCd, NiMH,
Li-Ion and Li-Po, lead-acid batteries remain the primary
standby source of energy in telecommunications power sup-
ply systems.
3. VLRA Batteries
Flooded lead-acid batteries have been used in the telecom-
munications sector for about 100 years now. Because of
their open design, they must be installed in separate, ven-
tilated and secured rooms. The first leak-proof, valve-
regulated lead-acid (VRLA) batteries first appeared in the
1960s in the USA, but they only began to be used on a wider
scale in Europe in the 1990s. It is difficult to say if VRLA
batteries are significantly superior to the flooded variety,
but they offer certain advantages which have contributed
to their widespread use. VRLA batteries have a shorter
lifetime, but their maintenance cost is lower. They do not
require separate, special rooms, but there is a need to pro-
vide float voltage thermal compensation. VRLA units can
be installed in rooms used by staff or other electronic equip-
ment, but in a designated area. Adequate room must be
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Fig. 1. Examples of power system configurations.
provided around the battery system to allow maintenance,
including the exchange of blocks/cells. The area required
for installation of VRLA batteries can be smaller than in
the case of their flooded counterparts. The battery can be
placed vertically or horizontally and can be stacked with
the use of a dedicated rack enclosure.
All lead-acid batteries have a defined maximum storage
time of six months at the temperature of 18–30◦C. By the
end of that period, batteries should be either installed or
charged. Therefore, it is important to schedule the delivery
of batteries to the site and their date of production as close
as possible to the date of actual installation.
Two primary types of VRLA batteries exist, relying on gel
and AGM technologies. In the case of the gel technol-
ogy, silica dust is added to the electrolyte, forming a thick
putty-like gel. The Absorbed Glass Mat (AGM) technology
employs a fiberglass mesh between the individual battery
plates. The mesh absorbs and retains the electrolyte. Both
technologies offer similar advantages and disadvantages in
comparison to conventional battery types.
4. Battery Condition Monitoring
To improve operational functionality of batteries and to pro-
tect them against damage, the use dedicated equipment is
required. A relevant device can be integrated within the
power supply system, may constitute a part of the battery
itself, or may be installed as additional, stand-alone test
equipment [3], [4]. The following parameters can be mon-
itored with use of this equipment:
• battery voltage,
• charging/discharging current,
• ambient temperature,
• all cell/block voltages and temperatures,
• AC ripple current and voltage.
Voltage and temperature measurements pertaining to all
cells/blocks enhance assessment of battery cell balancing
and help detect damaged cells. Comparisons of battery
string temperatures, in turn, allow for detection of thermal
runaways.
Specialized circuits are used in order to improve cell voltage
balancing. They reduce cell voltage if it is higher than
the prescribed limit value while the battery is charging.
Balancers are also used in which the cells with the lowest
voltage levels are charged with higher current in order to
manage cell voltage more effectively [3], [5], [6].
Generally speaking, monitoring systems are capable of in-
dicating the actual condition of the batteries, but do not
reflect their actual capacity.
5. Key Parameter Measurements
All battery manufacturers recommend periodic check of
batteries condition including:
• leaks,
• verification of cell interconnection resistance,
• battery capacity measurements.
Battery maintenance always requires that periodic site vis-
its be paid (even on unmanned sites), but attempts are made
to minimize the maintenance time. It is recommended that
only a few measurements be made to evaluate the condition
of a battery, with a particular focus on its capacity and the
remaining lifetime. With the accuracy of all crucial pa-
rameter measurements, the time and cost of tests, as well
as the need to mitigate test-related risks taken into consid-
eration, one may conclude that no single method meeting
all the requirements exists [4], [7], [8]. Therefore, internal
resistance measurements and discharge tests are among the
most commonly used procedures. The properties of such
methods are described in detail below.
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6. Internal Resistance Measurement
The common internal resistance measurement procedure is
cheap, fast and safe, and usually does not require that the
battery undergoing the test be disconnected from the power
system. It relies either on the analysis of DC pulses or
on resistance measurements performed with the use of AC
signals [5], [9]. The resistance reflects not only the battery
capacity, but also:
• grid corrosion,
• loss of active material from electrodes,
• possible sulfation,
• temperature increase,
• internal short circuit,
• other cell failures.
Measurement equipment manufacturers recommend that
a principle be adopted in line with which a 20% loss of
battery capacity is related to a 25% increase in the resis-
tance of each cell. It is also estimated that the loss of
battery capacity is related to only 40% of the total inter-
nal resistance (for the entire battery). Additionally, internal
battery resistance may vary by approximately ±10% for
the same type. Therefore, it is recommended to measure
each cell and the entire block separately, and directly at
battery terminals. If the measurements are performed pe-
riodically under the same conditions, i.e. temperature and
charge level, it is possible to identify deterioration of the
cells based on historical data analysis. Unfortunately, re-
search fails to prove that the internal resistance test may
be considered an equivalent of the battery capacity mea-
surement that relies on the discharge test. Hence, it is not
commonly used to actual battery capacity assessment.
7. Discharge Test
The discharge test is the only reliable method used to eval-
uate actual battery capacity with a high degree of accuracy.
It takes a long time to perform – even up to 20 hours. While
the measurements are performed, the battery needs to be
disconnected, which results in a considerable depletion of
the amount of reserve energy available on site. A few test
procedures and equipment setups may be employed, which
can provide results characterized by a varying degree of ac-
curacy. The cost of the measurements performed may vary
as well. Examples of the test procedures are presented
below.
7.1. Discharge Test Built into the Power System
Modern DC power systems offer an advanced functionality
enabling the efficient use of energy from VRLA batteries,
referred to as the “battery test”. This function is capa-
ble of controlling the powered equipment based on prior-
ity levels assigned (e.g. critical equipment and non-critical
equipment). The test may be run periodically, e.g. after
a prolonged mains failure, or on-demand. Charging volt-
age may be boosted or reduced.
The test is based on a simultaneous, partial discharge of all
batteries (up to 50% of the batteries’ design capacity). Dur-
ing the test, the output voltage of the power system’s rec-
tifier is temporarily reduced to the pre-programmed value,
e.g. 44 V. If the batteries manage to keep the telecom-
munications equipment powered up, over a pre-defined pe-
riod of time, with the voltage remaining higher than the
rectifier-provided value, the test result is deemed positive.
If the battery voltage drops below the rectifier-fed value,
over a period of time that is shorter than specified, the test
result is considered negative.
Power consumption of modern telecommunications systems
remains constant. Therefore, the amount of energy drained
from batteries can be measured quite easily. Interpretation
of test results is much easier when cell voltage of all bat-
teries is monitored. This solution is simple and cheap to
implement, but the capacity of batteries available at the fi-
nal stages of the test is unpredictable. Therefore, the real
battery capacity is unknown.
7.2. Discharge Test Using Battery Discharger
In order to determine the real capacity of a battery,
a discharge with the current of 0.1 C is usually performed
[10]–[12]. There are many types of battery dischargers,
but in general, all of them are passive and rely on the
transformation of power into heat. The majority of modern
battery dischargers are equipped with monitoring circuits
that measure the following parameters: battery voltage, in-
dividual cell voltage, discharging current and battery tem-
perature. Hence, they are capable of working out the bat-
tery capacity. It is possible to set threshold values for the
parameters referred to above, and to program the discharger
to discontinue the test if one of them is reached. This sim-
plifies the entire test procedure and allows to protect the
battery from damage caused by excessive discharge. An
example of the discharger unit that can sink up to 120 A
Fig. 2. Battery discharger with nominal current of 120 A.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Stand-alone battery ATE: (a) up to 160 A and (b) up to 50 A.
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Fig. 4. Power system with ATE (a) stand-alone TBA160-IŁ and (b) built-in test functionality (TBA-ST).
from 48 V batteries is presented in Fig. 2 [13]. However,
tests performed with the use of such devices are time con-
suming, as the full test procedure requires that several steps
be completed:
• disconnecting the battery to be tested from the power
system,
• charging the battery to its full capacity,
• discharging the battery,
• re-charging the battery to restore its operational pa-
rameters,
• reconnecting the battery to the power system.
Unfortunately, the return charging process is not monitored
and battery energy efficiency cannot be assessed. Each
stage of the process requires that battery connections be
altered, and that the measurements be activated manually.
One full battery test cycle takes approximately one day
to complete, which means that in the case of sites with
two batteries, the power system operates with a reduced
energy capacity for two days. Therefore, often only partial
discharges are performed.
It needs to be added that large amounts of heat are dis-
sipated in the course of the test, which increases ambient
temperature in the room and, of course, the battery temper-
ature. The above means that not only all discharge energy
is lost, but that air conditioning systems in use on the site
consume more power as well.
7.3. Battery Test Automation
The entire battery test cycle can be automated, thanks to
the use of sophisticated testers, either of the stand-alone
variety, or ones that are built-in to the power supply sys-
tem. TBA-IL is an example of a stand-alone portable device
designed to measure real capacity of batteries at telecom-
munications sites (Fig. 3). The device can be connected to
the battery and the power system via universal flexible ca-
bles, or with the use of a dedicated terminal box. As men-
tioned above, the battery undergoing the test needs to be
disconnected from the power system. TBA160-IŁ was de-
veloped within the framework of a project titled “The new
generation of VRLA battery control devices for telecom-
munications power systems”, and was subsidized by the
European Union under the Innovative Economy Operating
Program [14].
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The test unit can operate in a full automatic mode (Auto-
mated Test Equipment) – Fig. 4a. All input parameters
and measurement results are stored in its memory and may
be transferred to a local or remote PC by means of the
LAN-WAN interface. The unit presented in Fig. 3 is very
efficient – energy discharged from the battery is returned
to the power system and less than 5% energy is dissipated
in the form of heat. The enclosure of the device is also
smaller than that of a typical resistive discharger.
The ATE test device may be integrated with the power sys-
tem, as shown in Fig. 4b. In this case, it is supervised
by a power system controller and managed by the main-
tenance center. In such a case, the ATE comprises only
a bidirectional power converter and relevant sensors. There-
fore, the built-in test device can be a few times cheaper
than the stand-alone version. Automated battery switch-off
functionality is another of the advantages of this particular
configuration. No manual operation is required, and the
switching-off process is initiated by the power system con-
troller. However, there are certain restrictions inherent in
this solution. The only drawback is the fact that the built-in
unit is capable of controlling batteries with the maximum
capacity of 1000 Ah.
8. Universal Module for
Charging/Discharging Batteries
The National Institute of Telecommunications (ITL) boasts
extensive experience in designing devices for testing bat-
teries used at telecommunications sites. ITL cooperates
with the Electronic Power and Market (EP&M) company.
A consortium led by ITL won a contract from the Na-
Fig. 5. Universal battery charging/discharging module.
tional Centre for Research and Development for designing
a “Control systems for telecommunications site energy re-
serve solution - SKOT”. TBA-A with the module shown in
Fig. 5 was developed within the framework of this project,
which can serve as a TBA-ST device integrated with the
power system. There are similar solutions available on the
market, i.e. [15], but ITL TBA-ST ATE offers optimized
functionality. The TBA-ST is dedicated for medium size
telco sites and it is capable of driving/sinking current of
up to 50 A. When combined with the TBA-W control unit,
the TBA-A module forms another ATE unit. Its firmware
was also developed under the project in question.
The core of the TBA-A has the form of a bidirectional addi-
tive/subtractive power converter based on T1–T4 switching
transistors, L1 inductor and C1–C2 capacitors. The switch-
ing process is controlled by the PWM circuit at the fixed
frequency of 35 kHz, enabling output voltage to be regu-
lated, and the energy from the tested battery (either Bat-
tery 1 or Battery 2) to be transferred to the power system or
in the reverse direction. The charging and discharging cur-
rent is stabilized by using a high accuracy LEM current sen-
sor. The input and output voltage is monitored for exceed-
ing threshold values. The power conversion is controlled
by the STM32F103VE 32 bit microcontroller. It gener-
ates PWM waveforms, reads battery voltage, power system
voltage, each cell/block voltage and charging/discharging
current from the LEM transducer. It also offers an external
communications interface. All parameters and operational
modes can be transferred remotely via the RS232/485 in-
terface. The serial port is used also for downloading the
measurement results. The TBA-A is also equipped with an
additional RS232 port used for servicing. More details are
presented in Fig. 6 and in [16].
The firmware of the device presented above constitutes is
core component, as it controls the bidirectional converter.
It was developed based on the authors’ extensive experi-
ence. The first power converter dedicated to charging/dis-
charging batteries was developed by ITL 15 years ago and
weighed approximately 10 times more than the current so-
lution [6], [17]–[19]. The use of fast MOSFET transistors
with internal diodes, the 32-bit ARM-based microcontroller
and sophisticated firmware has enabled to develop a very
small, light and powerful unit.
Voltages of the batteries (B1 and B2 in Fig. 6) and cells
(a1. . .a4, b1. . .b4) are measured with the accuracy better
than 1%. The real capacity calculated in relation to the
capacity at 20◦C is saved with the accuracy 2%. In ad-
dition, the device calculates works out the energy of the
discharged battery. The test device offers high energy ef-
ficiency. About 95% of the discharged energy is returned
to the power system to supply telecommunications equip-
ment. As no heat is generated, the measurement condi-
tions remain very stable. The room itself and especially
the battery are not exposed to any additional heat, which
means that the air conditioner operates under stable ambi-
ent conditions. The TBA-ST ATE device was developed
under the “Monitoring system for telecommunications site
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energy reserve solutions – SKOT” project. The project was
implemented by the National Institute of Telecommunica-
tions and the EP&M company, and was co-financed by the
European Regional Development Fund under the Innovative
Economy Operational Program.
9. Deep or Partly Battery Discharge
The primary objective of the study is to evaluate the energy
reserves stored in the battery. It is usually assumed, in the
case of telecommunications power systems, that the battery
remains operational if its capacity (Q) is not lower than 80%
of rated value at the discharge current of 0.1 C. That is why
the designed battery capacity is 20% greater. It enables to
achieve the required capacity within the power system at the
end of the battery’s lifetime declared by its manufacturer.
Due to the adverse operating conditions, some batteries
fail to achieve the average declared life expectancy, but
a significant portion of them remain operational until the
end of the specified period. It should be noted that the
efficiency of each battery is determined by the condition of
its weakest cell.
Figure 8 shows the results of checks performed on various
batteries rated at 48 V/1000 Ah after operation lead times.
The drawings present cell voltages during the discharge and
charge test under the same conditions. The cell discharge
cut-off voltage was set at 1.80 V. If the voltage of any of
the tested cells drops below that value, the battery discharge
stops.
The initial charging current was set at 0.1 C (100 A), the
final charging battery voltage was 56.00 V, and the highest
cell voltage was set at 2.38 V. If either the voltage of the
battery reaches 56.00 V or any the voltage of any of the
cells is equal to 2.38 V, the charging current is decreased
and the charging process is stopped.
The discrepancies between cell voltage characteristics
shown in Fig. 8 tend to increase with time of use, and
with the reduced battery capacity. It can also be noted that
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Fig. 8. The results of inspection of various 48 V/1000 Ah batteries.
in the first stage of the discharging process, cell voltages
are usually similar and do not suggest a failure of any of
the cells. Moreover, the voltage of smaller capacity cells
recorded during the first stage of discharge process may be
higher than that of higher capacity cells. Such a case is
presented in Fig. 9. The cell with the lowest voltage in the
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Fig. 9. Detailed discharge characteristics of a 700 Ah battery.
final stage of the discharge phase (after 360 minutes) has
the smallest capacity. But in the first stage of the discharg-
ing process, the voltage of this particular cell was good, and
no evidence enabling to predict its reduced capacity existed.
This means that is not easy, or even impossible, to evaluate
battery parameters, especially its capacity, based on the cell
voltage chart during the first stage of the discharge process.
The National Institute of Telecommunications [20] has
performed research focusing on this particular issue, but
no effective algorithm to predict the battery capacity based
on short discharge results only has been developed yet.
10. Conclusions
Currently, the discharge test method remains the only re-
liable way to evaluate the real capacity of batteries. Such
a measurement method renders results with the accuracy
of ±2%, a level that is unattainable in the case of re-
maining methods. Unfortunately, measurements made with
dischargers or stand-alone testers are expensive and time
consuming. The use of a measurement module that is in-
tegrated with the power supply system can significantly re-
duce the cost of testing batteries to the level that is com-
petitive with alternative solutions.
The method presented and the ATE testers do not reduce
the measurement lead time, but offer the opportunity to
stop the test at any given moment, e.g. if the continuity of
power supply is jeopardized. Once the test is completed, the
battery is reconnected to the power system and the reserve
power is increased.
The measurement module enables also to disconnect the
battery remotely, should a need arise.
These benefits make the application of the ATE system
very profitable in the case of remote telecommunications
facilities.
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